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Introduction

Over the past decade there has been increasing
recognition at the multilateral level of the human rights
implications of climate change. The Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) have
addressed the relationship between human rights and
climate change and have called for a human rightsbased approach to guide measures addressing climate
change (see e.g. UNHRC 2009; OHCHR 2009; OHCHR
2010; OHCHR 2015). In its Fifth Assessment Report in
2014, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), building on previous reports, clearly linked climate
change to human activities and detailed the various ways
climate change adversely affects human well-being. In
2016 the Paris Agreement entered into force, and within
a year counted 195 signatories, signifying their commitment to combating climate change. However, only three
years later, the United States announced its intention to
withdraw from the Agreement.
The intervening years were beholden to growing climate
crisis protests, new climate justice movements, and civil
disobedience in protest against governmental actions
on climate change that allegedly were too little, too late.
Others demonstrated against the alleged unjust distribution of the costs of climate change measures. The effects
of climate change and the efforts to prevent or adapt to
its effects are strongly contested, with specific efforts to
combat climate change being denounced by one side or
another, including authoritarian leaders.
The human rights framework is increasingly brought
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forward as an instrument to combat the climate crisis.
Environmental and climate organizations have taken
up the discourse and tools of human rights to address
climate change issues, using human rights arguments
in court cases and public campaigns. In December 2019
the Dutch Supreme Court rejected the government’s
cassation appeal against a 2015 landmark decision of
the Hague District Court, ordering the state, as requested
by the Urgenda Foundation, to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by at least 25 per cent (compared to 1990)
by the end of 2020. The Supreme Court’s decision was
based on the Paris Agreement and on the Dutch state’s
obligations to protect the life and well-being of its
citizens, particularly under Article 2 (the right to life) and
Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life)
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). These state
obligations include taking suitable measures if a known
real and immediate risk to people’s lives or welfare exists.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that the ECHR in
its Article 13 provides that national law must offer an
effective legal remedy against (imminent) violations of
the Convention and that therefore national courts must be
able to provide effective legal protection. In other words,
the courts had not inappropriately entered the political
domain – as the state had argued –, they just properly
circumscribed it.
Human rights organizations, meanwhile, are turning their
attention to the climate crisis. There is now a widespread consensus that the enjoyment of human rights
will be both directly and indirectly affected by climate
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change. Common examples are sea level rise, temperature increases, and extreme weather events affecting
the rights to health, food, water and life amongst others.
These effects will not be felt equally: the more vulnerable
segments of the global population will be hit hardest.
Indeed, UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston, in a report on
climate change and poverty (UNHRC 2019), highlighted
an “increasing risk of climate apartheid”. Alston linked
the growing threat of climate change to risks to civil and
political rights, and even to democracy and the rule of
law. As the effects of climate change worsen, community
discontent, inequality, and deprivation increase.
With the worlds of climate crisis activism and human
rights protection becoming increasingly intertwined, their
value for and impact upon one another deserve closer
inspection. The language, policies and (campaigning)
strategies around climate change and human rights are
still in development. As the need for action becomes more
urgent and climate change issues become more dire, it is
important to critically examine the role of human rights in
climate change policies and activism.
A prominent question arising from the alleged convergence of these policy areas is whether human rights
activists should take a proactive or a reactive approach to
climate change and related issues. Some see the dangers
of a climate crisis as an all-embracing threat necessitating an all-hands-on-deck approach and close cooperation of civil society to secure the protection of justice
and human rights, including those of future generations.
Others advocate a more traditional, reactive approach,
arguing that the human rights framework is better
suited to protect against actual or imminent violations in
specific situations.
These approaches do not exclude each other but do play a
central role in current debates for human rights organizations and activists around the world. What is clear is that
regardless of one’s position, the worlds of human rights
and climate change are increasingly engaging with each
other, leading to new insights, (re)definitions, and new
challenges for human rights and environmental activists.
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The first two essays examine the opportunities, threats,
and difficulties at the nexus of human rights and climate
change. The authors discuss the applicability of the
human rights framework to the problems that arise with
climate change. Several environmental organizations have
taken up the language and framework of human rights
to further their goal. While many have welcomed this
development, it invites scrutiny as well.
Ashfaq Khalfan and Chiara Liguori set out how climate
change impacts human rights, from vulnerable populations to intergenerational inequity, and make a case for
action from the human rights movement. “The climate
crisis threatens a huge range of human rights. It exacerbates inequalities and its effects are disproportionately
felt by those who are more vulnerable, marginalized
and/or subject to discrimination.” The benefits of a
human rights lens, they argue, are threefold. First of all,
it strengthens the climate justice movement. Second,
they argue that international human rights law provides
more extensive legally binding obligations than environmental law, which will help states design ambitious and
effective policies. It also keeps the focus on states and
corporations, rather than individuals. The third benefit is
the range of human rights tools of both pursuing action,
and monitoring outcomes. The accountability and remedy
mechanisms of human rights law are stronger than
those of environmental law and will be more effective in
obtaining results.
Providing a counterpoint, Eric Posner’s essay warns
that rather than providing an extra stimulus to combat
climate change, the human rights framework brings its
own problems. He points out that the current approach to
climate policy, given the unique nature of the problem,
is through the framework of international agreements.
Introducing the human rights framework might negatively
affect existing efforts of combating climate change. The
lawful basis for a human rights approach is missing, and
applying the human rights framework is “more likely to
distract from the effort to combat climate change than
advance it.” It might even damage existing efforts, as
major polluting countries, such as China, might find
grievances with a more human rights-based approach:
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“These countries, and others like them, will not only resist
the use of human rights language, but, more practically, they will worry that if a climate treaty is seen as
a vindication of human rights, or an implementation of
human rights commitments, then claims based on those
underlying human rights will be more difficult to resist.”
Posner furthermore points out that the instruments used
by human rights organizations are ill-equipped to combat
climate change. There is a role for human rights however:
Posner suggests focussing on the human rights abuses
that are the result of states responding to the challenges
of climate change.
Where the first two essays focus on whether climate
change is and should be a human rights concern, the
following four examine recent human rights approaches to
climate change issues in specific policy areas: displacement and migration, subnational entities, companies, and
(strategic) litigation.

often prepared to go much further than the nation state
in combating climate change”. Particularly, the impact
cities could have on effectiveness, legitimacy, and
appropriateness of climate action are noted. However,
as Oomen points out, local and regional human rights
responsibilities are usually not addressed in international
law. This might be changing as “today’s world abounds
with ‘frontier cities’ seeking to explicitly assert responsibility for international human rights law”. Oomen divides
the subnational authorities in the ‘more-than-willing,
the willing and the less-than-willing’ to combat climate
change. The more-than-willing are showcases for what
is possible, providing avenues that might strengthen
human rights law in relation, but not exclusive, to climate
change. The willing cities are targets, where large gains
could be made through networks and alliances. For the
less-than-willing entities, Oomen argues that explicating
the responsibilities of subnational authorities by human
rights and climate change activists is especially important to ensure compliance and timely action.

Jane McAdam and Sanjula Weerasinghe illustrate some
of the difficulties around the interactions between climate
change and human movement (used here as an umbrella
term for displacement, migration, and relocation), and
critically examine concepts such as the term ‘climate
refugee’. Their essay charts the normative developments
regarding climate change and human movement, and the
duties of states when movement occurs within and across
borders. The accumulation of knowledge and awareness
has led to two instruments adopted by the UN in 2018: the
Migration Compact and the Refugee Compact. McAdam
and Weerasinghe conclude that there are existing
frameworks and tools that can prevent movement where
possible and manage it where unavoidable. The standards offered by the human rights framework can assist
in assessing risk and policy responses related to climate
change.

Sara Seck’s essay discusses the role of multinational
business enterprises by charting the evolution of the
responsibilities of businesses regarding climate and
human rights. Starting with the 2007 Caring for Climate
initiative, guidance for businesses on human rights
and climate change is emerging and will continue to
develop, regardless of the involvement of human rights
actors. Noting that “it is crucial that human rights NGOs
not ignore the emergence of business guidance tools
in the climate context”, engagement to further develop
these tools by human rights actors might determine the
strength of social norms and in turn, inform legal responsibilities. Seck draws attention to the fact that the human
rights community “has for the most part utterly failed to
meaningfully engage in efforts to develop useful tools”,
due to their scepticism over non-binding guidance tools.

Barbara Oomen suggests that subnational entities,
especially cities, are important stakeholders and should
be targeted by human rights actors. Charting the
growth and importance of subnational authorities for
the global problem of climate change, she notes that:
“it is clear that all types of subnational authorities are

In her essay on climate change litigation and its limitations, Annalisa Savaresi discusses the accelerating trend
of using human rights in strategic climate litigation.
Human rights are turned to as “a gap-filler to provide
remedies where other areas of the law do not”. So far, the
focus of these cases is on states, with only a few cases
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targeting non-state actors only. Savaresi notes that in
recent years “human rights arguments have been increasingly used to prop up those based on private or public
law”. In some cases, the emphasis has been placed on
a failure to act resulting in human rights violations.
Analyzing some key cases, Savaresi states that “far
from treating climate change as a series of individual
transboundary harms, therefore, applicants (…) are
arguing that climate change should be averted because
it systematically threatens the enjoyment of human
rights”. Although human rights are used as an avenue of
exploration in the courts, Savaresi notes several limitations. While several court cases have been won, this has
not always led to tangible results on the ground. Human
rights law is “no replacement for effective legislation
concerning climate change mitigation, and human rights
remedies are no replacement for tort-like liability for
climate change impacts”.
A central theme coming out of the discussions on climate
change and human rights is the concept of climate
justice. How should it be defined, and what is its relation
to human rights? The final four essays center on justice,
focusing on social justice and climate change, the potential for new justice movements, and the emerging concept
of intergenerational justice.
In his essay on justice delayed Stephen Humphreys
considers how climate change is changing the landscape
of time, justice, and the experience of living in a world
of uncertainty. Indeed, it is the delay between cause
and effect, between our actions and their outcomes, and
between harms and redress, that has formed the obstacle
to the achievement of justice and redress with regard
to climate change. So where do we find climate justice?
Humphreys looks at the notion of equity and its history,
arguing that “[t]he emerging law of climate equity cannot
and will not by itself bridge the expansive sea between
climate justice, however we conceive it, and a law that
remains fundamentally supportive of the pollutive and
distributive effects of climate change”. It is here that
human rights might supplement equity, since we have
reached the point where once speculative harms are now
palpable, with a growing number of actors standing up
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to claim their rights and seeking redress in the face of
massive injustice.
Elizabeth Dirth’s essay examines the interlinkages
between the impact of climate change, social justice, and
human rights. Noting the tension between these concepts,
Dirth highlights three examples, arguing that “in the
face of these new and diverse challenges resulting from
climate change and how we deal with it, perhaps utilizing
a human rights framework does not go far enough to
understand the injustices caused or exacerbated by
climate change”. So how can socially just solutions be
found? Dirth suggests that two fundamental challenges
have to be overcome. First is the necessity to fully
understand what climate change problems and solutions
entail, and to acknowledge the complex on-the-ground
realities behind abstract solutions. The second challenge
is that in order to incorporate justice into climate policies
and programmes, they need to be locally relevant and
context-sensitive. Indeed, Dirth states that “the fact that
justice is a word with fluid and dynamic meanings, means
that it has come to incorporate environmental needs,
struggles and climate injustice in a way that human
rights narratives and groups have struggled with”.
Anna Schoemakers points out that the notion of ‘climate
justice’ is expanding and is now being used by young
people around the world to fight for a secure future. In
her essay, Schoemakers discusses how the term climate
justice is being coopted and redefined by a young climate
movement: “Climate justice matters because today’s
generation is the last generation that can take steps to
avoid the worst impacts of climate change.” Schoemakers
further makes the case that the burgeoning movements
for social and climate justice might be game changers,
as the reasons for their existence will only grow as
climate change effects become more visible and have
higher impacts. So how can human rights actors support
these new movements? Schoemakers suggests it is best
to facilitate the movements, sharing experience and
resources where possible. Organizations such as Amnesty
International and Greenpeace can operate from their
own strengths and provide space and expertise for the
activists where possible.
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In the final essay Bridget Lewis examines the turn from
intra-generational justice towards intergenerational
justice: “Given that future generations have not contributed to greenhouse gas emissions and have no say in how
we choose to combat global warming, limiting their ability
to enjoy their human rights and forcing them to deal with
the consequences of our actions represents intergenerational injustice.” But is the human rights framework a
fitting instrument for this? Theoretically, argues Lewis,
there are duties that correspond with the consequences
of our past and current actions that could be expanded
towards future generations. However, these rights and
duties of future generations are currently not enshrined
in international or domestic (human rights) law. Furthermore, one of the more important tools of the human rights
framework – its claims-based approach – does not fit the
intergenerational nature of climate change: “The cumulative, transnational and long-term impacts of greenhouse
gas emissions create challenges for proving that a
particular state’s conduct has caused a given interference with human rights.” While the existing human rights
framework will struggle with these claims, Lewis outlines
possible ways forward. Through expanding the scope of
states’ duties for example, or through expanding rules
of legal standing on behalf of future persons. A notable
development is that human rights language and principles are already being employed, particularly by young
people. As with Schoemakers’ showcase of burgeoning
movements, these are developments that have been set in
motion and will continue to progress, requiring adaptation
by human rights actors.
The essays in this volume were written in 2019, before
the Dutch Supreme Court announced its judgement in the
matter between The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Climate Policy) and the Stichting
Urgenda (Urgenda Foundation).
The views expressed in the contributions that follow are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
positions of Amnesty International, its Dutch section or
the Strategic Studies Team. The editors wish to thank
Jeroen Teitler for his editorial assistance.
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Ashfaq Khalfan & Chiara Liguori

*

Amnesty’s approach to climate change
and human rights

The climate crisis is one of the most critical threats
to human rights faced by humanity. The human rights
movement, including Amnesty, has a significant
contribution to make to the wider climate justice
movement.
Introduction
It is a truth not yet universally acknowledged that climate
change poses a severe threat to human rights. This is
something Amnesty, and our partners in the human rights
movement, need to change. Not only that, but we need to
bring our perspectives, our constituencies and our tools to
the struggle to protect humanity from the climate crisis,
to ensure that we come out of this crisis with a world in
which all parts of humanity can not only survive, but also
thrive.
The climate crisis threatens a huge range of human
rights. It exacerbates inequalities and its effects are
disproportionately felt by those who are more vulnerable,
marginalized and/or subject to discrimination. While it
is mostly caused by the emission of greenhouse gases by

*
The authors would like to thank Ajay Taheem for his
research assistance, Iain Byrne, Lucy Graham, Mark Dummett,
Clare Algar and the editors for their review of this essay, the many
colleagues from the Amnesty movement, Amnesty’s external
Reference Group on Climate Change and Human Rights which
provided inputs on Amnesty’s policy, and partners in the Human
Rights and Climate Change Working Group who blazed this trail
many years before Amnesty and whose insights we have built
upon.
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developed countries since the industrial revolution, its
harshest effects are and will be felt mainly by people in
developing countries.
In this essay, we will describe the extent of the threat the
climate crisis poses to human rights. We will then discuss
key features of states’ obligations under human rights
law to prevent the situation from getting worse, to help
those affected and to provide remedy. We will address the
corporate human rights responsibilities in the context of
the climate crisis. We will then move from a legal analysis
to one of strategy. Why should we take a human rights
lens to climate change? Why should Amnesty itself get
involved, and if so: how?
Climate change’s human rights impact
Climate change has made extreme weather events such
as heatwaves, storms and drought much more likely
(Carbon brief 2019). It also causes, or contributes to,
environmental changes that occur gradually over the
course of a prolonged period of months to years, such
as desertification, sea level rise, glacial melt and ocean
acidification (UNFCCC 2012). These effects undermine
human rights such as the rights to water, food, housing,
health, adequate standard of living, and life. In 2019,
cyclones in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe killed
more than a thousand people, and almost 4 million were
affected, being displaced and losing access to schools,
hospitals and sanitation (see Chagutah 2019; OCHA
2019a). If unchecked, climate change will continue to
blight the lives of hundreds of millions of people.
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The World Health Organization (WHO) projects that
climate-caused undernourishment is expected to lead
to 7.5 million children suffering from stunted growth
by 2030, rising to 10 million by 2050 (WHO 2014: 80).
The World Food Programme expects that climate change
could lead to a 20 per cent increase in global hunger and
malnutrition by 2050 (WFP 2016: 1).
A 2°C rise in global temperature would lead to more than
1 billion people suffering from a severe reduction in water
resources (IPCC 2014). A temperature rise to 1.5°C – which
is currently the ‘least worst case’ scenario – would reduce
this number by half but still leave hundreds of millions
affected (IPCC 2018a: 179). The WHO predicts that
climate change is expected to cause 250,000 additional
deaths per year between 2030 and 2050 due to malaria,
malnutrition, diarrhoea and heat stress (WHO 2014).
Climate change disproportionately affects those already
subject to discrimination including, for example, on the
basis of gender, class, ethnicity, age, and disability (IPCC
2014). Women are on average fourteen times more likely
than men to die or be injured due to a natural disaster
– although this discrepancy is lower in situations where
women face lower levels of gender inequalities (UN
Women 2014). Children bear a disproportionate burden
of climate-related impacts, for example with 88 per cent
of the diseases attributable to climate change affecting
children under the age of five (WHO 2009: 46). Because
Indigenous peoples heavily rely on the natural environment for their livelihoods, housing, medicines and cultural
identity, and because they often live in areas prone to
climate-related disasters due to a history of expropriation and forced evictions, they are among the groups
suffering the most from climate impacts (UNHRC 2017).
People with disabilities have a heightened vulnerability to
climate disasters compared to people without disabilities
and their needs and voices are generally neglected in
disaster risk reduction strategies. For example, a recent
survey found that almost 80 per cent of people with disabilities wouldn’t be able to evacuate immediately without
difficulty following a disaster (UN 2018: 15).
Climate change will have clear intergenerational inequi-
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ties. Current generations of children and youth, as well
as future generations will live in a world that is more
precarious for their rights, and they will bear the costs of
coping with the damage.
Climate change will perpetuate the effects of colonialism. In spite of decolonization, the empires (and their
offshoots) struck back; effectively colonizing much of the
atmosphere. The USA, UK and Germany have per capita
greenhouse gas emissions, between 1751 and 2018, that
are six times or more the global average. Russia, Canada
and Australia have 4-5 times the global average (Hansen
& Sato 2016).
As a result of climate change, the economic output of the
warmest countries has significantly reduced: India’s by
31 per cent compared to what would have been the likely
case without climate change. At the same time, some of
the coldest countries have benefitted, for example Norway
by a 34 per cent increase in economic output, while the
figure for the Netherlands is 7.9 per cent (Diffenbaugh &
Burke 2019).
The above projections of the impacts on human rights
are based on an increase of up to 2°C over pre-industrial
temperatures. It is not the worst-case scenario, nor is it
even the most likely outcome based on current projections. Unless there is a rapid phase-out of fossil fuels
and other sources of greenhouse gas emissions, current
projected national plans (officially termed ‘Nationally
Determined Contributions’ under the Paris Agreement),
even if fully implemented, would put us on a course to
reach a 2.9 to 3.4°C increase by 2100, and continue to
rise (WMO 2019). Given that governments often cannot
be trusted to implement their plans, we may be looking
at apocalyptic consequences. A world that, for example,
reaches 4°C warming may make large parts of the world
uninhabitable, such as the tropics, southern Europe,
low-lying islands and coastal regions.1 In such a
1
See e.g. Vince (2019). It must be emphasized that given
the uncertainties involved, including around potential feedback
loops, this particular example can only be treated as a possible
outcome, rather than an accurate prediction. The situation may
well be better, or much worse.
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situation, humanity would somehow have to completely
revise its political, social and economic structures and
accommodate itself primarily in densely populated cities
in the relatively small number of countries in temperate
zones that could sustain life. If it could not, billions of
people would be facing unbearable conditions, often
incompatible with life.2
State obligations
States have three levels of duties relating to climate
change. First, under international human rights law,
states have obligations to protect people from harm
caused by conduct or omissions within their territory or
jurisdiction, whether committed by state or non-state
actors, including businesses. The foreseeable adverse
effects of climate change on the enjoyment of human
rights give rise to states’ duties to take all reasonable
steps to the full extent of their abilities to prevent this
harm (UNHRC 2016). This means that states need to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions within the shortest
possible time frame both nationally and through international cooperation and assistance (CESCR 2018a; OHCHR
2019a). A failure to do so represents a violation of states’
human rights obligations.
The IPCC has shown that it is feasible for states to
collectively reduce greenhouse gases within thirty years
to a level that would keep the global temperature to
no more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (IPCC
2018b). This requires that greenhouse gas emissions
are reduced by 45 per cent globally from 2010 levels by
2030, and to net zero by 2050. It would be unreasonable
to demand that developing countries make this transition
at the same pace as developed countries. Thus, developed
countries, which currently emit approximately one third
of global emissions and that have greater resources and

2
Vince (2019) quotes Johan Rockström, director of the
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research as saying: “It’s
difficult to see how we could accommodate eight billion people
or maybe even half of that. There will be a rich minority of people
who survive with modern lifestyles, no doubt, but it will be a
turbulent, conflict-ridden world.”
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technological capacity,3 should therefore move to zero
carbon emissions by 2030 or as soon as possible after
that. This still requires developing countries to reduce
their emissions by at least one third below 2010 levels by
2030, and moving to net zero by 2050 – a deeply difficult
task, for which many will require significant financial
assistance and technical cooperation. Wealthier countries are required under their obligations of international
cooperation (as per Article 2.1 of the ICESCR) to respond
to developing countries’ requests for assistance to meet
their own transition targets.4
Second, all states must also adopt all necessary
measures to assist affected people in adapting to the
unavoidable effects of climate change, thus minimizing
the negative impact on their human rights, as well as
ensuring remedy for the harms caused. Three distinct
but overlapping duties apply here: i) states that have
a greater responsibility for the climate crisis – due to
their higher than average per capita current and past
emissions – are jointly responsible for ensuring remedy to
affected people based on the extent of their contribution
to this harm;5 ii) wealthier states are also responsible
for providing assistance to people at risk or already
affected by climate impacts on the basis of obligations
of international assistance and cooperation; and iii) all
states are responsible for the realization of rights of those
living within their jurisdiction, and thus need to take
steps to safeguard the rights of affected people, request
the necessary assistance from other states and demand
remedy from those most responsible.
Third, respect for and protection and fulfilment of human
rights must be central in the design and implementa-

3
Center for Global Development (2015)
4
For an elaboration of the legal basis for such obligations, see
de Schutter et al. (2012).
5
The International Law Commission Articles on State
Responsibility state that where several states separately carry
out internationally wrongful conduct that contributes to causing
the same damage – such as where several states contribute
to polluting a river by the separate discharge of pollutants –
“the responsibility of each participating State is determined
individually, on the basis of its own conduct and by reference to
its own international obligations” (ILC 2001: 125).
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tion of all policies and measures aimed at addressing
climate change. In particular, states must ensure that
measures intended to protect people from the effects
of climate change do not result in the violation of other
human rights. They must avoid using the response to
climate change to justify violations of human rights. And
they must also ensure that the transition towards more
resilient and zero-carbon societies safeguards the rights
of affected workers and communities and is an opportunity to correct existing imbalances in terms of enjoyment
of and access to rights. For example, forest conservation
projects must contribute to strengthening the rights of
Indigenous peoples, not result in the eviction of forest
dwellers from their ancestral land (Amnesty International
2018). Carbon taxes must reduce inequalities rather than
deepen them, thus putting the burden primarily on fossil
fuel corporations and wealthier consumers whilst protecting the access of low-income groups to affordable energy
(Naidoo 2018; Amnesty International Canada 2019).
These examples also illustrate the importance for states
to respect and facilitate the rights to information and
participation in decision-making of all affected people,
as well as their right to access effective remedies for
human rights abuses. Ensuring that climate decisions
are taken with the full and meaningful participation of all
concerned people, and particularly those most affected
by climate impacts or by proposed climate mitigation
measures, will lead to more effective and ambitious
action that responds directly to the needs and demands of
those affected.
Corporate responsibilities
States have an obligation to protect all persons against
human rights harms caused by third parties, including
businesses. States must adopt and enforce regulations
on companies, do so without undue interference from
corporate actors and ensure that corporations respect
them. Alongside that, businesses themselves are also
duty-bearers with a responsibility to respect human
rights. These include extensive responsibilities to assess
the impact of their activities on human rights, to put
measures in place to prevent negative impacts, to make
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such information and efforts public and to remedy human
rights infringements and abuses.6 Such responsibilities
extend to human rights harms resulting from climate
change. One implication is that businesses are required
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to the greatest
extent feasible. In particular energy producers and
providers must expeditiously phase out the use of fossil
fuels in favour of clean energy produced in a manner
consistent with human rights. Financial institutions
should phase out investment in fossil fuel activities.
Companies must also refrain from other human rights
abuses linked to their operations, such as the use of child
labour in supply chains for materials required for the
production of rechargeable batteries needed for electric
vehicles or energy storage (Amnesty International 2016).
Why should we take a human rights lens?
A not entirely unreasonable question is what is the
practical utility of taking a human rights lens to climate?
Should we not just push for full implementation of
international climate and environmental law, which more
explicitly addresses climate issues than human rights
law? Given the fact that many states already pay no more
than lip service to their human rights obligations, is it
really effective to link these with climate action?
We argue that there are at least three broad benefits of
adopting a human rights lens. The first is to add numbers
and pressure to the existing climate justice movement.
Solving the climate crisis requires radical state action in
a two- to five-year timeframe whilst overcoming one of the
most deep-pocketed and powerful lobbies – the fossil fuel
industry. It needs the world’s most powerful and diverse
people’s mass movement ever assembled. Many people
are deeply committed to values such as dignity, equality
and justice for all, and a subset of such people specifically identify with human rights as the value system and
vocabulary for such values. The climate crisis threatens
these values, and indeed threatens to reverse many of the
human rights gains of the last century. It makes a differ6
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, Principles 22 and 31.
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ence to some that government failures are characterized
as human rights violations rather than simply bad policy
or poor environmental stewardship, and it helps show who
the villains and victims are. Therefore, to advocate on
the basis of human rights – as opposed to environmental
protection – and emphasizing the impact on people itself
helps humanize the problem and motivate a segment of
society to engage more deeply in climate activism. This
may motivate some decision-makers to adopt decisions
in favour of human rights consistent climate action,
either due to the intrinsic argument we are making, or by
showing that climate action has broad support in society,
not just among environmentalists.
Second, human rights perspectives can provide additional
arguments to strengthen the climate justice struggle.7
International human rights law provides more extensive
legally binding obligations than environmental law,
obligations that can be used to demand effective climate
change policies and measures. For example, international
environmental law does not oblige states to take any
particular steps to substantively reduce emissions. Under
the Paris Agreement, states determine themselves the
extent of their commitment to reduce climate change by a
particular amount. In contrast, as discussed under ‘State
obligations’ above, under human rights law, states are
required to take all feasible steps within their available
capacity to reduce emissions, help people to adapt to
climate change and ensure remedy for violations. International human rights law thus, properly interpreted and
applied, places reasonable boundaries on the margin that
states have for discretion on issues ranging from emissions reductions to paying for the losses and damages
that people and countries suffer due to climate-related
impacts.8 In other words, while states, and their voters
(if they listen to them) can broadly determine how they

7
The Climate Justice Syllabus, a project endorsed by the
Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice, defines climate
justice as the recognition that climate change is not only a
question of emissions reductions and our physical environment,
but also a political issue, an ethical issue, and a social issue (see
https://demandclimatejustice.org/).
8
For further information on loss and damage from a human
rights perspective, see Amnesty International (2019a).
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address climate change, and have a wide range of options
for doing so, human rights law helps in shaping ambitious and effective policies by setting certain boundaries
and minimum floors for these actions.
Human rights law also helps to keep the main focus on
governments and corporations, rather than on individual
consumers. This, we argue, is beneficial. While individuals obviously have moral and personal responsibilities
to reduce their carbon footprint, it would be naïve and
inequitable to put the burden mainly on them. Rather,
those who have the power to design the systems we live
in, to allocate public resources and to design regulations,
should be held to account for their conduct, rather than
individuals who often have limited control over how they
can live their lives in a way that does not harm others,
particularly if they are disadvantaged.
The most important human rights perspective in this
context is to help shape the content of climate action.
As noted above under ‘State obligations’, climate action
without attention to human rights has the potential to
cause significant harm. By taking into account human
rights values such as public participation, accountability, equality and non-discrimination, climate action is
more likely to get buy in from the public and be effective,
than if it takes a purely emissions-reduction focused
approach. Human rights will also become increasingly
important as a counterpoint to policy approaches and
political narratives that use the threat of climate change
as a justification to violate civil and political rights, such
as freedom of expression and association, or adopt even
more restrictive policies against particularly vulnerable
groups such as refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers.
As the window of opportunity to limit even more catastrophic levels of global heating narrows with every
passing day, it is possible that states will resort to
desperate measures that could result in violations of
human rights (UNHRC 2019: 65-66). In so doing, they
could adopt the view that violating some people’s rights,
for example those of Indigenous peoples to clear land for
carbon removal projects, is a lesser evil that is justified for the greater good and grounded in the need for
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fast action. However, Amnesty opposes such utilitarian
approaches based on the clear international law position
that reducing emissions can and must happen in full
compliance with human rights standards. While rapid
emissions reductions will certainly require restrictions
in some lifestyle areas and consumption, significant
inconvenience and major policy shifts, such steps can be
implemented in ways that impose burdens primarily on
corporations and higher-income groups whilst restricting
activities that are not essential for the realization of
human rights. Similarly, governments can and must carry
out emissions reductions in a way that ensures everyone
has access to a reliable and sufficient supply of energy to
realize their human rights.
It should be recognized that many states, despite having
become party to the relevant human rights treaties, will
contest that these legal obligations apply to the climate
crisis, or even in some cases exist at all. In these cases
simply citing these obligations will not be sufficient.
Sustained, patient pressure and coalition-building will
be required. However, the fact that there is a strong legal
basis for these demands is useful for advocacy purposes.
It helps civil society groups align their advocacy across
coalitions and indeed is a tool to ensure that we are
consistent and principled in our advocacy, and therefore
more credible and persuasive. A critical example is the
Declaration of the Peoples’ Summit on Climate, Rights
and Human Survival, which was signed by over 400
organisations around the world representing diverse
environmental, women’s rights, Indigenous, trade union,
social justice and other human rights causes.9

ized countries that have benefitted economically for over a
century from growing emissions - while suffering far less
from its ill-effects – should not be content to be global
freeloaders, with the costs borne by people in poorer
countries. Rather, people living in such countries should
insist that their governments act with decency and honour
in doing the right thing for people elsewhere (Amnesty
International 2019b).
The third benefit of adopting a human rights lens is the
range of human rights tools at our disposal, including
litigation, supranational and domestic scrutiny by
human rights bodies and monitoring through the use of
rights-compliant indicators and benchmarks. Human
rights accountability and remedy mechanisms are
stronger than those available under environmental law,
both with regard to procedural and substantive rights.
For example, global and regional human rights mechanisms provide for assessment of individual and/or group
complaints and regular periodic review by independent
treaty monitoring bodies, whereas most environmental
treaty bodies do not. Human rights bodies have increasingly been addressing climate change as a human rights
issue.10 Relatedly, the human rights movement, often
working with other disciplines such as scientists and
economists, excels at determining whether state actors
are responsible for particular forms of misconduct and
what they need to do to make amends.

Clearly, asserting legal claims alone would be foolhardy
– much of the battle will be in the court of public opinion.
But the moral underpinnings of these legal standards can
be of great help in winning this battle. It is an intuitive
argument to say that states should not harm people, both
within and outside their borders. Nor should they allow
companies under their regulation to do the same. Similarly, it is a compelling argument that wealthy industrial-

What is the relative weight of these three contributions?
We posed this question in an audience survey at the
Peoples’ Summit on Climate, Rights and Human Survival
in September 2019, which brought together over 200
activists from a range of regions and backgrounds. 23
per cent of those responding selected ‘Numbers and
pressure’, 47 per cent selected ‘Human rights perspectives’ and 30 per cent selected ‘Human rights tools’. Time
will tell as to who was right, but strategies that employ
aspects of all three are likely to be more successful.
Amnesty’s experience of working on human rights for
nearly six decades has demonstrated that strong research

9 For more information on the Declaration see https://www.
climaterights4all.com/

10 For an overview of UN human rights treaty body statements
on climate change, see CIEL & GI-ESCR (2019).
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grounded in solid legal arguments and linked to effective
campaigning, mobilization, litigation and advocacy can
make a real difference.
Why is Amnesty getting involved and how so?
In September 2019, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights Michelle Bachelet warned the UN Human Rights
Council that climate change is the greatest ever threat to
human rights. Earlier in the year, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and extreme poverty had challenged
the human rights community, including NGOs, to take
much more bold and innovative steps to face the extraordinary challenge of the climate crisis (UNHRC 2019).
Amnesty International, as the largest global human rights
organization, with a supporter base of 8 million people
and a presence in over 70 countries, including increasingly in the Global South, must respond to this challenge.
Since 2015 Amnesty has been escalating its level of
engagement to work on the climate crisis, and it is now
ready to fully throw its weight in support of the climate
justice movement.
Amnesty’s strategy on climate change and environmental
degradation, requested by the organization’s main
decision-making forum in 2017 and adopted in April
2019, is based on a theory of change that focuses on national strategies to pressure governments to uphold their
obligations, weaken the power of the fossil fuel industry,
defend the right to peaceful protest and participation,
and support a just transition to a new energy economy
that protects human rights and leaves no one behind.
As a result, Amnesty is working to achieve four main
objectives. First, it has commenced work to pressure
national governments, through research, campaigning,
litigation and advocacy, to reduce emissions in a fast
and fair (i.e. human rights consistent) way. In particular,
Amnesty is planning to escalate the pressure on wealthy
industrialized countries which bear most responsibility for
the climate crisis and have the most available resources
to address it. In some of these countries and in partnership with other groups, Amnesty will identify and demand
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one or more key policy changes related to climate mitigation together with a just and human rights-consistent
transition. In so doing, our decision-making will be guided
by an assessment of the most critical relevant issues in
the country, and of where Amnesty is best placed to make
a contribution as part of the wider climate movement.
Such policy changes should be on issues where it is clear
that lack of political will (rather than scientific or technical uncertainty) is the issue. Advocacy in developing
countries will include demands on emissions reductions
and just transition but will also focus on pushing the
leaders to demand more concrete action and support from
wealthy industrialized countries for mitigation, adaptation
and address loss and damage. Amnesty has also engaged
in international standard setting, for example through
engaging in advocacy with others for the inclusion of
human rights language into the Paris Agreement and for
stronger human rights standards. It continues to advocate for urgent, effective and human rights-consistent
climate action at international decision-making forums
on climate.
Second, Amnesty will expose corporations which are
fuelling the climate crisis, mobilize action to stop them
and call on them to phase out fossil fuels. Amnesty will
also continue to call for companies to ensure that the
transition to clean energy is undertaken in a just fashion.
In March 2019 Amnesty launched an Ethical Battery
Campaign (Amnesty International 2019c). This campaign
challenges industry leaders to ensure that the shift to
green energy – which relies on batteries – does not cause
or contribute to human rights abuses or environmental
harm.11 The campaign aims for governments to legally
require electric vehicle companies and battery manufacturers to produce an ethical battery by 2024, which does
not harm human rights or the environment.
Third, Amnesty has started to mobilize its own supporters
and people interested in human rights and sharing

11 For example, companies must phase out any use of fossil
fuels to produce batteries and must refrain from the use of
child labour in the supply chain for materials required for the
production of batteries. See Amnesty International (2016).
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similar values, and encouraged human rights groups that
have not engaged in-depth in climate change to join the
struggle for climate justice. It has mobilized its members
to participate in key global moments for action, such as
during the youth strikes or climate protests around major
international events. It is also mobilizing, campaigning,
producing human rights-focused outputs, as well as
human rights education tools, to illustrate the link
between the climate crisis and human rights to a wider
public. These will amplify the stories of individuals and
communities affected by the climate crisis and who are
driving the battle for climate justice.
Finally, Amnesty will continue to support human rights
defenders and communities to campaign for a safe
climate and participate in relevant decision-making
processes. Building on its work on human rights
defenders in general, and environmental human rights
defenders in particular, Amnesty will enhance its work
in support of all those taking non-violent direct action,
including civil disobedience, against the climate crisis.
These include community and grassroots groups, young
people, Indigenous peoples, minority communities and
communities discriminated on the basis of work and
descent. Amnesty will actively stand with them in national
and international level initiatives, and support them when
they are criminalized, attacked and publicly smeared.

Conclusions
The climate crisis is one of the most critical threats
to human rights faced by humanity. The human rights
movement, including Amnesty, has a significant contribution to make to the wider climate justice movement.
Simply framing the crisis as a human rights crisis will
by itself make only a modest difference. However, with
determination, sound strategy and humility we can use
our strengths to support and be guided by those who are
at the front line of the climate crisis, and who have been
leading the struggle for climate justice for a long time. We
can add numbers and pressure for action, use additional
tools and share important perspectives that can help
build the case for fast but fair action to reduce emissions
in a manner to that protects the human rights of all.

There is certainly an open question as to what tactics to
use – are our traditional forms of research, advocacy and
campaigning sufficient? At the Peoples Summit referred to
above, an audience survey of participants asked what the
most important tactics on climate ambition were. These
were the results from the options provided: 1). Changing
public opinion (25%); 2). Civil disobedience (19%);
3). Litigation (17%); 4). Divestment (14%); 5). Mass
demonstrations (9%); 6) Consumer boycotts (9%); or 7)
something else (7%). The first, third and fifth are established methods for Amnesty, whereas the second is much
rarer, and the sixth not something Amnesty has ever done.
We will have to discuss whether our existing methods are
sufficient, and maybe to deepen them, or whether we are
well placed to consider new tactics to have more impact.
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The climate change problem has in recent years been
described as a ‘human rights’ problem rather than simply
an environmental disaster that threatens humanity.
However, the human rights perspective contributes little
to the challenge of combatting climate change, and is
more likely to cause harm by complicating negotiations
and provoking a backlash from states that are sensitive
about human rights claims.
Introduction
Climate change is one of the most difficult challenges
ever faced by humanity. Yet the world has converged
on an approach to tackling this problem, and the only
question is one of mustering the political will. The
approach is, by now, well known: it involves countries
committing to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions
through international agreements, based on scientific and
economic estimates of the likely costs of mitigation and
the benefits from slowing the climatic changes that have
already begun to plague us. The approach has not, so far,
relied on human rights law or norms, at least not in any
recognizable sense. But in recent years, some people have
argued that climate change is a human rights problem,
and that any solution must be based on human rights
principles. Unfortunately, a ‘human rights approach’ to
climate change, while well-intentioned, is not grounded
in the law, and is more likely to distract from the effort to
combat climate change than advance it. Ironically, while
human rights advocates insist that human rights are
universally recognized and provide a bedrock normative
commitment that demands action to mitigate climate
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change, in fact human rights are more hotly contested
than climate policy is, and so a human rights approach
could very well undermine the delicate near-consensus
on climate policy that it has taken decades to cobble
together.
The current approach to climate policy
What is that near-consensus on climate policy? The
current approach to climate change follows a pattern that
states have used before to negotiate international treaties
that address environmental challenges. The approach
can be broken into two stages. In the first stage, states
learn that an activity that takes place on the territory of
multiple states (or sometimes in other areas, such as on
the high seas) causes cross-border harms that cannot
be fully addressed through national policy. Those harms
include harms to life, health, and property, and often to
wildernesses and other natural resources. While a state
may be able to pass laws that limit the harms caused by
the activity – pollution, for example – they are reluctant
to do so because unilateral state regulation imposes
costs on citizens, while producing benefits that are partly
enjoyed by foreigners in other countries. In the second
stage, states negotiate a treaty with other states. The
treaty imposes obligations on all the states, requiring
each state to absorb a share of the costs of resolving the
environmental problem in a mutually acceptable way. The
most successful example is the Montreal Protocol of 1987,
an international agreement that led to the reduction of
emissions that damaged the ozone layer.
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Two points can be made about this model for addressing
international environmental harms. First, the international effort to reach a treaty is rooted in a prior understanding among states that it is in their national interest
to mitigate the environmental harms. States understand
their national interests in different ways, but, as a very
rough approximation, most governments perform either
a formal or rough cost-benefit analysis, in which they
compare the benefits from, and costs of, reducing the
harm. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, states realized
that as the ozone layer dissipated, the incidence of skin
cancer and other harms would rise. Yet many industrial
and other activities emitted ozone-depleting substances,
and the cost of replacing them would be high. Weighing
the costs and benefits, countries – initially, and primarily,
the United States – realized that their citizens would be
better off if measures were taken to preserve the ozone
layer. This type of cost-benefit analysis, sometimes called
‘policy analysis’, takes seriously the well-being of citizens,
including their interests in environmental quality, health,
and the goods supplied by the economy.
Second, the treaty itself is the product of bargaining.
States enter treaty negotiations with a mutual interest in
mitigating the environmental harm, but a desire to shift
as much of the burden as possible on other countries. The
outcome of bargaining will normally reflect the bargaining
power of states, which may mean that the distribution of
the ‘surplus’ generated by the treaty (the benefits minus
the costs) will not necessarily satisfy general notions of
fairness. The states with the most bargaining power are
typically (though not always) the wealthiest and most
powerful states – those on which other states rely. Thus,
the treaty may not require wealthy states, and even states
that are responsible for the problem in the first place, to
comply with ideals of redistributive or corrective justice.
To be sure, not all treaties are unfair. These ideals might
play a role in negotiations, and sometimes poor states
will receive transfers or technical assistance because
they lack the capacity to comply with the treaty on their
own. But there is clearly a tension between those ideals,
which are also reflected in human rights norms, and
the outcomes that can be expected from great-power
bargaining.
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For all the complexities, climate change and the international efforts to address it have fit this pattern. Nationallevel regulation alone will not suffice because of a freerider problem: the country that issues climate regulations
bears all the costs of the regulation and shares the
benefits with the rest of the world. And such regulations
may simply shift carbon-emitting industries to foreign
countries, with the result that global carbon emissions
remain unaffected. Thus, it was recognized early on that
international cooperation was necessary, and a series of
international agreements, culminating in the Paris Agreement, moved the world incrementally in that direction.
The unusual level of difficulty in reaching international
agreements reflects the special features of the climate
change problem, including the high level of uncertainty
about the amount of harm that climate change will cause;
the variation in the level of likely harm across countries,
and hence in the strength of the interests of different
countries in addressing the problem; the very long time
horizon; and the high cost of climate mitigation efforts
because of the ubiquitous role that fossil fuels play in the
economy of every country. Nonetheless, the international
consensus seems to be that a framework successfully
used for the ozone problem – in other words, policy analysis and international bargaining – should be used for
climate change as well.
Climate policy and human rights
Against this backdrop, what exactly does the human
rights perspective add? A survey of recent publications
– by organizations, commentators, and advocates –
provides little clarity.1 Below I describe some of the
claims, suggestions, or implications that I have gleaned
from this literature. I conclude that the human rights
perspective contributes little to the challenge of combatting climate change, and is more likely to cause harm by
complicating negotiations and provoking a backlash from
states that are sensitive about human rights claims.

1
See, e.g., Amnesty International (2019d); OHCHR (2015);
UNEP (2015); Knox (2009a).
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First, one might think of the human rights approach as
no more than a redescription of the existing approach
to the climate change problem. The policy analysis or
cost-benefit approach overlaps with the human rights
perspective in several respects, and so one might see
the human rights perspective as one that simply recasts
policy analysis in more vivid or normatively appealing
terms. In policy analysis, especially as used in international relations, human beings are given equal moral
weight regardless of nationality, status, and wealth.
These are the core elements of the traditional human
rights approach as well. Thus, to the extent of this
overlap, we might understand human rights advocates
as pointing out that if states cannot agree on an international programme of climate mitigation, they have
betrayed their commitments to human rights as well as
to the ‘national interest’, understood as a more generic
commitment to the well-being of their citizens. On this
view, the advantage of the human rights approach is that
it addresses people who care about human rights and
directs their attention to climate change, enabling human
rights organizations to mobilize their members to bring
pressure on government bodies.
Second, one might see the human rights perspective as
a way to assert the claims of poorer, more vulnerable, or
powerless populations. This assertion is the major thrust of
a document issued by the Office of the High Commissioner
of Human Rights (OHCHR), which recommends: “Mitigation
and adaptation efforts that place people at the centre, are
gender sensitive, and ensure the rights of persons, groups
and peoples in vulnerable situations, including women,
children, indigenous peoples and the poor” (OHCHR 2015:
23). Elsewhere, it argues that: “Equity in climate action
requires that efforts to mitigate and adapt to the impacts
of climate change should benefit people in developing
countries, indigenous peoples, people in vulnerable
situations, and future generations” (OHCHR 2015: 3-4).
The OHCHR’s approach thus departs from standard policy
analysis in two respects. It advocates redistribution of
wealth from rich to poor and to other vulnerable groups –
which is normally left out of policy analysis – and from developed countries to developing countries. The OHCHR and
other human rights organizations have also insisted that
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international cooperation on climate mitigation respect
democratic norms of consultation among all ‘stakeholders’
– another human rights norm that policy analysis, which is
resolutely technocratic, usually disregards.
Third, human rights could be a vehicle for legal change.
Most countries have ratified most of the human rights
treaties, and many countries have submitted to the
jurisdiction of international legal institutions that monitor
or enforce their compliance with those treaties. National
courts and other national institutions also may implement
international human rights commitments. If the failure to
mitigate climate change violates human rights, then victims of climate change may appeal to these legal bodies,
which in turn may compel governments to take action.
Problems with the human rights approach
to climate policy
There are problems that are specific to each of these approaches, and there are problems common to all of them.
Let me start with the first. While it may seem harmless to
redescribe the climate change problem so that it is a ‘human rights’ problem rather than simply an environmental
disaster that threatens humanity, the truth is the opposite.
Once the scientific uncertainties are surmounted, everyone
understands that rising sea levels, the spread of pests,
melting glaciers, and all the other environmental harms
caused by climate change spell significant trouble and call
for international cooperation toward a remedy. By contrast,
the moment that the term ‘human rights’ is invoked, a
large number of countries are immediately put on guard
against threats to their sovereignty. Above all, the two
countries with the biggest economies in the world – the
United States and China – have made no secret of their
opposition to human rights obligations that might compel
them to act against their perceived interests. Without the
participation of these two countries, an adequate response
to climate change is not possible.
These countries, and others like them, will not only resist
the use of human rights language, but, more practically,
they will worry that if a climate treaty is seen as a vindication of human rights, or an implementation of human
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rights commitments, then claims based on those underlying human rights will be more difficult to resist. China
will not make concessions to human rights claims that
threaten the authoritarian structure of the government,
the suppression of political and religious freedom, and
the massive repression of Muslim and ethnic minorities.
For the United States, there is a deep and apparently
unshakeable hostility to human rights commitments that
are seen as threats to the country’s political autonomy.
Contrary to the claims of human rights advocates, the
nature and content of human rights are controversial
– indeed, more controversial, it seems to me, than the
argument that the world should cooperate to mitigate
climate change, putting aside the declining minority of
people who deny that climate change has occurred.2
If all this is true, then the OHCHR’s attempt to leverage
human rights on behalf of developing countries and
vulnerable populations threatens the success of climate
mitigation efforts. The argument that rich countries have
a moral obligation to help poor countries has been made
before, and it has never gained traction. The argument
that rich countries have a moral obligation to carry a
greater climate mitigation burden relies on numerous
contestable philosophical premises that are unlikely
to sway the voters who will need to be convinced.3 The
OHCHR’s approach effectively takes the difficult but
manageable problem of international cooperation toward
climate mitigation and converts it into an impossible,
never-before-tried programme of redistributing wealth
across the globe and across generations, all at the
expense of the countries whose participation is most
essential, and who have never shown themselves to be
notably generous. It is hard to imagine a more certain way
to bring climate cooperation to a halt.
The same point can be made about the OHCHR’s insistence that international cooperation on climate litigation
respect norms of consultation, which can be derived,

2
For an interesting effort to put climate change in terms of
“human security” rather than human rights for just this reason,
see Adger et al. (2014).
3
For a discussion, see Posner & Weisbach (2010).
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more or less, from the political rights recognized in
human rights treaties. However, the Chinese government
is not going to consult the Uighurs who it has placed in
concentration camps, nor any of its other citizens, for that
matter, outside the party elite. Nor are other authoritarian
countries, or the many imperfect democracies that are
actually controlled by an oligarchic elite. On the other
side of the problem, human rights organizations need to
figure out how to reconcile the demand for consultation
with the fact that many ordinary people do not believe
that anthropogenic climate change is happening, or is
a problem, or is best addressed through the elimination
of fossil fuels; or are hostile to international cooperation
on principle, or do not trust foreigners.4 Here again, the
human rights organizations may need to make a choice, or
at least recognize that there is a choice – about whether
we should give priority to climate mitigation or human
rights – rather than pretend that the different areas of
international cooperation are actually the same.
These tensions create challenges for the ‘name-andshame’ approach made famous by Amnesty International,
which, like the OHCHR, argues that states violate human
rights both by failing to address climate change and by
addressing climate change in the wrong way. Amnesty
International is no doubt correct when it argues that
“conservation areas or renewable energy projects must
not be created on the lands of Indigenous peoples without
consulting them and getting their consent” (Amnesty
International 2019d). But then Amnesty International
needs to decide who to shame – the government that does
nothing about climate change or the government that, in
its eagerness to address climate change, runs roughshod
over the rights of indigenous peoples. Of course, it could
try to do both but there seems to be a practical limit on
how much naming-and-shaming can be done before it
loses its effectiveness.

4
While this problem might seem specific to the United States,
public opinion polls suggest a great deal of climate change
scepticism around the world – suggesting that democracy might
be more of a problem for climate mitigation than we would like to
think. For data on global attitudes on climate change, see Lee et
al. (2015).
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One might argue, at least, that human rights law could
help push forward climate change mitigation. If states
are obligated to comply with human rights law, and the
failure to mitigate climate change results in human rights
violations, then it seems that we could advance climate
change mitigation by reminding states of their human
rights obligations or compelling them to comply with
them. Individuals and organizations may also be able to
file complaints with domestic and international courts,
regulatory bodies, and other forums – and even if they
do not obtain remedies, these activities will further bring
attention to climate change and mobilize political support
for climate change mitigation.
There are several problems with this argument. First, the
connection between human rights law and the climate
problem is far from obvious. There is no recognized
human right to an atmosphere free of carbon emissions,
thus the human rights argument must be that carbon
emissions result in human rights violations – for example,
by resulting in avoidable deaths and other harms. Even
more creative arguments are possible:
“According to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, ‘everyone has the right to education.’ Article 13
of the ICESCR elaborates upon this right, guaranteeing
to all persons, free, compulsory primary education and
calling on States to progressively realize free secondary
education for all. However, the impacts of climate
change and the exigencies which it creates threaten the
ability of States to expend maximum available resources
for the progressive realization of the right to education
and can press children into the labour pool prematurely.” (OHCHR 2015: 19)
But no court, government, or other legal authority would
accept such an argument, as it implies that all government resource decisions – all decisions to spend money
on X rather than Y – are limited by international treaties,
since spending money on X could always mean failure to
spend money on education, health care, old-age pensions,
and all the other rights guaranteed by the treaties. If the
failure of governments to curb carbon emissions violate
human rights in this way, then so do all failures to curb
all forms of serious pollution. Human rights thinking, on
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this approach, does no more than restate the premise of
policy analysis while getting us no closer to a solution.
Second, the legal institutions responsive to human rights
arguments are too weak to provide any traction against
climate change. Even at the best of times, international
legal institutions are unable to coerce, shame, or in any
other way influence the behavior of countries, except at
the margins. And, with a new populist-nationalist fervour
raging across the world, now is hardly the best of times.
The International Court of Justice rarely has mustered
the courage to pressure countries to comply with human
rights; but in any event, most great powers refuse to
submit to its jurisdiction. The various human rights
committees, offices, and organizations established by
the treaty regime are also frequently ineffective. Further,
having no authority, relevant expertise, or legitimacy for
directing climate policy, these organizations would be
unable to influence governments if they tried to.
In many countries, domestic courts also sometimes
enforce international human rights law (or regional or
domestic law that overlaps with it). But their record is
spotty, and in any event, it is hard to see what could
be accomplished if courts were persuaded that climate
change is a problem for human rights. Domestic courts
rarely dictate policy outcomes, and in the handful of
cases where courts have recognized positive rights, they
have mostly urged the government to take action rather
than issuing compulsory orders requiring the government
to change its policies. National institutions in most countries already recognize that climate change is a challenge
that should be addressed through international cooperation and domestic policy. The problem is one of achieving
international cooperation, which domestic courts are in a
poor position to solve.
Third, it is not even clear that a human rights approach,
grounded in existing legal instruments, would require
states to make climate mitigation a priority. As the OHCHR
acknowledges, “The rights of children are protected by
the CRC [Convention on the Rights of the Child] but the
rights of future generations (in the sense of generations
yet unborn) are not formally recognised in this or other
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major human rights instruments” (OHCHR 2015: 24).
Never mind; the OHCHR insists that a climate treaty is
required by ‘intergenerational equity’ without explaining
what intergenerational equity requires or how it can be
derived from human rights law. Under existing law, there
is no basis for criticizing a country that says it will refuse
to take climate mitigation efforts because, inspired by the
CRC, it needs to spend money to save the lives of existing
children instead of the non-lives of not-yet existing
children.
A way forward
But this last point does suggest a way that human rights
law could be of use in the coming battle with climate
change. From time to time, a government might be
tempted to engage in human rights abuses in the course
of responding to the challenges posed by climate change.
The most obvious danger on the horizon is the coerced
transfer of populations from low-lying areas to higher
ground, or to make way for massive new green-energy
projects or untried geoengineering schemes. China’s
Three Gorges Dam provides a cautionary tale. While not
motivated by climate mitigation, the dam is the type
of project that a world bent on eliminating reliance on
fossil fuels might undertake in increasing numbers. The
dam project displaced more than a million people and
caused significant harm to the environment – raising
protests from human rights organizations (Human Rights
Watch 1995). Amnesty International might have had this
concern in mind when it invoked the rights of indigenous
peoples: once states commit to climate mitigation, the
natural constituency of the human rights organizations
will comprise vulnerable individuals whose rights may be
steamrolled by a panicking or over-aggressive government
rather than the vast majority for whose benefit the climate
mitigation projects are undertaken. As an early warning
system for drawing the world’s attention to climate mitigation projects that go too far, human rights might play
a role. That is not the role that its advocates have called
for, but it seems like a role that the human rights regime
might be able to play.
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Climate change and human movement

This essay discusses the evidence and available tools to
address human movement linked to the adverse effects of
climate change. In doing so, it offers insights into associated human rights implications. While human rights actors
have recognized the immediate and longer-term implications of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights
as a key challenge, including in the context of human
movement, there is scope for a deeper engagement in order
to foster rights-based policies and practical solutions.
Introduction
In public discourse and narratives on climate change and
human movement, misconceptions abound. Correcting
these is essential if suitable legal and policy frameworks
are to be developed. At the outset, the following baselines
need to be appreciated. First, climate change does not
on its own cause the movement of people, but rather
interacts with (and exacerbates) existing triggers. In
particular, climate change impacts on the frequency and/
or severity of certain disasters, such as extreme weather
events. Secondly, most movement associated with climate
change occurs within countries, not across international
borders. When cross-border movement does occur, people
will generally remain within their own region. Thirdly, the
term ‘climate refugee’ is legally flawed, although refugee
law may have some relevance when people are displaced.
Fourthly, long before island nations are inundated by
rising seas, depleted water resources will render them
uninhabitable. Finally, many people may need assistance
to move, and some may not move at all – whether by
choice or inability.
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These corrective statements highlight the complexity of
movement linked to climate change, and why evidencebased research is critical. This essay discusses the
evidence and available tools to address human movement related to the adverse effects of climate change. In
doing so, it offers insights into associated human rights
implications. While human rights actors have recognized
the immediate and longer-term implications of climate
change on the enjoyment of human rights as a key
challenge, including in the context of human movement,
there is scope for a deeper engagement in order to foster
rights-based policies and practical solutions.
Types and magnitude of human movement
The adverse effects of climate change are already
influencing people’s options and decisions on movement.
They may contribute to displacement (forced movement),
migration (voluntary movement) and decisions to relocate
as households or communities (which can be forced or
voluntary, depending on the circumstances).1

*
The authors would like to thank the Research Council of
Norway (Project No 235638) for supporting this work.
1
‘Relocation’ here refers to a planned process in which
people voluntarily move, or are forced to move, away from their
homes or places of temporary residence, are settled in a new
location within their own or another state, and are provided with
the conditions for rebuilding their lives. Planned relocation is
carried out under the authority of the state, and is undertaken to
protect persons from risks and impacts related to disasters and
environmental change in the context of sea level rise. This has
been adapted from Brookings Institution et al. (2015).
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The full magnitude of movement associated with climate
change is unknown, although the evidence base is much
richer than it was just a decade ago. Since 2008, the
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) has
compiled data on internal displacement linked to suddenonset disasters (such as storms, cyclones, floods, wildfires,
extreme temperatures and landslides). In 2018, of 17.2
million new disaster-related displacements, 16.1 million
were associated with weather-related disasters (IDMC
2019a: 7). Over the past eleven years, disasters triggered
265 million internal displacements, which was an average
of 24 million new displacements per year – and three
times the figure for conflict and violence (IDMC 2019b:
5-6).2 These figures are, however, an underestimate since
they fail to capture displacement linked to slower-onset
disasters (such as droughts, sea level rise, and desertification) (IDMC 2019a: v).3
Attribution and causality
To fully appreciate the evidence, it is crucial to recognize
that weather-related natural hazards that trigger disasters cannot easily be attributed solely to climate change.4
What is known is that in 2018, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reinforced its earlier
findings on the intensity and frequency of climate and
weather extremes, which have increased in the past and
are predicted to continue.5 This means the magnitude of
adversity arising from storms, floods, droughts and heatwaves will rise as climate change continues. The same is
true for sea level rise.6
There is also a tendency to view sudden- and slow-onset
disasters in isolation. Yet, between 2004 and 2014, roughly
34 per cent of disaster-affected people and 58 per cent of

2
In 2018, 61 per cent of new internal displacement was
caused by disasters compared to 39 per cent by conflict (IDMC
2019a: 6).
3
Note, however, that some drought-related displacement is
captured in the 2018 global figures.
4
See National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine (2016) and Otto et al. (2014).
5
See e.g. IPCC (2018b) and Hoegh-Guldberg et al. (2018).
6
On human rights impacts of sea level rise see e.g. McAdam
et al. (2016). See also OHCHR (2018).
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disaster-related deaths occurred in the top 30 countries
listed in the Fragile States Index (Peters & Budimir 2016).
IDMC’s 2018 data also explain an overlap of conflict and
disasters which displaced people in a number of countries
such as Afghanistan, Nigeria and Somalia (IDMC 2019a).
These dynamics underline another important factor:
displacement, migration or relocation associated with
climate change is multi-causal. Stressors such as weak
governance, resource scarcity, environmental sensitivity
and demographic changes; individual vulnerabilities
associated with age, gender, civil and political status and
socio-economic well-being; and other root causes such
as conflict and violence, impact on people’s resilience,
affecting whether they remain in situ (and in what condition), are displaced, or can migrate elsewhere.
This is why climate change is sometimes described in
narratives and public discourse as a ‘threat multiplier’,
and why the scale of climate change-related movement
is difficult to measure. It also partly accounts for why
policy development in this area has been incremental.
However, with expanding knowledge and a growing pool
of actors willing to engage with the phenomenon, there is
now a clearer normative framework and more robust tools
in place for averting, minimizing and addressing climate
change-related mobility.
Normative developments
The IPCC first identified the potential impacts of climate
change on human movement in 1990 (IPCC 1990; IPCC
1997). Following its 2007 assessment report, which reinforced its impacts on mobility, empirical research on the
connection between climate change and human movement
expanded (Hegerl et al. 2007; IPCC 2007). The adoption of
paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Adaptation Framework in
2010, whereby states parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognized
“climate change induced displacement, migration and
planned relocation” as elements to be addressed within
the framework of climate change adaptation, was pivotal
(UNFCCC 2011). It explicitly acknowledged the impacts of
climate change on human mobility and became a catalyst
for action (see McAdam 2014).
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Even so, it was the Nansen Initiative and its Agenda for the
Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the context
of Disasters and Climate Change (Protection Agenda) that
paved the way for a clear and comprehensive plan to address human movement (The Nansen Initiative 2015). Prior
to the Nansen Initiative’s establishment in 2012, scholars,
practitioners and policymakers had identified normative
gaps but concerted efforts to address them had faltered (see
McAdam 2014). The Protection Agenda sets out a toolkit for
responding coherently to climate change-related mobility,
underpinned by the recognition that multi-disciplinary and
multi-sectoral actions are needed at the local, national,
regional and international levels.
The Protection Agenda was developed through political,
strategic and technical efforts that engaged states and
other stakeholders across regions, and it was endorsed by
109 state delegations in October 2015. It encompasses
humanitarian dimensions, but also disaster risk reduction
(DRR), climate change adaptation (CCA) and sustainable
development, in efforts to avert and minimize unsafe and
involuntary movements and to respond to displacement
within and across international borders when it does occur.
Three key priorities are to: (1) collect data and enhance
knowledge (particularly on cross-border disaster displacement); (2) enhance the use of humanitarian protection
measures for cross-border disaster displaced persons; and
(3) strengthen the management of disaster displacement
risk in countries of origin.
The centrality of proactive efforts in countries of origin,
and not simply remedial measures in destination countries,
is reflected in the Protection Agenda’s priorities. In this
respect, the third priority encompasses four interventions:
(1) integrating human mobility within DRR, CCA and relevant development processes; (2) facilitating migration with
dignity; (3) improving the use of planned relocation; and
(4) ensuring that the needs of internally displaced persons
(IDPs) are effectively addressed in domestic laws and
policies. This envisages that human rights consequences
could potentially be minimized if involuntary and unsafe
movements are averted. Displacement also undermines
development gains and frustrates the sustainable development agenda.
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The Task Force on Displacement (TFD), established in
2015 under the UNFCCC, was accordingly tasked with
developing recommendations to avert and minimize, as
well as address, displacement related to the adverse
impacts of climate change. Similarly, the International
Law Commission’s 2016 Draft articles on the protection of
persons in the event of disasters, which explicitly address
human mobility, detail the scope and content of states’
duties in the context of sudden and slow-onset disasters
with respect to preventive and remedial actions.
Since the adoption of the Protection Agenda, coordinated
efforts (including through the Platform on Disaster
Displacement (PDD), the Nansen Initiative’s successor)
have been undertaken to frame and secure acknowledgement of the diverse dimensions of climate change-related
mobility in pivotal global processes and instruments.7
Concerted efforts to ensure states and other stakeholders
have the requisite tools to implement recommendations
has been another central focus.
One example is the UN General Assembly-endorsed Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, which
contains language on human mobility and measures
related to displacement, evacuation and relocation in the
context of strengthening disaster risk governance, investing in resilience and enhancing preparedness. The Framework recognizes displacement as one common, devastating consequence of disasters and notes that managing
disaster risk aims to protect people, their property, health,
livelihoods and assets, while promoting and protecting
all human rights. In May 2019, the UN Office for Disaster
Risk Reduction (UNDRR) published a Words into Action
guide, which offers practical guidance to governments on
integrating human mobility into DRR strategies.
Movement within countries
Moving people away from harm is an important measure

7
For details, see McAdam (2016); Global Compact on
Refugees, UN Doc: A/73/12 (2 August 2018); Global Compact for
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN Doc: A/RES/73/195 (19
December 2018).
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to reduce mortality and injury in the face of imminent risk
and when other DRR and CCA actions to reduce exposure
and vulnerability are inadequate. Indeed, international
human rights law imposes duties on states to undertake
certain actions to protect the right to life (inter alia) from
risks emanating from natural hazards. Substantive and
procedural duties are engaged, such as the obligation to
take regulatory measures and to provide sufficient information. In essence, the duty is one of conduct to “take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their
jurisdiction”, not one of result (ECtHR 2008: para 128).8
In practice, this may mean providing people with warnings,
options to leave, safe areas to move to, and assistance and
protection while displaced. This strategy proved vital in
May 2019 when the Indian government evacuated over 1.2
million people in less than 48 hours from the worst cyclones
to hit India in over twenty years. While storm surges,
powerful winds and flooding ravaged infrastructure, loss of
life was minimized (see e.g. Dora & Padhee 2019).
The international community has conceded that preventative or remedial relocation (that is, in the aftermath of
displacement) may be necessary from places that present
risks from landslides, flooding, storm surges and the like,
or which are likely to become inhabitable due to water,
ecosystem or livelihood depletion or inundation from sea
level rise (Republic of Fiji 2018).9 Increasingly, communities are themselves making decisions to relocate to avoid
the adverse effects of climate change and environmental
degradation.
When an evacuation or relocation occurs, a range of human
rights are implicated in the actions and choices of states
and other actors. Past experiences demonstrate that
relocation can entail disruptions to livelihoods, income,
socio-economic networks and cultural heritage, which is

8
See also Burson et al. (2018).
9
See also International Law Association (2018) Resolution
6/2018 and accompanying Sydney Declaration of Principles
on the Protection of Persons Displaced in the Context of Sea
Level Rise. Available at: https://environmentalmigration.iom.
int/sites/default/files/ILAResolution_6_2018_SeaLevelRise_
SydneyDeclaration.pdf.
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why it is often considered an option of last resort. Due
regard must be had to procedural safeguards (including
access to information, in-depth consultation and participation), financing and planning, and expert guidance has
been developed to try to ensure these and human rights
protections are safeguarded.10
Through the state-led Migrants in Countries in Crisis
(MICIC) Initiative, states, intergovernmental organizations, private sector actors and civil society have
developed guidance, practices and tools to address the
protection needs of migrants displaced in a range of
contexts, including by disasters. They cover needs from
the period prior to departure, through to the emergency
response phase and finally to return.11
In all of these situations, the Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement remain the most authoritative
and overarching normative framework on the protection
of IDPs, including those displaced by the impacts of
disasters. They reflect international human rights and
humanitarian law and cover all stages of flight.
Movement across international borders
Cross-border movements have been the subject of extensive policy and scholarly debate, partly due to recognition
of a normative gap for addressing admission, status and
rights.12 Concerns about the legal lacunae for so-called
‘climate refugees’ stimulated calls to expand the 1951
Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
adopt a new protocol to it, or create a whole new treaty.
However, states are reticent to develop new international
legal standards and many legal experts believe such
efforts are premature. In this context, one of the Protection Agenda’s three priorities recommended enhanced use
of ‘humanitarian protection measures’, exceptional migration categories or other special protection measures to
assist people displaced in the context of climate change.
10 See Brookings Institution et al. (2015); UNHCR et al. (2017);
CCCM Cluster (2014).
11 For more on the initiative, its guidance and tools see
https://micicinitiative.iom.int/.
12 For further elaboration of these points, see McAdam (2012).
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To be recognized as a refugee under the Refugee Convention, a person must demonstrate a “well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political
opinion” (Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
1951: art 1). Scholars and decision-makers have recognized that in limited circumstances, this definition may be
applicable to claims from people fleeing disasters or other
adverse effects linked to climate change. For instance,
if, in the aftermath of a disaster, a government withheld
humanitarian aid due to a person’s political opinion or
ethnicity, this could amount to Convention-based persecution. In general, however, the Refugee Convention has
been considered an inappropriate normative framework on
account of:
– difficulties in demonstrating discriminatory human
agency and in identifying the so-called ‘agent of
persecution’;
– difficulties in demonstrating the requisite nexus to a
Convention ground;
– arguments that governments may be willing and/or
able to provide protection;
– inaccurate conceptions of disasters as ‘natural’ events
arising from forces of nature, and conceptions of
disasters and adverse effects of climate change as
inflicting indiscriminate harm.
Recent jurisprudence from New Zealand has offered some
insights into where and how refugee law might apply.13
Some scholars have also put forward salient arguments
for a deeper examination of the Refugee Convention’s
potential,14 seeking to dispel the common perception of
disasters as purely ‘natural’ phenomena. Disasters are
also social phenomena which can exacerbate existing
patterns of discrimination and marginalization. This lens
provides new insights into differential experiences and
risks of harm that may be based on ethnicity, gender or
other grounds.

13 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413; AC (Tuvalu) [2014]
NZIPT 800517-520.
14 See e.g. Scott (2016); note also UNHCR (2018).
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In situations where disasters combined with conflict
or violence, states in Africa and Latin America have
recognized refugee status on the basis of broader
criteria explicit in definitions in regional instruments. For
instance, neighbouring states granted refugee status to
Somalis who fled in the context of drought, conflict and
famine in 2011 (see e.g. UNHCR 2018). As noted earlier,
there is a tendency to view disasters in isolation. Yet,
in many countries and regions, disasters overlap with
conflict and/or violence, such as in Nigeria, South Sudan,
Afghanistan, Iraq and parts of Central America.
At present, international human rights law also offers
limited opportunities. It prevents states from sending
people to places where they face a real risk of being
arbitrarily deprived of their lives or being subjected to
inhuman or degrading treatment. Certainly, at some
point, on the basis of cumulative impacts (such as where
fresh drinking water is unavailable, crops cannot grow,
and people are at risk of repeated displacement), the
harm could amount to inhuman or degrading treatment.
However, timing will be relevant, including the potential
for mitigating factors to intervene to limit exposure and
severity of harm.15
In this context, states have often used discretionary
measures to permit people to remain, or to be admitted, in
the aftermath of disasters. Underpinned by humanitarian
considerations, some states have issued special humanitarian visas, generally for temporary stays, with options
for disaster-affected individuals to apply before departure
or upon arrival. For instance, Brazil granted humanitarian visas to Haitians following the 2010 earthquake.
Other states have permitted non-citizens present on their
territory to stay after a disaster has struck. For instance,
New Zealand offered temporary visas to Nepalis who
could not return after the 2015 earthquake. Occasionally,
states have also evacuated people across international
borders, but mostly for medical reasons. While most of the
measures described above have been wholly discretionary,
some have had a legislative basis (such as Temporary
15 See Anderson et al. (2019) and Teitiota v New Zealand,
UN doc: CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (24 October 2019).
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Protected Status in the United States). Some countries in
Central and South America have sought to create more
systematic responses by producing non-binding regional
guidelines, identifying effective practices.16
States have also used regular migration law categories
(such as labour, family, education or tourism) to support
entry and stay. Authorities have expedited processes,
waived or relaxed substantive requirements, and used
their discretion to grant visas to disaster-affected people
who apply through these more general migration channels. Such measures can offer a more predictable legal
status and, potentially, a path to a permanent solution.
These types of migration law and policy-based measures
are a vital component of efforts to develop sustainable
approaches. As Anote Tong, former President of Kiribati,
stated: “If we train our people and they become skilled,
then they would migrate with dignity and on merit, they
would not be people running away from something. They
would be migrating, relocating as people with skills
as members of communities they go into, even leaders,
I hope” (Walsh 2017).
Temporary labour migration schemes, which can support
livelihood diversification, have also been used to support
people living in precarious conditions. For instance,
Australia and New Zealand have seasonal employment
schemes targeting Pacific island countries significantly
affected by climate change (although that is not the
stated rationale for the programmes). Regional or bilat
eral free movement agreements can also enable disasteraffected people to travel safely across borders, and in
that sense can be a form of ‘migration as adaptation’.
Global compacts on migration and refugees
The knowledge and awareness amassed over the past
decade on climate change-related movement is evident in
two instruments adopted by the UN General Assembly in
2018: the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular
16 See e.g. The Nansen Initiative (2016) and CSM &
International Organization for Migration (2018).
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Migration (Migration Compact) and the Global Compact
on Refugees (Refugee Compact).17 Although not legally
binding, they reflect political commitments by states to
which they will be held to account in regular high-level
reviews.
The Migration Compact reflects an express commitment
by states to address the challenges of climate changerelated mobility. The text underscores the three priorities
identified in the Protection Agenda and addresses
displacement, migration and relocation within and across
borders. Notably, it recognizes the significance of regular
migration pathways (such as those discussed above) for
offering safe options for affected people, including as a
way to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change.
Unlike the Migration Compact, the Refugee Compact
does not contain specific commitments on climate
change-related movement. However, it does acknowledge
displacement in the context of disasters, environmental
degradation and the adverse effects of climate change,
including the importance of preparedness and DRR, the
need for coordinated operational responses, and the role
of multiple protection options. In particular, paragraph 61
notes that states must determine the status of those on
their territory “in accordance with their applicable international and regional obligations, in a way which avoids
protection gaps”.
Conclusion
Human movement linked to the adverse impacts of
climate change is likely to increase, but frameworks and
tools exist to prevent some movement where possible, and
to manage it where not. Concerted efforts are needed to
ensure these interrelated approaches are implemented
robustly to avert, minimize and address displacement
linked to climate change. Most people do not want to

17 Global Compact on Refugees, UN Doc: A/73/12 (2018);
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN Doc:
A/RES/73/195. For analysis, see the special issue: ‘The 2018
Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration’ (2018) International
Journal of Refugee Law 30(4), particularly the article by Walter
Kälin.

32

Climate change and human movement

leave their homes, and most want to return as soon as
possible if they are uprooted. Yet, some are also coming
to the realization that moving away from their homes
may become inevitable for their long-term security. To
safeguard these choices and provide dignified options,
the multi-pronged preventative and remedial approaches
discussed in this essay must become part of preparatory
processes at all levels of governance.
In his June 2019 report to the Human Rights Council,
the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human
Rights urged the human rights community to engage
robustly and systematically to help create transformative
responses to climate change (UNHRC 2019). The human
rights framework offers an established set of standards
against which to assess both risk and proposed policy
responses. In this context, a central role for human
rights actors is to determine how to “translate States’
obligations in a way that more clearly engages with [the
available] policymaking choices” (UNHRC 2019: para 71)
so as to foster sustainable and rights-attuned solutions.
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Barbara Oomen

Subnational authorities and climate change

Today’s world abounds with ‘frontier cities’ seeking to
explicitly assert responsibility for international human
rights law, even – and especially – where the state parties
concerned do not take their international obligations as
seriously. They can add to the effectiveness, but also to
the legitimacy and the appropriateness of climate action.
International (human rights) law has a key role to play in
supporting their efforts. There are, however, risks involved
in a focus upon local action.

is important to distinguish between subnational authorities that are more-than-willing, those that are willing and
those that are less-than-willing to meet the global goals
in this field. In each of these cases, international law has
a specific role to play. Before turning to this, however, it is
important to take a closer look at how subnational authorities have come to play an ever-larger role in combating
climate change and thus protecting human rights.
Global challenges, local action

Introduction
In May 2019 Heidelberg declared a ‘climate emergency’,
as did hundreds of other local authorities in dozens of
countries – including New York, Vancouver and Naples.
In the German town, this led to, amongst others, a focus
on electrical buses, reconsidering building projects and
supporting food saving projects. Heidelberg forms but one
example of how local and regional authorities are taking
the lead in climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Small wonder that such subnational authorities show up
in addressing the causes and consequences of climate
change: they do not only have a lot to lose with global
warming, but also a great deal to contribute. If addressing climate change and its human rights implications is
about having ‘all hands on deck’, subnational authorities
are powerful partners to have on board. They can add to
the effectiveness, but also to the legitimacy and the appropriateness of climate action. In this essay, I will argue
that international (human rights) law has a key role to
play in supporting their efforts, and that human rights organizations should support this. In setting out this role, it

Changing perspectives on human rights
Climate Change, Justice and Human Rights

Tiny hamlets amongst wide stretches of agricultural land,
global cities with monorails amongst skyscrapers, tribal
areas in which people live close to nature, regions and
states that encompass both and everything in between
– the term subnational authorities encompasses a wide
range of actors like cities, local governments, municipalities and regions (Bäckstrand et al. 2017). The common
denominator is that these are authorities other than the
nation state, that hold public power within a certain territory. They do not hold functional authority, as is the case
with for instance water boards or transport authorities.
Neither are they non-state actors, such as businesses
or civil society. This, however, is where the commonality
ends. The public power concerned can be allocated via
decentralization or devolution, or exist simply because it
concerns a federal state. It can also range from seemingly mundane features, such as garbage collection and
zoning, to far-fetching constitutional and fiscal powers
which all impact differently the ability to respect, protect
and fulfill human rights in times of climate change. In
addition, resources and needs in this area differ vastly.
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Amongst this collection of highly diverse actors, cities hold
a special role (Aust 2015). They are home to more than
half of the world’s population, but are also often threatened directly. Seaside cities like Ghuangzou, New Orleans,
Mumbai and Osaka, for instance, all run the risk of being
flooded by 2100 if emissions are not reduced (Cassidy
2018). It is not surprising that New York, after hurricane
Sandy demonstrated the city’s vulnerability in 2012,
passed a far-reaching Climate Mobilization Act in 2019
(Kaufman 2019). Coastal towns aside, cities in general
account for 60 to 80 per cent of both energy consumption
and global CO2 emissions, and as such are as much part
of the problem as they can be part of the solution.
Such urban solutions come in a wide variety of forms. The
C40 climate network lists 14.000 examples of city climate
action (C40 2018). Among them is San Francisco’s move
towards zero waste via recycling and composting. Addis
Ababa’s focus on low carbon building designs. Sydney’s
investment in green links connecting all city parks.
London limiting access to its central business district.
Buenos Aires offering free led lights. Milan and Shenzhen
changing all their municipal transport to zero emission
buses. Accra closing down illegal waste dump sites and
Dubai participating in the adaptation academy. And so
on, and so forth.
The fact that all these examples are shared within a city
network is not coincidental. If cities are taking the lead
in addressing climate change, they are doing so together
(Kern & Bulkeley 2009). The Global Covenant of Mayors
for Climate and Energy, for instance, brings together
nearly 10.000 signatories in 59 countries which commit
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 40 per cent by
2030, and to drawing up a sustainable action and energy
plan. The C40 network unites some of the largest cities
in the world, with the Paris Agreement as its normative
basis. ICLEI, local governments for sustainability, is
another mayor network, that helps over 1750 local and
regional governments in developing pathways to lowering
emissions, enhancing biodiversity and strengthening
circularity and resilience in an equitable manner. These
are only three of the hundreds of Transnational Municipal
Networks (TMNs) at play in climate governance, often with
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overlapping membership and partnerships with international organizations and businesses (Acuto 2013).
These TMNs often unite global cities that have the power
and the resources to participate in them (Lee 2013). This
does not apply to smaller places, where it will often be
the region, a province or – in a federal context – the state
to undertake climate action. In Canada, for instance,
provinces set their own climate plans, which means that
British Columbia focuses on introducing a carbon tax
and Alberta regulates industrial emissions. In the United
States, similarly, California and Hawaii passed State Bills
committing to 100 per cent clean energy by 2045, Colorado focused on clean cars, New Jersey passed a Clean
Energy Act focusing on wind energy and Illinois vowed to
boost solar capacity by 2000 per cent (Zukowski 2018).
Next to all the focus on the activities of cities, transnational municipal networks and regions in combating
climate change, there is relatively little scholarly attention
for the activities of smaller towns in rural areas. Still,
it is clear that all types of subnational authorities are
often prepared to go much further than the nation state
in combating climate change. Let us briefly consider how
this contributes to the process of mitigation and adaption, and thus also to protection of the rights at stake.
The subnational contribution
When US President Trump pulled out of the Paris
Agreement, stating that he represented the citizens of
“Pittsburgh, not Paris”, the Pittsburgh mayor Peduto
replied with a tweet stating that his town would follow
the Paris Agreement, “for our people, for our economy
& for the future” (Aust 2018). Such local commitment
can contribute to reaching global goals as formulated in
Paris, in three different ways: by adding to their effectiveness, their legitimacy and their appropriateness. Let’s
briefly consider each of these contributions.
– Effectiveness: subnational authorities can make a
key contribution to keeping global warming under 1.5
degree Celsius, if only because cities are responsible
for an estimated 75 per cent of global CO2 emissions. A
2018 report calculated the impact that all pledges ‘to go
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the extra mile’ made by cities could have, including the
9149 cities and municipalities, and 245 regions in 128
countries that made such a pledge, covering one fifth
of the world’s population. Of course, not all causes of
emissions fall under the legislative jurisdiction of these
authorities. But if all these places alone would keep their
promises in fields that they can influence, this, together
with business commitments made, would go one third of
the way in meeting the Paris goals (Data Driven Yale et
al. 2018). Even if this is not enough, it does provide an
important addition.
– Legitimacy: combating climate change is not only about
technological fixes and regulatory action, but also about
public support. Climate leadership by mayors and local
politicians can play a key role in overcoming political
divides and disengagement. Consider the bipartisan
coalition of Climate Mayors in the US. The Democratic
mayor Walsh from Boston emphasized that: “We see the
impacts of climate change every day in the streets and
homes of our cities – the extreme heat, flooding, and
increasing health issues. It’s our responsibility to act, and
I’m proud to stand among the growing number of Climate
Mayors fighting for our residents.” At the time, his
Republican colleague mayor Tomás Regalado of Miami put
it this way: “We believe that the city of Miami is ground
zero for climate change and sea level rise. Now, more than
ever, we are undeterred and will vigorously pursue our
commitment to this fight. This is not just about ‘the here
and now,’ but for generations to come.” Such rhetoric can
add to the support for climate action as something that is
not imposed from Paris but from Pittsburgh, and does not
concern faraway places and concerns, but the lives of all
of us here and now.
– Appropriateness: one of the key challenges in
combating climate change is the complexity of its causes
and the vast array of potential ways to address them. The
best fit will differ from sunny suburb to monumental town
to tribal community. A strong role for subnational authorities allows for a focus on those measures that form an
optimal fit with the people, place and purpose.

domains that can impact climate change – from garbage
collection, housing and zoning to fiscal and foreign policies. What, here, is the role of international law?

In all this, subnational authorities differ from other
entities (civil society, businesses) because they often hold
formal responsibilities, under the national constition, for

Still, today’s world abounds with ‘frontier cities’ seeking
to explicitly assert responsibility for international human
rights law, even – and especially – where the state
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The role of international human rights law
Climate change concerns human rights: not only because
of the human right to a clean environment but also
because the consequences of global warming affect
a wide variety of civil, political, social, economic and
cultural rights – starting with the right to life. In addition,
the above makes clear that subnational authorities, in
practice, have a role to play in protecting the rights of
those who live on their territories. A question, however,
is what the role of the law, and international law in
particular, is and should be in assisting subnational
authorities in this process.
Here, it is important to recognize how international
law, traditionally, does not address the human rights
responsibilities of local and regional authorities, leaving
the internal allocation of such responsibilities up to the
state parties (Oomen & Baumgartel 2018a; Nicola 2012).
Take the landmark environmental law case of Öneryildiz
v. Turkey (ECHR 30/11/2004), in which the European
Court of Human Rights recognized how allowing people
to build a dwelling on a rubbish tip in Istanbul, resulting
in the death of nine people after a methane explosion,
violated the positive obligations that comes with the
right to life. Even if Istanbul had primary liability here,
Turkey was held responsible for the violation of art. 2 of
the Convention. Turkey, after all, is party to the European
Convention of Human Rights and thus the sole party to be
held responsible for its violation – the local government
is merely considered part of the state. A consequence of
such thinking in terms of a ‘black box of national sovereignty’ is that local authorities seeking to address human
rights violations by the nation state have not received
standing in front of international and European courts
(Oomen & Baumgartel 2018a; Nicola 2012).
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parties concerned do not take their international obligations as seriously (Oomen et al. 2016). They declare
themselves to be human rights cities, often committing to
one specific set of rights. They also rally around concepts
like ‘the right to the city’, recognizing Harvey’s classic
concept in local ordinances but also ensuring its inclusion
in global agenda’s, like UN Habitat (Cohen 2018). International and regional organizations, in turn, increasingly
explicitly focus upon the human rights responsibilities of
local authorities, with the UN advocating guidelines in
this field (UNHRC 2015).
The specific role that international (human rights) law
has to play in supporting local action to combat climate
change, very much depends on the type of commitment
held by subnational authorities. Here, it is useful to
distinguish three types of authorities: the more than
willing, the willing and the less than willing. Let us
consider each separately.
– The more than willing subnational authorities are those
that do not only seek to lead the way locally, but also
seek to address the system. They are engaged in global
and regional agenda and standard setting. At the COP21
conference, for instance, where the Paris Agreement was
adopted, there were not only 150 heads of state, but
also 400 mayors (Tollin 2015). In addition, they are often
involved in climate litigation against companies and
against the government. New York, for instance, was one
of the American municipalities to start a law suit against
fossil fuels companies like BP and Exxon (Setzer & Byrnes
2019). In France, the community of Grande-Synthe lodged
a case against the government for “inaction climatique”
in response to its feeble action plans (Le Monde 2019).
At the European level, Paris, Brussels and Madrid filed a
case calling for the annulment of emissions regulation
2016/646, calling it a “license to pollute”. Whereas the
American case was rejected, and the French case awaits
a decision, the European case was moderately successful:
not only were cities granted standing in Luxembourg, but
the European Commission was also ordered to amend the
legislation (EGC 2018).
This case shows what subnational authorities and the
people they seek to protect stand to gain if they can
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help develop and invoke international and regional law
directly, not only in national cases but also in international and regional courts and in front of treaty monitoring bodies. Offering recourse to such entities, could
thus strengthen human rights law, for instance in relation
to climate change.
– The willing subnational authorities could be considered those that take a less confrontational perspective,
but that do seek to enforce existing international human
rights law and environmental law. The challenge, here,
often lies in deciding what is the best course of action,
ensuring stakeholder participation and implementing the
proposed changes. Here, membership of transnational
municipal networks can play an important role in sharing
best practices, deciding on the discourse to employ,
setting common standards and ensuring access to
funding (Oomen et al. 2018b). The Global Greenhouse Gas
Protocol for Cities, for instance, is an emissions measurement standard developed by the C40, ICLEI, and World
Resources Institute (WRI) together with the World Bank
and UN-Habitat, to which countries sign up voluntarily
(Gordon & Johnson 2018). A major challenge here is how
to also offer this type of support to smaller places and
rural areas, that often do not have the resources to participate in these transnational networks.
– For the less than willing subnational authorities,
explication of their autonomous international human
rights responsibilities could also be important. Take
the case of Saskatchewan, in Canada, as a province
characterized by inaction. Here, the Canadian government
won a case concerning the constitutionality of an Act
enabling taxation of greenhouse gases (Court of Appeal
for Saskatchewan 2019). The ability to explicitly refer to
international legal obligations pertaining to human rights
would, arguably, have made the case of the Canadian
government even stronger, as it would have been able to
argue that even an ‘unwilling’ subnational authority like
Saskatchewan is still bound to international treaties such
as the Paris Agreement. It is for this reason that international and regional human rights organizations increasingly seek to explicitly set out the human rights responsibilities of local authorities, for instance in discussing the
possibility of UN Guidelines (UNHRC 2015).
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Conclusion
Cities, regions and other subnational entities can
increasingly be found amongst a coalition of the willing
in taking bold climate action. This is good news for those
who inhabit them, and for the world at large. Cities might
often be the main places generating carbon emissions,
but can also go a long way in curbing them. Their activities, often devised in the context of transnational municipal networks, are however not only effective. They also
add legitimacy to often polarized discussions, and ensure
that appropriate measures are taken. Strategically, all
who care about international human rights, like human
rights NGOs, are wise to support and strengthen these
subnational efforts. This can be done, first, by supporting
efforts to explicate the human rights responsibilities of
local authorities, such as efforts to establish UN guidelines on the role of local government in the promotion and
protection of human rights (UNHRC 2015). In addition,
human rights NGOs can support the specific global efforts
by subnational entities to raise the bar in combating
climate change. As set out, such efforts often take place
within the context of transnational municipal networks,
and human rights NGOs could support efforts to enhance
access to such networks for all subnational authorities, not merely the megacities that currently dominate
debates. Locally, human rights NGOs could call on
willing cities to join such networks, and develop lobbying
strategies geared towards subnational entities directly
– for instance by offering information on international
instruments to organizations that are active locally.

Nevertheless, going local holds great promise. After all,
a large part of meeting the largest global challenge of
our times, is about both supporting and stimulating local
action.

Combined, such strategies can help strengthen the role
of subnational entities in combating climate change even
more. There are, however, risks involved in a focus upon
local action. Most importantly, it can strengthen existing
cleavages between more than willing and less than
willing subnational entities, and the rights of those who
live there. One way to address this is by means of strategic
litigation, and a focus on less than willing subnational
entities and their obligations. In addition, avoiding
inequality means that a focus on localities should never
take the place of national and international efforts in this
field.
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Sara Seck

Climate change and the human rights responsibilities
of business enterprises

The causes of climate change and solutions to it are inherently tied to non-state actors, including businesses.
As multinational business enterprises are at the heart of
global emissions, historical and current, it is vital to understand how the attribution of climate change impacts
goes beyond the responsibilities of states. The first
lawsuits targeting companies have begun. Meanwhile,
businesses are increasingly focused on sustainability at
different levels of their organizations, including by endorsement of business responsibilities for human rights.
What independent responsibilities do business enterprises have when they undertake to respect the human
rights of those who are vulnerable to climate harms?
Introduction
The adoption of the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights (UNGPs) by the United Nations Human
Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2011 has created an opportunity for the international human rights community to
clarify how the independent responsibility of business
enterprises to respect human rights applies to rights
at risk from climate change (UNHRC 2011; Seck 2017).
This essay will consider the evolution of international
understandings of this responsibility at the UNHRC, as
well as in other international initiatives, some of which
are multi-stakeholder in nature. A key insight is that
whether or not human rights NGOs choose to contribute
to the development of guidance for businesses on
human rights and climate change, this guidance will
continue to emerge and inform accepted social norms for
responsible business conduct, which in turn will inform
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legal responsibility (Buhmann 2017). The question is
whether the guidance that emerges will rigorously embed
business responsibilities to respect human rights at risk
from climate change, or whether weaker, less effective
guidance will be all that is available. The answer to this
question depends on the extent to which human rights
NGOs choose to actively contribute to these drafting
processes.
International scientific consensus is clear that anthropogenic climate emissions, notably those arising from
industrial activities including changes in land use, are
key contributors to the climate crisis (IPCC 2018a; IPCC
2019). As the science has evolved, the link between
fossil fuel emitters and climate change has begun to be
clarified, and additional studies of other industry sectors
will likely emerge. For example, Richard Heede’s 2014
climate attribution study provided a quantification of
the historic contributions of ‘carbon-majors’ to climate
change (Heede 2014). Heede initially classified carbonmajor producers into investor-owned, state-owned,
and nation state producers of oil, natural gas, coal,
and cement, concluding that 63 per cent of cumulative
worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide and methane from
1854-2010 were attributable to identifiable carbon-majors (Heede 2014: 229). A subsequent study to which
Heede contributed distinguishes investor-owned from
majority state-owned carbon majors (Ekwurtzel et al.
2017). These studies provide an alternative framework
to the exclusive focus on state responsibility found in
traditional public international law (Voigt 2008; Wewerinke-Singh 2018). Investigations, inquiries, and litigation
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targeting investor-owned carbon majors have begun to
proliferate (Greenpeace Southeast Asia & Philippine Rural
Reconstruction Movement 2015; The Permanent Peoples’
Tribunal 2018; Ganguly et al. 2018), some of which have
been inspired at least in part by the Heede research, as
well as by the businesses’ responsibility to respect human
rights (BHR), the second of three pillars in the 2011
UNGPs. In addition, various international initiatives have
attempted to clarify the content of the responsibility of
businesses to respect human rights in relation to climate
change.
2007 Caring for Climate
The idea that businesses should play a role in climate
action has been promoted by the United Nations since at
least 2007, when the UN Global Compact, together with
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), launched
the Caring for Climate initiative in order to mobilize
business leaders to climate action. CEO signatories to the
Caring for Climate Statement acknowledge that responsible business behaviour includes climate action, by playing
a “leading role in deploying low-carbon technologies,
increasing energy efficiency, reducing carbon emissions,
and [...] assisting society to adapt to those changes in the
climate which are now unavoidable” (Caring for Climate
2007). Current participants contribute to the development
and sharing of practical solutions in workstreams focused
on carbon pricing, science-based targets, climate adaptation, as well as on how to responsibly engage in climate
policy. However, the idea that climate change might have
human rights dimensions that should inform business
responsibilities is not evident in this initiative.
2014 NAZCA
The launching in 2014 of the portal for Global Climate
Action prior to the negotiations of the Paris Agreement
represents another important moment. An initiative of
UN Climate Change together with Peru and France in
the lead-up to the Paris Agreement, the NAZCA platform
reflects the reality that all sectors of society must take
ambitious action to address climate change. Non-party
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stakeholders are able to display their climate action
commitments on the platform, whether cities, subnational
regions, civil society organizations, or companies and
investors. Company commitments (of which there are
currently over 3500) include carbon pricing and renewable energy use, while investor commitments (currently
over 1000) include the issuance of green bonds as part
of the move to mobilize finance for development that is
both climate-resilient and low in emissions. There is no
explicit linkage here between business responsibilities to
respect human rights and climate action. Nevertheless,
this initiative represents a further acknowledgement that
businesses, including the investor community, have a key
role to play in global climate action.
2014 IBA Climate Justice Report
The first international initiative of note to consider how
the business responsibility to respect rights might apply
in the climate change context is the July 2014 report by
the International Bar Association (IBA), entitled Achieving
Justice in an era of Climate Disruption (IBA 2014). The
overarching aim of the report is to shift climate change
considerations from science and economics to equity
and human rights. A section is dedicated to corporate
responsibility and climate justice, where it is argued that
there is a need for states to agree on consistent standards with which to regulate corporations, while increasing
the ability of businesses to self-regulate (IBA 2014: 148;
Seck & Slattery 2015). The IBA report recommends that
businesses adopt the UNGPs, and also that the OHCHR
develop a model for an internal corporate policy on
human rights and climate change (IBA 2014: 148-9). This
model policy would require a three step commitment and
appears loosely modelled on the responsibility to respect
in the UNGPs: first, the adoption of a policy stipulating
measures to prevent or mitigate climate impacts linked to
operations; second, the implementation of a due diligence
process to “identify, prevent, mitigate, and account” for
“actual climate change impacts” which must then be
translated “into active efforts to minimise or reverse”
impacts; and, third, implementation of “remediation
processes that allow for open communication with stakeholders most affected by the corporation’s operations”
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(IBA 2014: 148-9). Measures adopted “must include due
diligence of corporate projects, including the environmental practices of the company’s affiliates, and as far
as is reasonably practicable, its major contractors and
suppliers” (IBA 2014: 148). Further guidance is provided
on translating awareness into active efforts:
“The corporation should consider measures it can
implement to assist in achieving the objective of
limiting global warming to no more than a 2°C increase.
The corporation’s goal should be to implement the most
advanced available technology to minimise its carbon
footprint. In situations where negative impact on the
environment is unavoidable given current technology or
if the cost of such technology is prohibitive, the corporation bears responsibility for corresponding mitigation
and remediation” (IBA 2014: 149).
The IBA recommendations could be critiqued as not fully
in accordance with Principle 13 of the UNGPs, given that
in some circumstances the negative impact of a project
on human rights may be so severe that the project simply
should not proceed (Seck 2017: 19). Nevertheless, the
overall recommendations are a key contribution, although
the OHCHR has not yet developed a model policy for BHR
and climate change. This is unfortunate, as a BHR and
climate change compliant model internal corporate policy
could serve to inform legal advice given to business
clients who are committed to tackling their contributions
to climate change, but are unsure how to proceed. While
some business law firms are stepping forward to provide
advice (Zampas & Elgie 2019), a model corporate policy
developed with active input from human rights NGOs
could play an important role in guiding climate responsible corporate practice.
2015 OHCHR Key Messages
In November 2015, the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) developed Key Messages
on climate change which also informed a submission
to the COP 21 negotiations of the Paris Agreement
(OHCHR 2015). Consideration 8 (“To protect human
rights from business harms”) endorses the UNGPs, and
highlights that “businesses are also duty-bearers” and
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that businesses must “be accountable for their climate
impacts and participate responsibly in climate change
mitigation and adaptation efforts with full respect for
human rights”. Yet while the Key Messages claim that the
fostering of policy coherence is important for all climate
action, only consideration 8 addresses the role of business, while the other nine considerations focus exclusively
on the role of states.
Consideration 8 further clarifies that it is critical that
businesses comply with their responsibilities when states
adopt market-based or private financing approaches to
climate change in accordance with international climate
law. Yet there is a lack of clarity as to the role of business where a state has chosen not to incorporate private
financing or market-based approaches to climate change,
or the approaches adopted are clearly inadequate. As the
business responsibility is independent of the state duty,
the failure of a state or states to take their climate obligations seriously should not be used as an excuse for irresponsible business conduct (UNHRC 2011: Commentary
to Principle 11). Moreover, there is no direction as to how,
where, and to whom businesses should take responsibility
for the remediation of climate harms. While the OHCHR’s
endorsement of the UNGPs in the Key Messages is a step
in the right direction, it is far less developed than the
work of the IBA, and the limited guidance given is not
obviously consistent with the UNGPs. The OHCHR should
revisit the Key Messages with input from human rights
NGOs, and provide more fulsome guidance for businesses
that at a minimum aligns with the UNGPs.
2015 Oslo Principles
In the same year as the OHCHR submission, a group of
legal experts attempted to grapple in more detail with the
responsibilities of businesses and states in relation to
climate change, resulting in the “Oslo Principles on Global
Obligations to Reduce Climate Change” (EGGCO 2015).
The Oslo Principles focus only on climate mitigation, and
claim that the primary legal responsibility to urgently respond to climate change rests with states and enterprises;
however, ‘enterprises’ is not defined. This legal responsibility is said to arise from a duty of humanity as guardians
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of the earth to preserve the biosphere, and reflects the
precautionary principle as well as existing human rights
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil the basic dignity
of people as well as the integrity of the biosphere.

not satisfied with this result, and undertook a subsequent
drafting initiative.

Oslo Principles 6-8 provide that both states and enterprises have obligations to ensure that global average
temperature increases remain below a 2 degree Celsius
threshold. However, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
reduction obligations are qualified by cost, and new
excessively emitting activities may be indispensable in
some circumstances. Although the Oslo Principles rely on
the UNGPs as well as a selection of other international
normative instruments, the four principles that most
directly articulate obligations of enterprises do not clearly
reflect BHR (Seck 2017). Most crucially, they focus on assessment and disclosure of harms to the enterprise itself,
or its investors, or perhaps customers, rather than harm
to rights-holders as is clearly required under the Principle
17 of the UNGPs.1 Oslo Principle 29 and 30 do suggest
a need to be aware of and reduce the carbon footprint
and GHG emissions of a proposed project, yet there is no
suggestion that assessments should seek out alternatives
with zero emissions, nor is it suggested that the voices of
those most vulnerable to climate harms should be sought
for decision-making that respects rights. Moreover, there
is no mention of the need for businesses to take responsibility to remedy climate harms as would be required
under Principle 22 of the UNGPs.2 However, as will be seen
below, some of the drafters of the Oslo Principles were

In 2016, the Special Rapporteur on human rights and
the environment prepared an important report on climate
change and human rights which considers how the
obligations of states with regard to environmental human
rights should be understood to apply in the climate context. Only brief reference is made to businesses: “corporations themselves have a responsibility to respect human
rights” and all “three pillars of the normative framework
for business and human rights apply to all environmental
human rights abuses, including impairments of human
rights in relation to climate change” (UNHRC 2016:
66). This is not surprising given the lack of detail in the
OHCHR’s 2015 Key Messages with regard to business
responsibilities, and reinforces the sense that the OHCHR,
perhaps with input from human rights NGOs, should
undertake a more in-depth study of this issue.

1
According to the Commentary to Principle 17:
“Principle 17 defines the parameters of human rights due
diligence while Principles 18-21 elaborate its essential
components. Human rights risks are understood to be the
business enterprise’s potential adverse human rights impacts.
Potential impacts should be addressed through prevention
or mitigation, while actual impacts – those that have already
occurred – should be a subject for remediation (Principle 22).
Human rights due diligence can be included within broader
enterprise risk- management systems, provided that it goes
beyond simply identifying and managing material risks to the
company itself, to include risks to rights-holders.” (UNHRC 2011)
2
Principle 22: “Where business enterprises identify that
they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should
provide for or cooperate in their remediation through legitimate
processes” (UNHRC 2011).
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2016 Climate report

2018 CESCR Committee
The October 2018 statement on climate change by the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) specifically identifies the independent responsibility
of businesses to comply with human rights, stating that:
“Complying with human rights in the context of climate
change is a duty of both State and non-State actors.
This requires respecting human rights, by refraining
from the adoption of measures that could worsen
climate change; protecting human rights, by effectively
regulating private actors to ensure that their actions do
not worsen climate change; and fulfilling human rights,
by the adoption of policies that can channel modes of
production and consumption towards a more environmentally sustainable pathway. Corporate entities are
expected to respect Covenant rights regardless of
whether domestic laws exist or are fully enforced in
practice [emphasis added]”.3 (CESCR 2018b)
3
The statement refers here to the Committee’s General
comment No. 24 (2017) on State obligations under the
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Again, while it is useful to have an acknowledgement of
business responsibilities to respect human rights in the
climate change context, it is unfortunate that further detail of what this would mean in practice is not elaborated.
2018 Enterprises Principles
As the drafters of the Oslo Principles could not agree on
the substance of reduction obligations for enterprises,
some members subsequently decided to work together
to draft more concrete obligations for both enterprises
and investors (EGCOE 2018: 17). The result, released in
2018, is a report of close to 300 pages entitled Principles
on Climate Obligations of Enterprises (EGCOE 2018).
Similar to the Oslo Principles, the Enterprises Principles
take as a starting point that the “legal maximum” for
global warming is 2 degrees Celsius, even as the authors
acknowledge that this “is by no means safe in view of the
increasing amount and severity of natural disasters the
world is already experiencing today” (EGCOE 2018: 24).
Yet, the authors claim that if all countries were to curb
emissions such that the 2-degree threshold was avoided,
there would be no need to consider the obligations of
enterprises (EGCOE 2018: 28). From a human rights
perspective this is highly arbitrary and creates confusion
when combined with the independent responsibility of
businesses to respect human rights.
The definition of enterprise includes a “business,
company, firm, venture, organisation, operation, or
undertaking that is private” unless it “does not carry
on commercial or industrial activities”, as well as “any
non-private entity when and to the extent that it carries
on commercial or industrial activities” (EGCOE 2018:
1). The Enterprises Principles focus on GHG emissions
that can be attributed to an enterprise, while observing
that the methodology for doing so is contested (EGCOE
2018: 30-36). Here, “emissions from oil exploration,
extraction and refining [are attributed] to the responsible
oil company, whereas emissions from combustion in
an airplane are attributed to the airline” (EGCOE 2018:
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
the context of business activities (CESCR 2017).
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32). The key concern is prevention, and the drafters “do
not express a view on damages”, suggesting this aligns
with sources of international environmental law (EGCOE
2018: 43), a claim that many would contest (Doelle
& Seck 2019). The Enterprises Principles adopt a per
capita and carbon budget approach, and so distinguish
between countries that are “Below Permissible Quantum
(BPQ)” that are “not (yet) under a general legal obligation to reduce their GHG-emissions” (EGCOE 2018: 60)4
and those that are “Above Permissible Quantum (APQ)”
and “must reduce [their] emissions to the permissible
quantum ‘within the shortest time feasible’” (EGCOE
2018: 61). The GHG reduction obligations of enterprises
are then aligned with those of the country in which they
operate (Principle 2.1), although countries are given flexibility to allocate enterprise reduction targets differently
(Principles 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2). This approach aligns with
distinctions between developed and developing countries
that are fundamental to the climate regime even as they
have evolved over time (UNHRC 2016: para. 43, 48).
Notably, global enterprises are treated separately under
Principle 5 as emerging trends place “special emphasis
on the role, responsibilities and obligations of multinational enterprises” and many global enterprises outsource
production to BPQ countries. Principle 6 further provides
that controlling enterprises must ensure compliance of
those under their control.
Enterprises Principles 7-11 focus on mitigation. However,
the extent of reduction obligations may be limited by cost,
and the purchase of offsets is acceptable, such as in the
case of coal-fired power plants. The obligation to reduce
applies to activities as well as products or services with
excessive GHG emissions, absent offsets, unless these are
indispensable in a least developed country context. Principles 12-13 provide that if emissions are not reduced,
offsetting is permitted and a grace period may be contemplated. Overall, this appears to be at odds with a human
rights approach which should allow no grace period, nor
accept that positive contributions could offset violations

4
However, if these countries “have accepted reduction
obligations under the Paris Agreement or a subsequent
amendment thereof, they are bound to honour their pledges”.
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of human rights. Furthermore, Principle 16 suggests that
where exceptional circumstances such as natural disasters occur, an enterprise may be exempt from reduction
targets, yet it is unclear why powerful and well-resourced
companies that fail to adequately anticipate a natural
disaster should be exempt, particularly if the extent of
the disaster is exacerbated by human-induced climate
change.
Principle 17 contemplates that enterprises should
take into account the GHG emissions of their suppliers
where feasible, suggesting that these emissions are not
routinely attributed to the enterprise. This may also be out
of step with a human rights due diligence approach to
responsibility under Principle 19 of the UNGPs.5 Guidance
on disclosure, including of stranded assets, is provided in
Principles 18-23, and goes beyond the Oslo Principles in
extending those for whom disclosure is made to include
consumers, the public, and employees.
Principles 8 and 24 provide that enterprises must conduct
environmental impact assessment of major new facilities
or expansions, including an assessment of carbon footprint, upstream and downstream effects and related mitigation opportunities, and potential future climate change
effects. However, no explicit direction is given on what to
do with this information, or whether the public should be
consulted by the enterprise as part of the process (EGCOE
2018: 193-196). Moreover, consideration of the need for
the project or alternatives to it that are less carbon intensive does not appear in the text. The Commentary does
conclude by noting that human rights impact assessments, following the UNGPs, are “progressing rapidly” as
an additional tool (EGCOE 2018: 198).
Principles 25-30 consider investors and financiers, including the obligations of banks engaged in project finance,

5
What precisely would be required of human rights due
diligence in the climate context is unclear, although supply
chain responsibility for GHGs could be viewed as the exercise of
leverage across relationships in response to human rights due
diligence. However, the authors of the Enterprises Principles did
consider the UNGPs and related OECD guidance when developing
the scope of this principle and came to a different conclusion.
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pension funds, insurers and reinsurers, among others.
Consideration is given to the financial implications of
failing to adequately consider GHG emissions associated
with a project or investment, the need to justify investment
in non-complying enterprises, and the need for investors to
play an active role in promoting compliance.
While open to critique especially for failing to consider
remedy or accountability, the Enterprises Principles adopt
a nuanced understanding of the nature of the international actors that include carbon majors. Rather than assuming that all sovereign states and all enterprises based in
sovereign states are operating on an equal footing and
bear equal responsibility, the Enterprises Principles make
a noble effort to grapple with the complexities of common
but differentiated responsibilities of states, carbon budget allocations between states, poverty, and development.
The result is unfortunately highly complex, with much
uncertainty in application, and does not clearly align with
the UNGPs. It would be informative to learn the views of
human rights NGOs on the Enterprises Principles, and
especially their attempt to grapple with the complexity of
differentiation. This is particularly pertinent in light of the
latest Heede update in which three state-owned enterprises, Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), Gazprom (Russia), and
National Iranian Oil Co. (Iran), are placed in the top 5 of
global greenhouse gas emitters since 1965 (Heede 2019).
From a human rights perspective, should the climate
change responsibilities of these state-owned enterprises
from countries that are classified by the UN as developing
be the same as US-based investor-owned enterprises
such as Chevron and ExxonMobil?
2019 Safe Climate report
The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Environment, David Boyd, released the Safe Climate report in
July 2019 for presentation to the UN General Assembly
in October. This report confirms the existing responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights as
they pertain to climate change, specifically stating that
businesses “must adopt human rights policies, conduct
human rights due diligence, remedy human rights violations for which they are responsible, and work to influence
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other actors to respect human rights where relationships
of leverage exist” (OHCHR 2019b: para 71). Moreover,
the Safe Climate report elaborates that the business
responsibility includes the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions from activities, products, and services, while
minimizing emissions from suppliers, and ensuring those
impacted by business climate harms can access remedies
(OHCHR 2019b: para 72). Notably, the Safe Climate
report relies on the Enterprises Principles for these
insights (OHCHR 2019b: note 90; Seck & Benjamin 2019).
Beyond this, the Safe Climate report also provides that
businesses should support public policies designed to
effectively address climate harms, rather than opposing
them (OHCHR 2019b: para 72).

and existing tools should be emphasized and leveraged by
human rights actors to ratchet up existing responsibilities
of businesses to do their part as organs of society to alleviate increasing climate impacts on those who can least
afford to bear them. Human rights due diligence guidance
tools are being developed for businesses, perhaps most
notably by the OECD, yet many fall short of integrating
human rights responsibilities for climate change, even
as they provide useful guidance for businesses on other
related aspects such as stakeholder and rights-holder
engagement (Seck 2018). This essay has briefly examined some key examples in the hope of providing ideas to
inspire climate action today by both human rights actors
and businesses themselves.

These two paragraphs in the Safe Climate report that elaborate briefly upon the meaning of business responsibilities
to respect human rights at risk from climate change, and
the need for businesses to support state climate policy,
provide the most elaborate OHCHR analysis to date on
point. It is notable that the Safe Climate report relies on
both the UNGPs and the Enterprises Principles. It is to be
hoped that further clarity will emerge from the OHCHR, and
from human rights NGOs, so that businesses that seek to
address the climate and human rights impacts of their
operations have access to meaningful guidance.

A common refrain from human rights NGOs is scepticism
over ‘non-binding’ responsible business guidance tools,
and a preference to devote resources to ‘binding’ solutions such as the business and human rights treaty. Yet
it is crucial that human rights NGOs not ignore the emergence of business guidance tools in the climate context
(and others) for many reasons. First, even if a ‘binding’
business and human rights treaty were negotiated that
provided the potential for future effective corporate
accountability, a treaty is only effective if a sufficient
number of key states ratify and then implement it. The
record of effective treaty implementation in the international environmental liability context is poor, and a quick
glance at the climate regime should give even the most
enthusiastic treaty endorsers reason to pause. If it has
proven so difficult to reach effective agreement among
states as to their own climate commitments, even before
ratcheting them up to the necessary level to avoid climate
crisis, how likely is it that a business and human rights
treaty will ever be able to effectively address climate
accountability?

Conclusions
The human dimensions of climate change are increasingly in the news, as the world grapples with the ongoing
failure of many states to effectively decrease greenhouse
gas emissions so as to avoid climate crisis. The independent responsibility of businesses to respect human
rights under the UNGPs provides a frequently overlooked
and often misunderstood tool that must be called into
play to prevent and remedy climate injustice. It is crucial
that the independent responsibility of businesses to
respect human rights, including those impacted by
climate change, be taken seriously. Failure to do so
inadvertently propagates the message that business
conduct that contributes to the violation of human
rights, including those associated with climate crisis, is
acceptable in the absence of state regulation. It is not,
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Second, with regard to climate change, the time to enable
preventative action is now. An increasing number of
businesses are seeking guidance on how to be climate
responsible actors, yet the human rights community has
for the most part utterly failed to meaningfully engage in
efforts to develop useful tools. Particularly at this moment
in history, with the United States poised to withdraw from
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the Paris Agreement on climate change, it is crucial that
non-state actors, perhaps especially powerful transnational businesses, are encouraged and enabled to take
meaningful human rights-respecting climate action,
rather than wait for state action that may never come. The
human rights community must step up, engage, critique,
and guide, rather than ignore the potential of climate
responsible business conduct as a vital preventative tool
that can be mobilized now.
At the time of writing, the Working Group on Business and
Human Rights has promised to develop an information
note on BHR and climate change, to be released in 2020
(OHCHR 2020). This is a crucially important opportunity to
provide clarity on the meaning of human rights respecting
business conduct in a time of climate crisis.
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The use of human rights arguments in climate change
litigation and its limitations

Human rights arguments are increasingly being made,
and human rights remedies increasingly being sought, in
climate change litigation. While relatively few cases have
been argued on human rights grounds so far, the trend is
continuing and accelerating, with some striking results.
However, human rights remedies offer little, if any,
compensatory relief for the impacts of climate change,
and few means to deter further harm. So why use them?
The use of human rights arguments in
climate change litigation
In recent years, litigants around the world have increasingly tried to push the boundaries of the law by filing test
cases to prompt state and corporate actors to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, or to obtain redress for the
impacts of climate change on persons, property, or the
environment. The use of human rights law as a gap-filler
to provide remedies where other areas of the law do not
is not new. It is thus hardly a surprise that human rights
arguments are increasingly used in climate change litigation. While relatively few climate cases have been argued
on human rights grounds so far, the trend is continuing
and accelerating, with some striking results.
In August 2019 there were 32 human rights cases listed
in climate change litigation databases curated by the
*
This piece builds on her contributions to Savaresi &
Hartmann (2019); Savaresi & Auz (2019); and Savaresi (2019).
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance
received from Marisa McVey, Chloe Abbott and Urenmisan
Afinotan in the preparation of this piece.
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Sabin Centre (Columbia University) and the Grantham
Institute (London School of Economics). These cases
preponderantly involve states (e.g. citizens suing governments), with only three involving non-state actors only
(e.g. citizens suing corporations).
This focus on states is to be expected, given that under
human rights law the main duty-holder is the state. As
discussed elsewhere in this volume, in recent years,
human rights bodies have done much work to clarify the
content of states’ human rights obligations in relation to
climate change. This interpretative work has clearly shown
that obligations associated with both substantive human
rights (e.g. the right to life, adequate housing, food, and
the highest attainable standard of health) and procedural
human rights (e.g. the right to access to remedies and to
take part in the conduct of public affairs) take on a specific character in relation to climate change. Most saliently,
states have specific obligations to “enable affordable and
timely access to justice and effective remedies for all, to
hold states and businesses accountable for fulfilling their
climate change obligations” (OHCHR 2019b: para 64).
Even though conventionally greenhouse gas emissions are
attributed to states, recent studies suggest that a group
of corporations are historically responsible for the lion’s
share of global emissions (Ekwurzel et al. 2017; Frumhoff,
Heede & Oreskes 2015; Heede 2014). After the adoption of
the Paris Agreement in 2015, many companies announced
voluntary measures to tackle emissions, but there has
been a glaring gap between words and action. In fact,
evidence suggests that many fossil fuel companies have
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continued to lobby against climate change action, to
spread disinformation and to support climate deniers
(Union of Concerned Scientists 2018). These activities
have come under increasing scrutiny in light of recent
developments in international,1 regional 2 and national 3
law, which acknowledge corporate responsibilities for
human rights violations, and impose at least some
accountability upon corporate actors for these.4
Most human rights cases concerning climate change
remain ongoing at the time of writing, and a handful
have been successful. Yet, this trend is remarkable if one
considers that, just ten years ago, a report of the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) noted
that “while climate change has obvious implications for
the enjoyment of human rights, it is less obvious whether,
and to what extent, such effects can be qualified as
human rights violations in a strict legal sense” (OHCHR
2009: para 70). The report cautioned that it would be
“virtually impossible to disentangle the complex causal
relationships” linking emissions to human rights violations, and that in all events the adverse effects of climate
change are often projections about future impacts,
whereas human rights violations are normally established after the harm has occurred (OHCHR 2009). These
caveats were echoed by the future UN Special Rapporteur
on Human Rights and the Environment, John Knox, who
warned that, if there was scope to recognize the negative
1
See UNHRC (2011) and UNHRC (2014).
2
Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014 amending
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and
diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups
(Text with EEA relevance) [2014] OJ L330/1. See also Protocol on
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court
of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol) (adopted 27 June
2014, not yet entered into force), art 46.
3
See e.g. the UK’s Modern Slavery Act (2015), the French Loi
n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance
des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre (‘Loi du
Vigilance’) and Décret n° 2012-557 du 24 avril 2012 relatif aux
obligations de transparence des entreprises en matière sociale et
environnementale.
4
See e.g. ICSID (2016) Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas
Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/26, Award of 8 December,
2016; The UK Supreme Court (2019) Vedanta Resources PLC and
another v Lungowe and others, Judgement of 10 April, [2019]
UKSC 20.
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obligation to refrain from causing harm, this would in
all events merely “treat climate change as a series of
individual transboundary harms, rather than as a global
threat to human rights” (Knox 2009b: 211).
So what has changed? In the last few years human rights
arguments have been increasingly used to prop up those
based on private or public law, to call for greater state
and corporate efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Furthermore, applicants have tried to use human rights
remedies as an avenue to redress personal injury and
property damage associated with climate change, which
can be framed in terms of human rights violations.
The success of human rights arguments depends
upon whether a victim can substantiate a claim that
a duty-bearer has failed to comply with human rights
obligations. Human rights arguments associated with
climate change can thus be formulated in two main ways:
applicants may complain that failure to act (e.g. a failure
to adopt and/or implement climate change legislation)
has resulted in human rights violations; or, conversely
that certain actions (e.g. permits or licenses to extract
fossil fuels or log forests) have led to human rights violations. The sections below look at how these arguments
have been used in climate change litigation, starting
with cases where applicants have used human rights
arguments to challenge governments and corporations for
failing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Human rights complaints about failure to
reduce emissions
Human rights arguments in climate change litigation have
so far largely been used to support complaints over states’
– and, to a more limited extent, corporations’ – failure
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Courts and human
rights bodies around the world have increasingly been
asked to consider the human rights implications of states’
action (e.g. licenses for oil extraction) (Oslo District Court
2018) or inaction (e.g. insufficient ambition in targets
enshrined in law and policy) (The Hague Court of Appeal
2018). Two landmark decisions taken in 2018 have shown
how decisive human rights arguments may be.
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In the first, a group of Colombian youth successfully
challenged the Colombian government for failure to
tackle deforestation in the Amazon, thereby breaching
several human rights enshrined both in the Colombian
Constitution and in international instruments (Supreme
Court of Justice of Colombia 2018).5 In the second, the
Urgenda Foundation and a sizeable group of citizens
successfully challenged the Dutch government for not
taking sufficiently ambitious action to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions (The Hague Court of Appeal 2018). While
the Dutch case had in the first instance been decided
on the basis of administrative and tort law (The Hague
District Court 2015), the Court of Appeal set aside a
restrictive interpretation of victimhood and framed the
state’s duty of care also with reference to rights enshrined
in the European Convention on Human Rights – such as
the right to life and the right to respect for private and
family life. These victories have encouraged litigants and
human rights advocates to use similar arguments before
national courts – for example against the Canadian
Government (Superior Court of Quebec 2019) – and before
international human rights bodies – for example against
Australia (Client Earth 2019).

was dismissed in 2019 because of lack of standing but
is currently under appeal. The People’s climate case is
nevertheless significant, in that it challenges a package
of climate legislation, arguing that implementation would
lead to human rights breaches, not only of EU citizens,
but also of those residing outside the EU.

These human rights complaints have started to target
corporations as well. In 2019 civil society organizations
in France (Notre Affaire à Tous 2019) and the Netherlands (Milieudefensie 2019) have asked national courts
to declare that fossil fuel corporations’ contribution to
climate change violates human rights law.

While so far no court has found that particular emissions
relate causally to adverse climate change impacts for the
purpose of establishing liability,6 litigants are pushing
the boundaries of private, public, and administrative law
to obtain redress for damage to persons, property and/or
the environment associated with climate change (Peel &
Osofsky 2018; Setzer & Vanhala 2019).

Applicants are also becoming more ambitious. In the
so-called People’s climate case, applicants from Kenya,
Fiji, Portugal, Germany, France, Italy, Romania, and the
Sami youth association Sáminuorra (CURIA 2018), asked
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) to set aside and
replace three EU climate law instruments, on the basis
of human rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. So far, the applicants have failed to persuade
the CJEU to move beyond its restrictive interpretation
of the threshold to access judicial review, and the case

5

Hereinafter Future Generations v. Colombia.
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Far from “treating climate change as a series of individual transboundary harms”, therefore, applicants in the
cases above are arguing that climate change should be
averted because it systematically threatens the enjoyment
of human rights. These developments show not only that
human rights arguments are being increasingly deployed,
but also that demands associated with the protection of
human rights are becoming bolder, and attempt to sanction harm that is predicted to happen in the future – and
thus affect future generations – or occurring outside of
the bounds of a state’s territory. At the same time, a new
front in litigation has opened, concerning the impacts of
climate change.
Human rights complaints about the impacts
of climate change

It is presently difficult to obtain redress for climate
change harms. Existing liability schemes scarcely seem fit
to address harm associated with the impacts of climate
change. As a matter of scale, climate change is predicted
to cause unprecedented damage to property, persons and
the environment. This damage is predictable, but only
to the extent that we know it will happen, not where and
when. Thus, extant liability and insurance schemes need
to be adapted in order to address the complex restorative
6
See e.g. Saúl Luciano Lliuya v RWE AG (2015), Case No. 2
0285/15 of the Essen Regional Court, Germany (pending).

51

The use of human rights arguments in climate change litigation and its limitations

and distributive justice considerations associated with the
impacts of climate change. Before this happens, human
rights arguments may be used to fill the gap.
Human rights remedies are not designed to specifically
redress environmental damage. They have, nevertheless,
historically been used as an avenue to address personal
and property harm associated with various forms of
pollution or environmental degradation, especially where
no other remedies are available (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2010; Council of Europe 2012). In
general, human rights are helpful because they are widely
recognized in both international and national law, as a set
of basic rights and freedoms that belong to every person.
The obligations associated with the protection of human
rights may be enforced both nationally and internationally
against states and – to some extent – non-state actors,
and, in certain circumstances, in an extraterritorial
context. The issue is, therefore, to establish when and
how they can be used in relation to the impacts of climate
change.
As recounted above, in 2009 the OHCHR specifically
cautioned that qualifying the effects of climate change
as human rights violations poses a series of technical
obstacles, concerning the jurisdiction to adjudicate
human rights complaints associated with the impacts of
climate change; how to attribute responsibility in terms
of causality, retrospectivity, and apportionment; and what
may be regarded as adequate remedies for human rights
violations associated with the impacts of climate change
(OHCHR 2009: para 69-70). Yet, recent litigation indicates
that these obstacles may not be insurmountable.
The historical contribution of state and non-state actors
to greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change is
increasingly well documented, and advances in scientific
knowledge are making it easier to trace causal connections
between particular emissions and the resulting harms
(UNHRC 2016: para 36-37). For example, the Athabaskan
people have petitioned the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, arguing that Canada has breached its
human rights obligations by causing significant adverse
impacts in the Artic, by failing to regulate emissions of
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black carbon, which affect Athabaskan communities
within and without Canada’s territory (Earth Justice
2013). Similarly, following the widespread loss of life and
harm to property and persons associated with increasingly
extreme weather events, civil society organizations asked
the Philippines Human Rights Commission to investigate
the responsibility of the world’s largest corporate emitters
– so called Carbon Majors – for human rights violations,
or threats thereof, resulting from the impacts of climate
change (Greenpeace 2015).
These complaints provide an opportunity to see whether
the arguments made in 2009 by the OHCHR on the justiciability of human rights violations associated with the
impacts of climate change still stand. For example, should
the Philippines Human Rights Commission find that the
Carbon Majors’ are responsible for human rights violations
resulting from the impacts of climate change, this would
be a primer and could have repercussions on the use of
human rights arguments in ongoing climate change litigation against the Carbon Majors elsewhere. As mentioned
above, in 2019 Friends of the Earth (Netherlands), six
NGOs and around 400 citizens sued Shell for breaches of
the duty of care associated with its contribution to climate
change and its continued investments in fossil fuels. Similar to Urgenda, the applicants have relied, amongst others,
on the right to life and the right to respect for private and
family life, home and correspondence recognized by the
European Convention on Human Rights.
The outcome of the Carbon Majors inquiry may therefore
resonate well beyond the Philippines. For the time being,
the inquiry has already set a significant precedent, by
showing that a national human rights institution may look
into the responsibility of corporate actors headquartered
outside of the territory of state. The inquiry may furthermore establish that corporations may be held responsible
for human rights violations associated with the impacts
of climate change and even open the way to compensation
through subsequent legal action, thus marking another
milestone in climate change litigation worldwide.
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The limitations of human rights
As the examples above show, human rights law arguments are playing an increasingly prominent role in
climate change litigation. For lack of better remedies,
human rights arguments are being used to supplement
regulatory action and change state and corporate actors’
behaviour, and to help address the complex restorative
and distributive justice questions associated with climate
change.
This is, however, an area where human rights law also
presents clear limitations. Human rights law typically
provides declaratory relief to name and shame human
rights abusers, but this makes little difference if it is not
followed by action to prevent further harm and to remedy
the harm caused. The Urgenda case provides a hopeful
example of how litigation may be used to put pressure
on the government to take legislative action on climate
change. Future Generations v. Colombia, however, clearly
shows how human rights remedies offer limited means
to deter further harm: in spite of their much acclaimed
court victory, the applicants have failed to halt forest loss
in Colombia, which has reportedly continued unabated
(Ardilla Sierra 2019).
In the Carbon Majors inquiry, the powers of the Philippines Human Rights Commission rest with the domestic
authorities’ limited powers to affect the future behaviour
of the Carbon Majors. But even the enforcement of court
judgements is not to be taken for granted, and the history
of human rights law is full of pyrrhic victories, especially
in the environmental context (Gilbert 2018). For almost
forty years (350.org 2019), coal power plants in the
Mugla region of Turkey have continued to severely affect
the quality of life for local inhabitants (Climate Action
Network 2018), despite the recognition of widespread
human rights abuses, including by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR 2005). Similarly, victims of severe
human rights abuses associated with oil extraction in the
Niger Delta are still awaiting for remediation of the harm
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caused to their lands, water and livelihood (Friends of the
Earth International 2019), in spite of multiple court victories before national, regional and international tribunals.7
Human rights law is no replacement for effective legislation concerning climate change, and human rights
remedies are no replacement for tort-like liability for
climate change impacts. There are dangers too, associated with clashes between human rights claims, that may
be relied upon to protect a quality of life that imposes
unacceptable climate costs on society (Pedersen 2011).
For example, human rights arguments have been used
to resist the establishment of wind farms (Peeters &
Schomerus 2014; Peeters & Nóbrega 2014), highlighting
the potentially complex, layered, conflicting claims when
it comes to the protection of different human rights.8
Yet, past experience suggests that successful human
rights complaints can help to bring about a change in
attitude by courts and lawmakers. By highlighting principles of universality and non-discrimination, the rights
of future generations and of those living outside a state’s
territory, human rights arguments in public interest
litigation can contribute to engendering a momentum to
deal with one of the most intractable challenges yet to
face humankind.
The viability of public interest litigation reliant on human
rights arguments depends on both legal and social
variables (Anderson 1998: 21). It requires that standing
rules be interpreted in a way to enable individuals or
groups to be heard, and that the judiciary is independent
and sympathetic. Under human rights law, victims are

7
Such as Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company
Nig. Ltd. and 2 others Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05; Shell Pet. Dev.
Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Isaiah (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.723)168; Social and
Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Anor v Nigeria (2001)
AHRLR 60, Africa Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
Communication 155/96; The Bodo Community v. Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (2015) EWHC HT-2015000241.
8
See Fägerskiöld v Sweden, European Court of Human Rights,
Application no. 37664/04, Decision as to Admissibility; and,
Vecbaštika and Others v Latvia, European Court of Human Rights
Application no. 52499/11 (pending).
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normally saddled with a less stringent burden of proof,
when compared, for example, with tort law.9 Applicants
in Urgenda and Future Generations v. Colombia have
convinced courts to expose governmental inaction, and to
order states to do more to tackle climate change. These
decisions relied on a novel approach to the interpretation
of human rights vis-à-vis climate change law obligations.
Using human rights law has also enabled petitioners to
formulate complaints, such as those in the Carbon Majors
inquiry, which would have not been possible by making
resort to tort law.
So far, some significant milestones have been achieved
and the boundaries of the law have already been shifted.
Human rights arguments have been used not only to
complain about actual harm, but also about future harms,
caused by states, as well as by corporate actors, and even
in an extraterritorial context. We have therefore already
gone a long way, compared with where we were only ten
years ago, when the OHCHR report made its first assessment of the state of play.

international level, human rights bodies may be systematically used as institutionalized pathways to monitor and
sanction human rights violations associated with climate
change and the implementation of climate change
response measures. Before national courts, human rights
arguments may be used to put pressure on state and
corporate actors, to increase ambition on climate change
and to redress harm caused by climate change.
Ultimately, human rights are no silver bullet and there are
limits to their capacity to redress human rights abuses
associated with climate change and to address their root
causes. Human rights law is nevertheless an important complement to climate change law, as it currently
stands. As Humphreys noted already in 2008, human
rights continue to “occupy much of the space of justice
discourse and therefore represent an ‘essential term of
reference’ to address justice and equity questions in the
context of climate change” (Humphreys 2009: 45). One
just has to be aware of their limitations.

The successes achieved thus far are likely to continue
to inspire others to use human rights arguments to put
pressure on state and corporate actors, both to increase
ambition in combating climate change and to redress
harm caused by its impacts. The outcome of pending
complaints may further embolden applicants or suggest
new avenues to test the full potential of human rights
arguments. The advantages of taking a human rights
approach to the matter of climate change are, eminently,
that it translates climate change concerns in terms of
obligations owed directly to individuals; and, relatedly,
that it provides access to remedies that may not otherwise be available.
Much more could be done going forward. Most saliently,
human rights law may provide access to remedies at
the domestic and, potentially, at the international level
to complain about breaches of human rights associated
with climate change. Both at the national and at the
9
See e.g. Tătar v. Romania, App No 67021/01 (ECtHR 5 July
2007) [107]-[124].
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Stephen Humphreys

Delayed and denied: climate inequity
and human rights

The delay between the causes of climate change and its
effects creates a space within which denial and injustice
have flourished. Climate law relies on ‘equity’ to address
climate injustice: this may be buttressed by human rights,
resurgent in the face of increasingly daily violations.
The bubble of delay
In his recent book, The Progress of this Storm, Andreas
Malm claims that the felt reality of climate change has
reawakened a sense that we are living-in-time. By ‘time’
he is not referring to daily or seasonal cycles, but to lines
of putative historical progress. As the last century ended,
it was plausible to consider that history had, in a sense,
come to a halt. Market liberalism had apparently won the
centuries-long battle of ideas and was installing itself
across the globe. Relatedly, perhaps, human rights too (in
a trajectory that accelerated with the founding of Amnesty
International in 1961) were becoming a dominant
language of justice across the world. The relationship
between these two forces – human rights and market
liberalism – was perhaps not initially very clear: were
market ‘freedoms’ consonant with human rights or did
they constitute a threat (Moyn 2014)?
On Malm’s telling, climate change reawakens the category of time precisely because we no longer know what
our destination is. Whether we approved of it or not, we
appear no longer to be secure in a universal vision of a
market machine that metabolizes the world’s resources
ad infinitum. Even if some, possibly most, contemporary
climate narratives cling to the vision of an expanding
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global economy capable of conjuring a technological
escape from our climate constraints (think of the ‘Green
New Deal’) – and even were such a vision feasible – the
spread of a liberal global market has, with contemporary
climate realities, lost the sheen of inevitability acquired
at the close of the cold war. There are real stakes.
“History,” writes Malm (2018:11), “has sprung alive”, as
the carbon consumption of the past – the immediate past
flowing by us, as well as its centuries-long tail – determines the future in ways that are both intractable and
unpredictable.
Climate change makes the future both intractable and
unpredictable because the cumulation of burned carbon
over past centuries builds in an atmospheric effect the
extent of which will only be felt and appreciated in future,
with the passage of time. There is, in other words, a delay
between the cause – the consumption of fossil fuels
(primarily) – and the effect – the storms, heatwaves,
droughts, floods, rising seas and sinking islands, whose
frequency and intensity will, on every account, increase,
even as their precise timing and location will remain
largely unknowable. There is delay built into climate
change, and it is a delay that is, moreover, inhuman – in
that it is not subject to human intent, unresponsive to
human time-management, and unconcerned with human
expectations and human pain. History reawakens as a
process of change-in-time where the stakes of change
remain up for contest. However, unlike the high modern
period with which Malm contrasts the present, in climate
change the contest is not (or not obviously – but I will
pick this up below) between competing ideas about law,
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economy and government; it is rather a contest between
competing interpretations of the nature of the delay itself.
What is unfolding? How quickly? Where? With what
effect? Can it be stopped?
The bubble of denial
In this knowledge-contest over the nature of the delay,
there are a spectrum of views, some of which are characterizable as denialist. But denialism is not exhausted by
the plaintive and, in fact, dwindling claim that climate
change is not ‘real’. Rather degrees of denialism run
throughout the entire climate experience – if by ‘denial’
we mean an unwillingness to face the truths serially
put before us by the practitioners of the ‘best available
science’.1 In conditions of climate change our daily lives
involve constant exercises in denial, requiring us to ignore
both the myriad small contributions we ourselves make to
the problem through our everyday choices and activities
and the sheer scale of the mounting pain these choices
of ours are building towards. We are in denial both about
how much has to be done to check the advancing tide of
heat, and about how little is actually being done. We are
in denial about the vanishingly tiny likelihood that we can
retain our lifestyles and global ‘growth’, just as we are in
denial about the huge costs to be borne to avoid the far
greater costs climate change will otherwise exact. We are
in denial about our personal and collective responsibility,
in high-emitting countries, for the havoc wreaked and
lives and livelihoods lost in vulnerable countries. We are
in denial about our past, which has brought us to this
impasse, our present, in which we continue to fail to
address it, and our future, which is bleaker than we are
ready to imagine. We are in denial about the fact that
our laws and governments are not working for us – for
the many of us who have and will suffer climate change
without having contributed much to it – and we are in
denial about our power to make them do better.
All this denial is also, or appears to be, enmeshed in
delay. In the bubble of delay, the incontrovertible causal

1

The term is from the Paris Agreement, Article 14(a).
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connection between the wind we are sowing today –
the extraordinarily destructive seeds of our everyday
lives – and the hurricanes we will certainly reap, feels
blurry, loose, deniable. It hasn’t happened yet: it might
not happen at all. Or: in the temporal gap between
cause and effect, we might figure out how to avert the
effects altogether. In its starkest form, this fantasy is
the dream of geoengineering – but it can be tracked in
every narrative proposing technological fixes to climate
change, and these today include all available scenarios in
which global warming peaks at 1.5°C above preindustrial
temperatures (see Rogelj et al. 2018). The delay, in short,
has become our lifeline of denial, allowing us to believe in
potential futures which do not and will not exist. Ignorance breeds inaction.
Responses delayed, responsibility denied
At some level, it will have been clear, I am invoking the
old adage ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. It is no
longer controversial that climate change brings about
grave harms and injustices, and that many of these are
best understood as human rights violations. People are
losing their lives, homes and livelihoods due to storms
whose frequency and force would have been vanishingly unlikely were it not for manmade climate change.2
Climate change already brings water scarcity and food
insecurity for hundreds of thousands of persons; health
is threatened, homes are lost, the less well-off everywhere are more vulnerable than the well-heeled.3 Climate
change greatly increases the likelihood of conflict and is
already triggering mass movements of people from its
related impacts. All this is set to get much worse.

2
See the testimony by Myles Allen at the proceedings of the
Philippines Commission on Human Rights National Enquiry
on Climate Change, hearings held at the London School of
Economics, 6-7 November 2018. Available at: http://www.lse.
ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/event/inquiry/.
3
See the various reports of the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, especially those of the
Special Procedures on Health, Housing, Children’s Rights,
Extreme Poverty, and the Environment. Available at: https://
www.ohchr.org/en/issues/hrandclimatechange/pages/
hrclimatechangeindex.aspx.
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The question of delay therefore has to do not only with the
space of responsibility within which climate harms take
place, but also with the time of redress for the extensive
human rights violations to which climate change is
now giving rise. The two are presumably related. Does it
matter for ‘climate justice’ that climate harms appear
in what I have called the ‘bubble of delay’ – that they
were not, for example, pre-empted, given that they were
predicted far in advance? Does it matter whether ‘redress’
for these harms come later rather than sooner and by
how much – or perhaps the question should rather be: is
it possible to expedite redress? It is, after all, a simple
matter to observe that the longer we put off effective
climate action, the worse the human rights consequences
are. It is less simple to identify the frame within which
climate action is persistently deferred and to relate this
to the available frameworks of justice and redress that
characterize ‘human rights’ in our usual understanding
of the term. Quibbles over ‘responsibility’, as a matter of
science, stand to delay redress, as a matter of law. Indeed
that is, presumably, the point.
Equity, justice, human rights
For my title I have chosen the term ‘climate inequity’
rather than ‘climate injustice’ (or, indeed, ‘climate
justice’) because ‘equity’ is a term of art in climate law
(appearing in both the UNFCCC and in the Paris Agreement) whereas ‘justice’ is not. Neither term is transparent, and the particular tradition that joins ‘equity’ to
‘justice’ (deriving from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics)
does not easily encompass the many strands of thought
and political activism that exist today under the banner
of ‘climate justice’. Further, in my title, I have linked
‘climate inequity’ to human rights. The consonance of
these two terms – equity and human rights – may appear
self-evident, but in fact in the vast literature on the legal
principle of ‘equity’, very little mention is made of human
rights. If the intuition that human rights are relevant to
climate equity is correct, it needs to be shown rather than
presumed.
So what is equity? Most accounts begin with Aristotle
(2012), for whom equity (epikieia) is an essential element
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in – indeed a superior form of – justice, a vital means to
compensate for the flawed generality of law when applied
to particular cases, through the exercise of discernment
or discretion on the part of an arbitrator or judge. The
Greek term epikieia translates as ‘decent’ or ‘fitting’ –
and Aristotle extols the ‘equitable man’ who exercises
equity in daily life – through letting go of legal rights, for
example, in the interests of empathy or harmony (Aristotle
1939). The point is equity involves not insisting on the
letter of the law. As Cicero would later put it, equity is
a recognition of the potential for harm in overly literal
legal interpretation: summum ius summa iniuria – the
more law the more harm (Shanske 2005). On its face, this
early tradition does not appear promising for a theory or
practice of human rights. But it clearly holds within itself
a kernel of sympathy for the individual human which will
blossom in time.
This kernel finds some fruition in the Roman law tradition,
where equity (aequum; aequitas) provided a channel
for what would gradually become known as natural law
principles – notions of fairness and equality that direct
lawmakers and adjudicators to ensure basic equalities
under law (Schiavone 2012). There are no slaves under
natural law, the Roman jurist Ulpian famously wrote
around CE 200; slavery is an institution of the positive
law of nations (Mommsen et al. 1985). In a powerful
tradition running through late Roman law (‘law is the
art of the equitable and the good’),4 and into medieval
scholasticism (‘equity is justice tempered by sweet
mercy’),5 equity becomes a marker of how law is to be
done, presuming an underlying universal equality between
the subjects of law, a technique for bridging the positive
law to something that would (later again) be termed
natural justice. Indeed ‘equity’ tells us what this kind of
justice might mean for law: equality, non-discrimination,
fairness. Something that is ‘due’ each person regardless
of status or wealth – something universal and prior to
the social or political. And so by the time it is revived in

4
Ulpian, quoted in Mommsen et al. (1985).
5
The glossarist Hostiensis, in an oft-quoted definition,
reworked by Jean Gerson and Christopher St. Germain. See
Rueger (1982).
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medieval canon law, equity has become a principle of
compassion, of regard for the vulnerable, a proximation of
God’s own justice and mercy, and one carrying real force
(Lefebvre 1963).
It is shortly after this point, as the medieval worldview
goes into decline as Europe encroaches on the world, that
we might begin to associate equity with rights – natural
rights, in their nascent early modern articulation. This
may be understood in part as a humanist embrace of the
principle of equity as a kind of ‘natural justice’, while
reacting against its medieval association with mercy.
As Martha Nussbaum points out, people can be treated
equitably without invoking mercy (Nussbaum 1993):
indeed the whole point of natural or human rights is they
do not engage mercy: they provide a floor of basic terms
of respect due to all without distinction as of right. The
line would appear to run from Jean Gerson – the medieval
French scholar credited by Richard Tuck with the earliest
articulation of the notion of natural individual rights (Tuck
1979) – through the English common lawyer Christopher
St. Germain, whose 1530 textbook was for centuries the
principal English authority on equity (see Rueger 1982),
and into the heady ferment of the English civil war period
of the mid-17th century (see Fortier 2005: 159-179). There
among the radical activists and pamphleteers exist many
rights- and equity-based arguments for root-and-branch
law reform, confronting the injustice of an increasingly
absolutist monarchy with regular invocations of interrelated principles: equity, reason, justice, conscience,
natural law and right. These terms recur in many writers
of the time, sewn closely together in many cases, such as
the Calvinist John Warr (Hill 1975: 269-276).

91). But over time, “laws, like swords, came to be used
against those who made them... Thus the law became
anything or nothing at the courtesy of great men and
bended by them like a twig” such that “laws upon laws
do bridle the people and run counter to their end”. Law,
which ought to be the guarantor of freedom, has, in 17th
century England, succumbed, says Warr, to power: it must
be “reduced to its original space which is the protection
of the poor against the mighty” (Sedley & Kaplan 1992:
92). Equity plays a starring role in Warr’s writings, as
“the divine principle”, which is the “clear reason and
understanding of all things”. “Reason,” Warr adds, “is
the measure of all just laws” and the “proper fountain of
good and righteous laws, a spirit of understanding big
with freedom, and having a single respect for people’s
rights”. When equity is restored to law, Warr says “we
shall all then stand on even ground, in a perfect level,
co-ordination and parity (…) This is the fall of worldly
interests” (Sedley & Kaplan 1992: 33-4). Warr’s work is
a reminder that today’s delay-and-denial is not merely a
question of science, but is also, in fact, one of law and
governance: who should the law serve and how?

For Warr – to choose one example from an extensive group
– the gap between the positive law and natural justice
was stark and critical.6 “At the foundation of governments,” he wrote in his Laws of England, “justice was in
men before it came to be in laws” (Sedley & Kaplan 1992:

For its time, this is less eclectic than it may sound
today: in the contemporary writings of Francisco Suárez,
Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes – the great theorists
of natural rights – equity will repeatedly appear, often
obliquely, as the ultimate backstop of a natural law, associated with the superarching justice and reason of God.
Warr’s particular association of equity and rights was
shared by his contemporary radicals Gerrard Winstanley
and Samuel Rutherford, both of whom find ‘equity’ as
the essential element in a law that underpins ‘rights’
that were not themselves codified.7 This association was
in fact the culmination of the centuries-long emergence
of natural right principles in medieval legal writing,
where ‘natural equity’ provided the conceptual means to
judge the ‘rightness’ of positive law (Tierney 1997: esp.
131-169).

6
Others invoking this family of terms include Samuel
Rutherford, John Harrington, the Levellers William Walwyne and
Richard Overton, and the Digger Gerrard Winstanley as well as
many anonymous pamphleteers.

7
See Rutherford’s Lex Rex (1644) and Winstanley’s The Law
of Freedom in a Platform (1652).
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But if this story is right, what then happened to the
association between equity and right? Around the same
time Warr was writing, Thomas Hobbes took a similar set
of associations in a very different direction, placing equity
above a sovereign who is answerable to God alone. The
sovereign, in exercising his right of judgement, may apply
mercy grounded in equity, but he is famously not accountable to the people on the use of this power. The English
Chancery court was an in-principle locus of the exercise
of this sovereign authority – in its origins, the site of the
king’s conscience. This view had been recently confirmed
in the pivotal 1616 Earl of Oxford case, in which it was
held – following an argument on these lines put forward
by the Stuart King James I himself – that the Court of
Equity took precedence over the common law courts
(Fortier 1998; Ibbetson 2014). In both James I’s argument
and Hobbes’s, equity is associated with natural rights –
but these are not necessarily ‘human rights’, rather they
comprise or presume the ‘natural’ higher (or retained)
right of the sovereign (Cooper 2014; Tuck 1992). For
Hobbes, of course, natural individual rights are precisely
those which, with the rest of natural law, must be given
up in the making of a social contract to preserve peace by
vesting power in a (rights-retaining) sovereign.
Hobbes was to win this war of ideas, at least insofar as
the radical power of equity was buttoned up behind the
veil of sovereignty. In England, equity disappeared into
the Chancery. By the early 19th century, equity referred to
a collection of relatively random, though rigid, practices in various discrete areas of law, without any clear
unifying theme (except perhaps as means to avoid taxes)
other than their co-existence within the Chancery’s former
jurisdiction, as F.W. Maitland tartly observed (2011). By
the late 20th century, through the ever-innovating vehicle
of the trust, equity law concepts were driving a global
financialization implicated in the financial crash of 2008
(Worthington 2009). The contemporary common law notion
of equity has little on its face to offer either climate
justice or human rights. By contrast, the much older root
tradition which gave rise to it now seems more relevant
than ever: equity as a concrete vehicle for righting felt
injustice.
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The roots of climate justice
Given the richness, longevity and durability of the
premodern concept of ‘equity’, perhaps it is unsuprising
that the notion it provides of a direct channel to ‘justice’,
beyond law, is alive and well, and indeed retains a
powerful hold on the collective imagination. This ancient
idea certainly lies at the heart of debates about climate
equity today. Equity is, for example, the guiding principle
behind the Stern Review’s controversial choice of a low
discount rate, enabling its famous and influential statement that it would cost less to deal with climate change
now than in future (Stern 2006). The point there was to
avoid what I called above the bubble of delay – and therefore the associated harms – altogether. Equity reappears
in discussions today over the carbon budget and nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement,
in discussions over the institutional architecture of
REDD+, of the CDM, and of carbon markets. In each case,
its work is to recognize the differential contribution of
different actors and to provide some protection for the
most vulnerable: justice tempered by sweet mercy…
And here it is perhaps easy – given the prehistory I have
sketched above – to see how this resurgent notion of
equity in climate law might latch very easily onto the idea
of human rights, itself a curiously natural law phenomenon in a positive-law-oriented world (law, we might
say, as the art of the equitable and the good). On most
tellings, modern human rights have emerged and imposed
themselves on the world as a response to a broad range
of felt physical (from Greek physis, ‘nature’) inequities
over time: slavery, torture, genocide. An appeal to human
rights proposes we accept their intuitive appeal to
justice and grounds this acceptance in the existence of a
broadly accepted list of internationally recognized rights,
themselves forged in a visceral response to the horrors of
the second world war, and since subjected to significant
testing and interpretation.
Across their long histories, then, both equity and human
rights share a secret debt to natural law, and a yearning
assumption, within that context, of radical universal
equality. But however intuitive this connection may
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appear, it is rarely made explicitly today. Climate law
refers to ‘equity’ but not justice, and the single reference
to human rights (in the Preamble to the Paris Agreement)
clarifies little. Climate equity has generally been interpreted to refer to the relative distribution of the costs and
benefits of climate policy options between ‘developed’
and ‘developing’ countries (Okereke 2010). This interpretation of ‘equity’ is due to the particular context in
which the term arose in the original UNFCCC text of 1992
– devised, as is well known, to circumvent entrenched
political blockage and achieve climate agreement (Grubb
& Paterson 1992). In recent writings on equity we begin
to find explicit mention of human rights (Fleurbaey et al.
2014; OHCHR 2015; Allen et al. 2018). But the concepts
are closely connected in a much broader literature.

states ‘owes’ compensation for harms in other states has
been vigorously refuted. Unlike climate science denialism,
this legal and ethical denialism is not marginal – it does
not struggle for respectability – it is much rather mainstream (though far from universal). The debates nevertheless follow a similar trajectory: what is self-evident
to some is hotly contested by others, and those contestations, while pitched as politically or ethically impartial,
nevertheless look to be normative or crypto-normative.
The blockage in reaching common principles for action
results in a blockage on action; the principal beneficiaries
of this delay in acting are those who stand to lose most
from effective action: the purveyors of fossil capitalism.
The result is the entrenchment of delay. Denial reinforcing
delay. Delay denying justice.

A grounding element of this notion of equity is ‘historical
responsibility’. States have ‘differential’ responsibility
to address climate change, on a widely held reading,
because they have not all contributed equally to the
problem in the first place. There are, on one hand, states
(and not just states) that are largely responsible for
having caused the problem and, on the other, states (and,
again, not just states) who are or will be affected by it
though they have contributed little to it. The historical
delay between long-term emissions from some and future
effects for others is, in short, central to the notion of
climate equity. And by corollary, equity is conceived as a
means of redressing the injustice implicit in that delay
– coupled with the broader fact that the world’s poorer
postcolonial countries continue to suffer the effects of the
trajectory that brought prosperity to the ‘great powers’.
Climate injustice, on this reading, arrives on top of, and
is intimately connected with, a longer historical delay, the
egregious injustices of colonialism and the slow progress
in surmounting them (Humphreys 2014).

Tides rising: human rights?

Unsurprisingly, this entire edifice of remedial equity is
itself frequently and repeatedly denied. The existence
and relevance of historical responsibility has never been
accepted by the United States delegates to the UNFCCC,
for example. The notion that developed and developing
country blocks have or should have differentiable obligations remains contentious and the idea that one group of
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It is here that human rights may appear to supplement
equity today. For human rights harms that were once
speculative and predicted have now become real and
palpable. It is the case, as I write in 2019, that with the
surging instances of concrete climate-related human
rights violations, courts and quasi-judicial human rights
bodies are being petitioned – and hundreds, indeed
thousands, of actors are embarking on the long road to
seek redress through the courts. These cases are not so
far meeting with much success, but someday they might,
some of them at least. And courts are not the only locus of
surging discontent with the state of our existing law. As
the swell of felt injustice grows into a tide, so the delay
itself fuels a growing tsunami of ‘justice denied’, and
for each cupful of ‘justice’ acknowledged in the courts
another ocean of denial rises close behind.8
The emerging law of climate equity cannot and will
not by itself bridge the expansive sea between climate
justice, however we conceive it, and a law that remains
fundamentally supportive of the pollutive and distributive
effects of climate change. Rather it seems we must await

8
On November 6, 2019, for example, two English High Court
judges ruled that a blanket police ban on Extinction Rebellion
protests was unlawful ([2019] EWHC 2957 (Admin)).
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the rise of the drowning tide to trigger the desperate fury
of self-proclaimed rights by those of us – humans – in
whom they have been invested and are being violated.
For this has been the history of human rights. As with
the English civil war and the aftermath of the second
world war, the sheer scale of felt injustice heads towards
a visceral level, triggering a radical response. So when
Greta Thunberg calls for equity in climate action, as she
did in New York in September 2019 (Milman 2019), she is
speaking the language of climate law, but it is through
the register of human rights that we must hear her.
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What about the people that already live there?
Intersections of climate change and social justice

Climate change, both in terms of its impacts and the
work we undertake to deal with it, is happening in a
world already populated with diverse groups, a world with
pre-existing inequalities and challenges to human rights.
As such solutions to climate change need a contextualized
and nuanced approach, and while mainstreaming
considerations of climate change in the context of human
rights is an important first step, we need to go one step
further and talk about justice.
Introduction
In July 2019 a friend who works in medical research
showed me an article about how and where we could
increase tree cover globally to help solve climate change.
He was pleased at finding something to share with me
about my work that offered, what he understood to be,
a positive and easy solution to a challenge we often
discussed, and he explained the article optimistically.
When he finished, I hesitated to respond, unsure whether
to share his optimism or my honest reflection… and eventually I asked: and what about the people that already
live there? He was stunned. “I’ve never thought of that
before,” he reacted. And just like that, his rose-tinted
optimistic lens cracked and human reality burst in.
This casual and light-hearted exchange between friends
points to the core of the challenge at the intersection of
social justice issues and climate change. This simple
*
The author wrote this piece during a Fellowship at the
Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies.
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question, ‘what about the people that already live there?’,
could be asked about various regions, various peoples
with various circumstances and relationships to the
climate crisis, to illuminate why climate change is not
just an environmental crisis, but a human one. Climate
change, both in terms of its impacts and the work we
undertake to deal with it, is happening in a world already
populated with diverse groups, a world with pre-existing
inequalities, with challenges to human rights, with
already scarce resources, with tensions, misunderstandings and power struggles. In the same way you would not
diagnose a patient without understanding their medical
history, solutions to climate change need a contextualized
and nuanced approach. There is a risk that new diseases
can exacerbate existing conditions, and the same is true
for climate change. There is a risk that treatment for
one illness can actually worsen another, and the same is
true for climate change. However, in the same way that
treatment can address multiple problems at once, climate
solutions have the possibility to address both climate
change and social justice challenges together too.
This essay will explore the tension between climate
change and social justice concerns, reflecting specifically on the history of this tension before elaborating on
three examples. Narratives around climate change have
changed drastically in the last couple of decades, and
the problem has been significantly reframed from being
narrowly defined as an environmental problem to a broader view incorporating a range of social, economic and
political aspects. While this is a step forward in terms
of understanding the complexities of the interlinkages
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between climate change, social justice, human rights and
human development, this also presents new challenges.
Even in the context of an expanding understanding of
climate and justice intersections and synergies, many
human rights organizations still fail to see the link
between climate change and human rights frameworks.
Additionally, in this process a new focus on the link
between concepts of justice and climate change has also
helped to illuminate a core challenge: that there is a huge
diversity in how people all over the world understand and
experience justice or injustice (Sikor 2013; Dirth et al.
2020). The three examples I highlight demonstrate these
complexities by focusing on three important tensions: a
story about Malawi will show how impacts of climate-related disasters can exacerbate already existing and
historically entrenched injustices; a story about forest
management in South America will show how sometimes
even seemingly simple solutions may also contribute to
local injustices; and a story about the energy transition
in Europe will show how injustices resulting from climate
change affect not only the Global South but vulnerable
people everywhere.
In the face of these new and diverse challenges resulting
from climate change and how we deal with them, perhaps
utilizing a human rights framework does not go far
enough to understand the injustices caused or exacerbated by climate change. While many human rights
institutions have already identified ways in which climate
change threatens human rights (Commonwealth Forum
of National Human Rights Institutions 2015), perhaps the
scale of the threat from the climate crisis on human wellbeing extends beyond our current understanding of human
rights. While mainstreaming considerations of climate
change in the context of human rights is an important
first step, we need to go one step further and talk about
justice.
A historical tension
For decades, human and economic development and
mitigating climate change were described as being in
conflict with one another. This often manifested itself in a
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tension between pursuits of human development for poor
and vulnerable communities (and what comes with this
development, such as access to energy and infrastructure
projects) and the imperative of mitigating climate change
(Agarwal & Narain 1991). This tension influenced political
decisions, such as those made in 1992 within the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change, where countries were divided by their wealth to allow for emissions
to increase in order to enable human development in
some places, while prescribing that they need to be cut in
others. Since the 1990s until very recently, influenced by
the creation of different standards for different countries,
among many other things, the assumption remained
that pursuing human and economic development and
dealing with climate change were incompatible and even
in conflict with one another. Broadly, the argument went
that in order to improve well-being, emissions need to
increase first, and we have to have space for this before
we can expect action against climate change. In this
line of argumentation, discussing limiting emissions
inherently also meant limiting human development, which
is not only a threat to a number of human rights but also
unjust for poor and vulnerable people around the world.
While this is the origin of the tension between human
development, social justice and climate change, it is now
becoming widely recognized that this tension comes from
a very narrow understanding of both development and
mitigating climate change (Trebeck & Williams 2019).
More recently, our understanding of social justice and
climate change has expanded and changed parallel to the
expansion of our knowledge about the urgency of climate
change and realizations about the imperative of adapting
to it. Terms such as ‘climate justice’ have been introduced
to capture new nuances. Pursuing climate justice refers
to addressing the injustice that those who have done the
least to cause climate change will be the first to experience the impacts, are often the most vulnerable and will
experience the worst impacts (Mary Robinson Foundation
2013). While this term has come to encapsulate many
aspects of this injustice, there are two central pillars.
First, there is the concern about the devastating impacts
of climate change on vulnerable communities and the
need to consider adaptation, compensation, and losses

64

What about the people that already live there?

and damages which are spread disproportionately to
affect the world’s poorest and most vulnerable. Second,
there is the concern about climate action focusing too
much on limiting emissions everywhere and the negative
consequences for human development, instead of considering ways in which the fight against climate change can
present opportunities for people’s well-being.

But perhaps the fundamental problem is that climate
change poses a challenge to the core of the human rights
framework: no human right can exist outside of a climate
system safely habitable for humans. The deeply existential nature of the climate crisis exposes the assumptions
behind a human rights approach which neglects basic
human needs.

The term climate justice helped to reframe the conversation about climate change to incorporate concerns about
human well-being, rather than to see a conflict between
the two. Meanwhile, the human rights community has
been slow to participate in these discussions. Why is this?

Fundamental to this whole discussion then is the difference between justice and human rights. While human
rights are codified in somewhat universally agreed documents and there are a number of concrete and specific
institutions and legal frameworks to enforce them, justice
is defined differently everywhere. For some, a just way of
dealing with climate change is the average greater good,
with acceptance of some inevitable hardship. For some,
a socially just way of dealing with climate change is
compensation from wealthy countries or regions to those
who are experiencing greater devastation and vulnerability. For some, justice also entails justice for their
natural surroundings and the non-human as an inherent
part of how justice is understood for their community. And
for some, justice for future generations is the central idea.
The fact that justice is a word with fluid and dynamic
meanings, means that it has come to incorporate environmental needs, struggles and climate injustice in a way
that human rights narratives and groups have struggled
with.

One possible explanation is that even though the conversation has changed in many places, many still perceive a
conflict between realizing social justice and addressing
climate change, and they worry that action on climate
change means that the pursuit of human rights may
suffer. This is a valid concern, as understanding nuanced
interlinkages does not mean this has translated to policymaking and implementation. Bad practice still prevails
on both sides of this debate: communities are still being
forcibly relocated for renewable energy production, like
hydropower, and development corporation agencies still
fund new coal or fossil fuel-based energy projects.
Another possible explanation is that the lack of interaction stems from the fact that there is no mention of
environmental conditions in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. New frameworks and interpretations have
been developed which build on this, making connections
to environmental rights clearer and stronger (UNHRC
2018). In addition, progress on litigation has also helped,
as scores of court cases around the world about environ
mental harms have been won using clauses about a
‘right to life’, or environmental rights where they do
exists. These cases draw important connections between
human rights and basic human needs like water and air.
However, much more of this litigation is needed in relation
to climate change in order to more deeply ingrain this
integral relationship.
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Climate-related disasters and
neo-colonialism
One of the most important justice challenges of climate
change is that contribution to climate change has
happened unevenly across the world and over time. There
are immense debates in academic, political, social and
economic spheres about who should take responsibility for
climate change, the damage it causes to livelihoods and
well-being, and how to hold those accountable for past
or future damage. This is perhaps the most commonly
discussed injustice resulting from climate change, with
many recent examples of climate-related disasters all
around the world, ranging from cyclones Idai and Kenneth
striking the south-eastern coast of Africa, to water
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scarcity in Chennai and Zimbabwe, to record-breaking
heatwaves in Europe, to enormous wildfires in almost every region of the world. While there is inconclusive science
about how many extreme weather events can be directly or
solely attributed to climate change, when we consider the
human impact, it is less important what percentage of
causality we can decisively conclude, than that we know
with certainty that as a result of climate change these
events will be more frequent, more extreme and more
deadly. It is no longer just about tensions between climate
mitigation and human development. Climate justice is
now also about sustaining life itself.
In early spring 2019 I was in Malawi for a partnership
project focused on empowering young people to take
action on climate change. While I was there, the country
was struck by a series of devastating extreme weather
events, which came at the end of their normal, intense,
rainy season. While cyclones Kenneth and Idai had a
larger impact where they first made landfall, in Mozambique, they also ravaged already vulnerable areas in
Malawi. A country where only around 12 per cent of the
population has access to electricity and whose carbon
footprint ranks 181st globally, lost over sixty lives from
these climate-related disasters, with thousands injured;
almost 100,000 people were displaced (OCHA 2019b;
World Bank 2019). In the region as a whole, over 750
people were killed with over 200,000 displaced. In the
week following the storm, the government used its emergency procedure for energy provisions. A country whose
electricity is almost entirely generated by hydropower,
struggles with consistency of energy supply both during
extreme storm events, because of the debris build-up at
the hydropower stations, as well as during the dry season
from lack of water flowing through the rivers. During these
times, the government manages energy use and distributes energy for a few hours per day across the different
regions. Most of the time, people don’t know when they’re
going to have power or for how long. It turns on, for a few
hours for your region’s quota, and then turns off and turns
on somewhere else. During the recovery periods from these
storms, which lasted several weeks, the electricity available for the entire country of 18 million people - people
suffering from a crisis they didn’t cause - was the same
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amount that twelve people in the United Kingdom use in
a year. For me, these events were a clear illustration of
social justice and climate change intersections which
exacerbate vulnerability and worsen human conditions.
The experience of this vulnerability is something difficult
to put into words. There is, first of all, loss. In the most
affected areas people were killed, lost their entire livelihood or their loved ones, which is hard to imagine if you
haven’t experienced it yourself. For the rest of the country,
the feeling that your access to water, your ability to cook
food, your connectivity to loved ones, your entire life
hinges on such a delicate system, is a feeling of vulnerability that is all-encompassing.
Vulnerability also goes beyond physical human needs to
impact ability to work, or go to school or university. In a
world where many believe that opportunities from digital
technology, communication and access to education
are levelling the playing field in a globally competitive
economy, we forget that these disasters do not strike
evenly, and nor are we evenly able to be resilient to them.
It is a kind of double inequality that when your school is
washed away every couple of years, or three months of
the year in the dry season you can’t access what many
globally consider to be basic technologies for learning or
professional communication, climate change is exacerbating structural inequalities in the global economy, and
through its uneven impact further entrenches inequality
of education and training, new industries and wealth.
This is also psychologically traumatic: this kind of
vulnerability comes with a reminder that you exist within
a system that you can’t control, whether that be climate
and weather, or energy, or wealth. All the while, the most
expensive hotels kept running normally using generator
systems so that international business people or travellers didn’t experience this devastation. In the face of this
trauma, lucky Malawian families had three to six hours
of electricity a day, but visitors could still have reliable
wifi and pizza at their hotel. The practices of personal and
community resilience that result from this kind of vulnerability are awe-inspiring. Often, research about building
resilience as a social response to climate change focuses
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on adaptation techniques, either social or technical, and
the daily need for psychological resilience as an essential
pillar of dealing with human devastation resulting from
the climate crisis is overlooked. Psychological resilience
in this context requires more than planning ahead,
adaptation strategies or disaster relief; at its core it is an
acceptance that this injustice is your reality.
The final element in this story is the historical context:
Malawi is one of the most vulnerable and least developed
countries in the world, and a contributing factor to this is
its history under colonialism. Under the rule of the British
Empire, Malawi was perceived as not having any useful
resources, and so infrastructure development lagged
behind other British colonies in the region, such as Kenya
and Uganda (Mwakasungura & Miller 2015). Not only was
it exploited and oppressed in the past, but it still lacks
infrastructure to meet basic human needs, which makes
the country incredible vulnerable to extreme weather
events. In some sense, Malawi’s experience with climate
change can be seen as a continuum of injustice beginning
with colonialization by the British Empire up to the UK
government’s current failure to acknowledge its historic
responsibility for climate change, and its failure to take
action both in its own mitigation and in its funding
contribution to implementation beyond its borders in a
way proportionate to the country’s contribution to climate
change. In this story climate change is an injustice multiplier and its nuances expand beyond human development
and disaster vulnerability to encompass long-entrenched
wealth hierarchies, colonial legacies and neo-colonialism.
East Africa is one of several regions around the world
that is particularly vulnerable to climate impacts because
of a number of overlapping socio-economic challenges
and historically entrenched injustices. While what is
happening there is the very definition of climate injustice,
is it also a threat to human rights? Most clearly, extreme
events and disasters are a threat to life. They also
threaten the right to housing or food. But the injustices
related to climate change here don’t fit very easily in this
framework, as the scope of the injustice goes beyond what
looking at this disaster through a human rights framework can convey.
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More than ‘the lungs of the world’
The world’s eyes turned toward the Amazon rainforest in
late August and early September 2019. However, the fires
which caught the media’s attention are just the tip of the
iceberg into understanding the complex socio-economic
relationship with the forest in many regions in South
America. The response of much of the media to say “the
lungs of the earth are on fire” only recognizes the value of
the forest in producing oxygen and its role in combatting
climate change, but not its social, cultural or human
value. The Amazon region is first and foremost a home.
A technocratic and natural science-based approach to
climate change often implies that energy technology,
innovation and nature-based solutions, such as tree
planting, are ‘silver bullets’ for the climate crisis. In the
case of the Amazon, this perspective is used in adopting
an optimistically toned narrative that we can solve
climate change simply by planting more trees.
There is and has been a long-standing challenge of
deforestation everywhere around the world: there is no
region which has not experienced deforestation at some
point in its history. Currently, a lot of attention and focus
is on the deforestation in South America, even before the
fires of 2019 captured the public’s attention. Deforestation in this region presents not only a challenge in the
context of climate change, but also for essential biodiversity and fragile ecosystem health. There have been many
attempts to solve this through programmes which foster
international investment in regions suffering deforestation and biodiversity loss; these range from carbon
offsetting initiatives that are simply about tree-planting,
to initiatives which foster social, economic and environmental outcomes.1
Often, the basic tenant of such programmes is that

1
REDD+ and REDD are two of the most well-known examples.
(REDD is an earlier version of REDD+.) REDD+ is a mechanism
developed by the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change to support reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation, and includes the role of conservation,
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest
carbon stocks in developing countries.

67

What about the people that already live there?

countries (as well as businesses or individuals) that
emit a lot of carbon can pay for offsets or compensation
in the form of tree-planting or forest and ecosystem
management programmes in other regions of the world.
The idea is that these programmes have positive impacts
by sequestering carbon, combatting deforestation and
promoting ecosystem health, as well as boost local
economic development by supporting the livelihoods of
people living in these regions. This is a very rosy picture,
and unfortunately, it fundamentally oversimplifies the
challenges faced and neglects the social justice aspects
of the locality in which they work.
There is first the problematic relationship that makes
up the structural core of the idea: that industrialized
countries can compensate for their emissions by paying
for tree-planting in more economically vulnerable regions;
this is unequal at its core. Many industrialized countries
cleared their forests long ago to make space for agriculture, industry and housing. That many now pay others
to protect their forests in lieu of industrial development,
cuts to the core of the tension between climate change
and human development. Agreements that developing
countries should have space for their emissions to grow
to allow for human development, are at risk of being
undermined by the economic incentives which might
discourage any change or new socio-economic activities
in forested regions. Additionally, many countries contributing financially to programmes such as REDD+ are also
home to companies which contribute to deforestation:
there is the painful irony that, for example, USAID pays
for programmes which combat damage from American
companies. In this way, forests and forest communities
have become a new battleground for domestic disputes,
conflicting ideologies, lack of adequate regulation
and lack of policy coherence of other countries. Even
with financial resources as part of the transaction, the
expectation that a poorer region acts on behalf of a richer
seems fundamentally unjust.
A closer look at whether these programmes contribute
to the realization of human rights and social justice is
helpful for understanding the complexity behind this
climate action ‘silver bullet’. First, there is the important
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question of who benefits and how. Many argue that the
injection of financial resources that comes with these
programmes enables forest communities to support
themselves in socio-economic activity in their home
culture and region, which can operate in parallel or even
support healthy forests and ecosystems. This also helps
shift the narrative from forest communities being victims,
to them being empowered and included participants in
development of their regions and communities (Schroeder
& González 2019). However, interestingly, much of the
research on the example of REDD+ actually points to
stronger social and economic outcomes than environmental ones (Schroeder & González 2019), indicating that
perhaps this work supports the realization of some human
rights such as employment and community development.
However, there is still a crucial challenge around relationships created and entrenched through these programmes,
as they continue to reflect global inequalities and injustices in wealth and power distribution.
There has been significant criticism about the role of
gatekeepers, intermediaries, and the power of funding
institutions in these processes (Dawson et al. 2018).
Whether this criticism is directed at regional or national
actors siphoning off funds meant for local communities
delivering the projects, or at the power exercised by
funders in goal-setting and decision-making, or at the
lack of full and meaningful participation of the community, there are certainly injustices in these processes.
Crucially, there is often accountability up to international bodies or external funding sources, but a lack of
accountability at the local level (Dawson et al. 2018). This
dynamic further entrenches global hierarchies, inequality
and neo-colonialist attitudes.
The romanticized ideal of replanting the Amazon is often
a vision of nature which neglects the human element and
the people who live there. In addition, such programmes
give the illusion to Western, high-consumption countries
and lifestyles that it’s possible to adequately compensate
for the emissions from a flight or a coal-power station,
by planting trees. Many participating in reforestation or
forest protection programmes may be wedged in between
the burden of compensating for the emissions of wealthy
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people and nations, changing local socio-economic
developments, neo-imperialist power structures and new
forms of hierarchy to adhere to, threats from large-scale
business developments and a changing climate. In this
example it is not only the impacts of a changing climate
that threatens social justice, it is also how we try to solve
it with ‘silver bullets’ without considering the human
impact.
A just transition
Finally, I’d like to turn to a different type of example:
an example of how climate change mitigation policies
and practices can also exacerbate social injustices in
industrialized regions in Europe. In many regions across
Europe, the production of fossil fuels has been the cornerstone of the local economy for over a century. A number of
intersecting and overlapping structural transformations,
such as the radical change to a more global economy,
resulted in a changing geography of industrial centres
and networks. This economic transformation over the past
forty years has left many previously industrial regions
socially and economically deprived, with none of the tools
necessary for pursuing improved human well-being in
21st century Europe, and no opportunity for any form of
economic renewal. Regions which once homed, housed,
fed, and supported populations through heavy industry,
coal mining and the oil and gas industry have, over the
past forty years, seen their economic backbone systematically undermined and dismantled. This happened either
through trade policy, a private sector policy of profit over
people, or as a result of environmental regulation and the
shift to a zero carbon economy. It can be seen again and
again in regions like Lusatia (Germany), Scotland, South
Wales, Appalachia (US) and many more, where the transition out of heavy industry and away from a carbon-based
economy into a green economy is not creating opportunities for economic renewal and is ultimately exacerbating
social injustices (Sheldon et al. 2018). While we should
absolutely be celebrating the closure of coal plants, the
decommissioning of oil rigs and the process of divestment
from fossil fuels, for the people that have lived in these
places for generations, climate change mitigation and the
net-zero transition can be an injustice multiplier and a
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threat to their well-being and community livelihood. This
transition has immense potential to offer new opportunities, economic renewal and improved well-being, but this
needs to be an intentional policy of all actors in these
regions, local government, national government as well
as the private sector, in order for this transition to be a
positive one for all.
In addition to this lived experience, the way in which the
narrative of experts about these regions in transition has
developed, often takes on a condescending and belittling
tone. For example, in Germany, the Lusatia region has
been coined a ‘social experiment’, evoking the image of a
cage full of lab mice rather than of a broader community
struggling with reimagining its cultural identity, and
lacking the support to do so. Research on the perspective
of coal operators has confirmed what is also clear in
their public communications: that fossil fuel intensive
industries publicly emphasize human concerns, such as
employment, career development, local economies, et
cetera, while the green transition emphasizes C02, environmental conditions, et cetera (Bosch & Schwarz 2019). A
technocratic approach to the energy transition and climate
change as a whole may be expected, as climate science
developed out of the physical and natural sciences.
However, this approach is undermining the success of the
renewable energy transition in industrialized regions. In
the long run, a technocratic approach to the energy transition could be detrimental to the goal of a net-zero economy
because it has the potential to neglect the human element
and exacerbate social injustices in doing so.
The concerns of people living in post-industrial areas in
Europe are well-grounded in our current understanding
of human rights. They justifiably can see that their right
to work, their support systems, their right to choose their
own development and their community’s development
are threatened. In addition to being grounded in human
rights, the process may also seem unfair and unjust. It
has only been very recently that many countries around
Europe have begun to prioritize involving communities
in decision-making, and especially those who experience
pain and turmoil from the transition. The transition is not
only consciously perceived as a threat to people’s way of
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life, but also perhaps both consciously or unconsciously,
as a threat to their identity.
A human rights framework without environmental rights
could actually be utilized in this example to argue against
a sustainability transition. When the human rights framework treats environmental conditions as an externality,
the same way industry has treated environmental impact
as an externality for decades, it may be time to more fully
incorporate environmental rights into human rights.
What would it mean to have socially just
solutions to climate change?
Before we can think about what it would mean to have
socially just solutions to climate change, it’s important
to address an important problem underlying all of this:
abstraction. One of the reasons why a technocratic
approach has been so successful is because it’s easy
to understand on its surface. However, often implied
underneath this approach, whether in climate models
or reforestation proposals, is a concept of justice which
looks at the average of the human condition, and
allows for, and accepts, some amount of devastation,
catastrophe and loss. To put it bluntly, many models
accept a certain amount of human lives lost. Perhaps one
of the reasons this is palatable, is that this loss is often
not ‘close to home’ to those doing this research.
This abstraction has allowed us to skim over communities
that are getting exploited or threatened in this process,
or look past those that are losing their economic stability
and potentially their identity in the post-fossil-fuel
transition because we are still pursuing the greater good
(Moreno et al. 2015). We don’t talk about this assumption very often because it is confrontational, but to really
address the social justice challenges of climate change
it needs to be explicit: the way we have approached
climate science for decades erases and devalues millions
of people around the world. On many occasions it allows
for some of their stories, their histories, their livelihoods,
their well-being to be sacrificed… and often that ‘some’
is already vulnerable, exploited or threatened by other
injustices.
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This process of abstraction and aggregation allows us to
forget that in addition to being contributed to unevenly,
climate change will be experienced unevenly (Raworth
2012). Looking behind the models and projections at what
it means to develop a new hydropower plant needed to
meet a global emissions target, or a reforestation project,
or more generally at the acceptance of a 2 degree target
being a global temperature upper limit, we come face
to face with the injustice of climate change both in its
impacts and in how we deal with it. Under every scenario
some will struggle. The first step we have to take to
minimizing this struggle is to acknowledge it. We have to
be explicit about what climate change, and addressing it,
means for individual communities all around the world,
and we are only beginning to understand in full detail
what this entails.
The second preliminary challenge to addressing climate
change and social justice together is that, within the
context of human rights and much research and policy on
social justice challenges, the current dominant paradigm
is often only one side of the story: that of European philosophical traditions. In some sense this normative dominance is also a kind of meta-injustice, because it may
mean that even in the pursuit of justice, we place some
value systems and cultural norms above others. Which
value systems tend to dominate also aligns with which
economies and political systems tend to dominate and
have dominated throughout history. How can we begin to
understand social injustices caused by climate change
if we do not understand what is being considered an
injustice in a certain context? A human rights framework
does not allow for this kind of contextual understanding
of climate change and social justice. Ultimately, climate
change action guided by a locally relevant, context-sensitive and people-focused approach has the potential to
pursue social justice at the same time as securing human
well-being in the face of this existential crisis.
While it is an important step in this process to see
pursuing justice and tackling climate change as mutually
beneficial and not conflicting ideas, this is not enough.
We must also design policies and programmes in a way
that allows them to be mutually beneficial. Over and over
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again, I have heard the argument that “we shouldn’t
burden decarbonization policies with concerns for social
justice and inequality”. However, policies which consider
inequality as a burden for decarbonization will inevitably
catalyse a backlash to climate action: the French gilet
jaune protest movement is the perfect example of this.
We often make policies with an inadequate understanding
of their impact on different socio-economic groups and
the way they might contribute, positively or negatively,
to social justice: climate policy is no exception to this
trend… yet. There was absolutely an alternative to the tax
which caused the gilet jaune movement. An alternative
where not only the unequal impacts of this policy would
be considered, but additional steps could have been taken
to address inequalities at the same time. This is not yet
the norm, but we have to start working this way. And that
means embracing this intersection in policies, research,
programmes and implementation and governance
processes, rather than criticizing it.
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The climate crisis and new justice movements.
Supporting a new generation of climate activists

Issues related to the climate crisis are mobilizing people
around the world to demand action, justice, and a voice
in international responses to the crisis. Recently, youth
movements have – largely spontaneously – appeared,
organizing school strikes and marches, and demanding
political change to secure their future. This essay asserts
that almost all human rights are threatened by climate
change and therefore argues for a human rights agenda
to make sure climate solutions serve people. That is why
major global players in the field of climate and human
rights – such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace –
should work together and engage with the young activists.
“By providing this new generation of climate defenders
with practical knowledge, skills and support, we can
strengthen their worldwide impact.”

United States. Mass protests also took place in Australia,
with 150,000 participants spread over fifty locations.
Young people in Japan, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Hong
Kong and New Zealand also skipped lessons and joined
the protests. And it didn’t stop there. The Youth Strikes for
Climate movement is not centrally organized, so keeping
track of the fast growing number of regular strikes is difficult, but many are registering on FridaysForFuture.org.

Introduction

When I saw the photo of the Swedish 16-year-old Greta
Thunberg together with acclaimed conservationist
Jane Goodall at the World Economic Forum in Davos, it
brought tears to my eyes. Goodall is 84, and must be
very concerned about the world she is leaving behind.
Hopefully, Greta and all these other wonderful youngsters
represent a glimmer of hope for her, so that she thinks:
you see, a new era is coming.

“Think we should be at school? Today’s climate strike is
the biggest lesson of all.” This was the headline above
an article in The Guardian of 15 March, 2019 (Thunberg
et al. 2019). In it, European school students Greta in
Sweden, Anna and Holly in the UK, Luisa in Germany, Kyra,
Anuna and Adélaïde in Belgium, and Alexandria in the US
explained why they intended to continue the school strikes
they had started a few months earlier.
On that same day, the largest youth-led protest in history
took place: an estimated 1.6 million students in 300
cities worldwide walked out of school to march for climate
action. Three school students organized the major Strike
for Climate campaign in more than 200 locations in the
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For me, as a climate activist working at Greenpeace
Netherlands, the sudden and largely spontaneous rise of
young people worldwide who refuse to accept the dire lack
of effective action against global heating is without a
doubt the most encouraging development of recent years.
It inspires us all.

This is what Greta had to say to the global elite, gathered
in Davos: “Some people say that the climate crisis is
something that we all have created. But that is not true
– because if everyone is guilty, then no one is to blame.
And someone is to blame. Some people, some companies,
some decision-makers in particular have known exactly
what priceless values they have been sacrificing to make
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unimaginable amounts of money, and I think many of you
here today belong to that group of people” (Germanos
2019). This is not very different from the way we at
Greenpeace see it: we think that the historically unfair
distribution of rights, power and land is at the basis of
the climate crisis. Giving people back their rights and
land will reduce the power of major polluters.
Save the Amazon
As much as I enjoy seeing the courage and dedication
of all these young people and their refreshing ways of
campaigning, I also think of 26-year-old Andre Karipuna.
Like Greta and all the others, Andre is a young leader and
climate defender. He lives in the Brazilian Amazon state of
Rondônia, together with the 57 other remaining Karipuna.
In 1998, 152,000 hectares of unspoiled Amazon forest
were transferred to them. But the Brazilian government of
the current President Jair Bolsonaro wants to sacrifice the
Amazon for quick profits. Looters and logging companies
are already penetrating the nature reserve of the Karipuna.
Those who resist must fear for their lives. However, the
Karipuna are not giving up, and will continue to protect
their forest against invaders – for as long as they can.
Andre has taken up this battle. Unlike his parents, he and
other young Karipuna went to school and speak Portuguese
– but they still live in a part of their original territory.
The Amazon is the largest rainforest in the world. It plays
a crucial role in our climate. This unique nature area
actually stores around 100 billion tons of carbon. That is
thirteen times the annual worldwide emissions from fossil
fuels. Huge amounts of CO2 that would otherwise heat
our planet. We cannot afford to lose this rainforest, and
protection is therefore in the interest of us all.
Like Greta, André Karipuna tries to get as much international attention for his fight as possible. This was his
message to the UN in New York and the UN Human Rights
Committee in Geneva: “We want to fight to protect nature,
but we no longer know what to do against the current
serious threats. That’s why I call on the world: help
protect my people and stop the companies that steal our
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land and destroy the rainforest. Please” (Greenpeace NL
2019).
A few weeks after the first global school strike, in
mid-April, indigenous communities from all over Brazil
gathered in the capital, Brasilia, to protest against the
violation of their rights. For Greenpeace, this was the
moment to put the Karipuna in the spotlight and call
for international solidarity. Out of solidarity with these
protectors of the Amazon forest, we stood in front of
Brazilian embassies in eleven countries with the message:
Save the Amazon.
People are part of nature, and we cannot create a green
and peaceful world if it is not fair and just. We strive to
uphold the rights of those most impacted by the effects
of climate change and environmental degradation –
including indigenous peoples, women, children, people
living in poverty, workers and environmental defenders. As
a global organization, Greenpeace can offer the Karipuna
and other courageous peoples who protect the Amazon
the platform they deserve. Because in the end, their fight
against loggers is also our fight to end the climate crisis.
And it’s essentially not different from the fight of the
thousands of school strikers in other parts of the world.
Climate justice
Every person has the right to a safe and healthy environment – as well as the right to life, health, food, and an
adequate standard of living. The climate crisis poses a
grave threat to these rights. When talking about ‘climate
justice’, for the last two decades the debate has concentrated on the protection of poor people in countries most
affected by drought, flooding and the disappearance of
species. The young climate movement takes a broader
view. And they are quite right! They see effects of climate
change all around them. Affecting not only the poor, but
also the more prosperous. Megacities suffer from extreme
temperatures and a lack of clean air and water. Going to
school, for example, becomes difficult.
As the window of time available to us to make a difference narrows, we must find ways to ensure lasting global
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change. The answer is climate justice, a term which
unites a growing global movement based on the belief
that people have a right to a stable climate and deserve
protection from the dangers of hazardous climate change
(see Greenpeace 2019). Climate justice tackles the
climate crisis and the violation of human rights simultaneously.
In this broad view, climate change already has an impact
on a number of human rights: from the right to school,
work, access to clean water and the overall right to a
healthy and clean environment. In addition to being
protected under international human rights law, they are
mostly also recognized by national constitutions and laws,
but not guaranteed.
Using the law, a growing number of communities are
taking legal action to secure their human rights and hold
governments and fossil fuel companies accountable.
Climate justice matters because today’s generation is
the last generation that can take steps to avoid the worst
impacts of climate change. Governments and fossil
fuel companies are being made to listen and respond,
as people from young to old, and from city-dwellers to
farmers, are standing up and taking action.
People have rights. States have duties. Companies have
responsibilities. That’s why we need to raise our voices for
climate justice.
Some have already succeeded, as in Colombia, where
the Supreme Court of Justice ruled in favour of 25 young
people. They argued that the government violated human
rights by permitting deforestation in the Amazon, which
in turn contributes to the climate crisis (Dejusticia 2018).
This was a ground-breaking decision recognizing the
Amazon Basin as a subject of rights for the first time.
In the meantime, litigants from all cases are using all
tools available, both in the courts of law and in the courts
of public opinion. Change is palpable, and mobilization
and litigation go hand-in-hand. In recent years a climate
justice movement has boomed across the world. Climate
change lawsuits have been launched in at least 28
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countries around the world, according to a recent report
(although three quarters of the recorded cases were filed
in the United States) (Setzer & Byrnes 2019). The case of
the citizens’ platform Urgenda against the government of
the Netherlands is among the most prominent ones.1
In solidarity with the inspiring people and communities of
the climate justice movement, and in response to requests
to assist in creating people-powered climate cases,
Greenpeace Philippines assisted in the creation of the
People’s Guide. This is a resource on how to hold governments accountable for its climate inaction. Drawing
on the efforts of allies, this guide is a non-exhaustive
document that provides ideas for community members,
NGOs, and public interest lawyers on how to build cases
that address the climate crisis from a human rights
perspective. It also showcases and celebrates the many
phenomenal landmark cases (several of them successful)
that are being brought all over the world. Ultimately, the
People’s Guide shows that communities made vulnerable
by the climate crisis can create real environmental, political and social transformations using strategic litigation
to demand a better future (see Greenpeace 2018).
Campaigning and political action
Of course, climate litigation is not a perfect catch-all
solution. Court cases take time, which is a problem
because time is running out. Other forms of activism are
needed as urgently as going to court.
Putting the climate crisis at the top of the political
agenda is just the first step, argues Sara Blazevic, the
co-founder and managing director of the American,
youth-led Sunrise Movement (Harkness 2019). This
political action organization, founded in 2017, advocates
political action on climate change. The group organized a
sit-in in the office of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House
and the most powerful woman in American politics, which
brought Sunrise its first significant press coverage.

1

For more information on the case, see Urgenda (2019)
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Sunrise is building the power of youth to urge the country
to take the climate crisis seriously while reclaiming
democracy. “We need to transform our entire economy
to prevent [the climate crisis] and we also have an
incredible opportunity to create millions of good jobs and
actually increase equity and justice in this country in the
process,” Blazevic said. “Sunrise is protesting to bring
the crisis to the forefront of the minds of every American
and bring the urgency of those fires, floods and droughts
we hear the plaintiffs talk about from our television
screens to our politicians’ scripts.” (Martinez 2019)

“In the 1970s, in the early years of Greenpeace and
other new ecology movements, we thought that ecological change would be simple, that once people understood the threats, they would demand change (...) We
probably underestimated the challenge of overcoming
our deep, evolutionary bias for short-term thinking. We
may have underestimated the status quo – corporate
elite, bankers, politicians, and even common citizens
dependent upon the economic system – attachment to
the old patterns of consumption and growth.” (Weyler
2019)

Also consider what 29-year-old Representative Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez of New York – who has long aligned herself
with the Sunrise Movement – has achieved in just a
few months in office. The youngest woman ever elected
to the US Congress has moved the terms of the climate
debate significantly by pushing a broad set of climate and
equality goals.

The new social movements, Weyler argues, are blowing
up these social logjams. The timeline of catastrophe has
grown too short. People now feel the threat to their own
lives and appear willing to make sacrifices for long-term
survival.

Under the banner of a Green New Deal, she and her
fellow-activists aim to drastically reduce greenhouse
gas emissions in order to avoid the worst consequences
of climate change (Kurtzleben 2019). They also seek
to address problems such as economic inequality and
racial injustice by prioritizing historically disenfranchised
communities. With her approach, Ocasio-Cortez forced
the climate issue to the forefront of the 2020 Democratic
primary, pressuring candidates to lay out their own plans
to address the effects of rising temperatures. In a sign of
grassroots pressure, centrist candidates such as former
Vice-President Joe Biden and former Representative Beto
O’Rourke both promised not to accept donations from the
fossil fuel industry (as they had in the past). O’Rourke
singled out youth activists for helping push him on the
issue, saying: “Thank you for your advocacy and leadership” (Herndon 2019).
Game changer
In a recent column Rex Weyler, co-founder of Greenpeace
International in 1979, reflected on the roots of activism,
environmentalism, and Greenpeace’s past, present, and
future.
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Is the recent global mobilization by young people on
the issues of climate and human rights really the game
changer we hope it will be? Will it end up as significant
as the anti-war, civil rights and gay rights movements, all
social movements in which young people played decisive
roles? I think the answer is yes. If every movement needs
a constant reason to stand up for their (our) rights, then
this movement will stay and have a long-term effect.
How it will develop is, however, hard to predict. Can we
expect these movements to harden, to radicalize? Being
a peaceful movement is one of the main principles of
#FridaysForFuture. But it is difficult to predict what will
happen if their protests are ignored, results fail and
frustration grows.
Look for example at Extinction Rebellion (XR), which
was launched as recently as October 2018 by a group
of activists from the campaign group Rising Up! Citing
inspiration from grassroots movements such as Occupy,
Gandhi’s Satyagraha, the suffragettes, Martin Luther
King and others in the civil rights movement, Extinction
Rebellion wants to rally support worldwide around a
common sense of urgency to tackle climate breakdown.
A number of activists in the movement accept arrest and
imprisonment, similar to the mass arrest tactics of the
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British anti-war group Committee of 100 in 1961. On the
eve of international Rebellion Day, 15 April, XR activists
occupied part of the International Criminal Court in The
Hague as well as the Parliament’s Lower House in the
UK, forming human chains before being arrested. Similar
actions were organized in many cities worldwide.
Andrew Winston, who advises some of the world’s leading
companies on how they can navigate and profit from
environmental and social challenges, argues that we are
in the middle of a major realignment of values around
climate. “It’s now unacceptable to young activists and the
millions of people they inspire, to espouse climate denial
or play the ‘let’s go slow’ card. They don’t appreciate
being handed a disaster movie for them to live with for 70
to 80 years.” (Winston 2019)
No organization can avoid value shifts, says Winston, the
author of bestsellers like The Big Pivot and Green to Gold.
Executives of many companies do increasingly seem to
be moving toward action on climate change, he acknowledges, with public pronouncements to cut their own emissions or buy renewable energy becoming the norm in large
companies. But that isn’t enough. The new generation of
customers and employees demands far more. “It may just
take the youngest Americans to get companies to take
a real and public stand for aggressive global action on
climate change; after all, if they don’t, they risk getting
out of step with an entire generation of employees and
customers,” Winston says.
The young climate defenders are very clear about the
values they stand for. Of course, the majority of them
come from Western countries (although the number of
participants from non-Western countries is steadily
growing). But the movement shows one big wave of
solidarity with the most impacted communities worldwide,
and demonstrates a willingness to change, to commonly
transform our ways of living. The young activists feel a
common greater good, which is a future on a safe planet.
It really touched me when I saw all the self-made protest
signs on the streets: “There’s no planet B”; “Less meat,
less heat”; “Like the oceans, we rise”.
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How can ‘regular’ activists support this
new generation?
In a Manifesto published in The Guardian, a large group
of influential individuals including Naomi Klein, Noam
Chomsky, Kumi Naidoo (former Executive Director of
Greenpeace International, and the then Secretary-General
of Amnesty International), and Jennifer Morgan (International Director of Greenpeace), called for a general strike
on 20 September 2019 as the start of the Global Week
for Future, “at the request of the young people who have
been staging school strikes around the world” (Klein et al.
2019). On that day, they announced, “we’re walking out
of our workplaces and homes to spend the day demanding
action on the climate crisis, the greatest existential
threat that all of us face. (…) The clear idea behind this
Manifesto is that adults should not be comfortable letting
school children carry all the weight here. These kids
need our support.” It also shows that the protests of this
movement resonate with an environmental and a human
rights organization.
My expectation is that this new generation gives hope and
its members stay strongly connected with each other all
over the world. I hope that when they come to choose their
higher education or work, they will be given the opportunity to choose to be part of the solution, not part of the
problem. At the University of Amsterdam, it is possible to
get your degree in Future Planet Studies. The young leaders
in the Amazon study law so that they can better protect
themselves. Greenpeace, together with other civil society
organizations, has put together a curriculum based on
their needs, so that they study law, but also learn about
sustainability, and how to develop alternative solutions.
This is part of the role Greenpeace International sees for
itself. In our recent Three Year Strategic Plan, 20182020, it is stated as our goal that we will be sought out
by allies to help solve problems, build capacity, maintain
forward momentum, and share skills and latest practices. Our reputation in the ‘movement’ will be that of a
risk-taking, innovative, effective, collaborative, diverse
and inclusive organization. We will be the place where
changemakers want to be.
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As Greenpeace Netherlands, we support the young Dutch
climate activists where we can. After an unexpectedly
large number of more than 10,000 students travelled to
The Hague to demonstrate and participate in a national
school strike in February this year, Prime Minister Mark
Rutte invited the leaders to meet him and talk about their
demands (although he only agreed to do this outside of
school time!). At their request, we helped them to prepare
for that meeting.
The new climate activists are in the lead, there can be
no doubt about that. Sharing is caring, but let’s not take
over. Greenpeace facilitates the movement wherever
needed, gives time, shares experiences, and amplifies its
call to action. During the school strikes, we also handed
over our social media channels so that the climate
activists were able to let their voices be heard through
a channel with a pre-existing larger audience. A more
serious task is to publicly support (and therewith protect)
young people that speak truth to power, and who directly
blame the CEOs of big fossil fuel companies for ruining
their future. Criticasters are being unreasonably hard
on them, sometimes in a very personal way. Professional
activists have a role to stand up and provide fact-based
backup.

Conclusion
Amnesty International and Greenpeace are two major
global players in the fields of climate and human rights,
with national and local offices or departments. We can
– and, in my opinion, we must – bring our strengths
together, and give all we have. In each hotspot, we can
also work together with, and for the benefit of, grassroots
organizations and local activists. Providing them with
practical knowledge, skills and support and the courage
to scale up will be an excellent way of strengthening a
worldwide movement of young climate defenders.
And this is my message to them: Keep going strong!
We’re proud of you!

These new movements of climate defenders see human
rights and the environment as inherently connected; for
them, there’s no distinction. What does this mean for
more specialized organizations such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace? Is the dichotomy between human
rights and environmental organizations unavoidably
shrinking, and could they best merge in the near future?
I don’t think this is the way to go. The power of organizations such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International is
largely based on their substantive expertise. That is too
valuable to give up lightly. Progressive organizations and
individuals need each other, and we need to support each
other’s causes. We do this best by fulfilling our own role.
But we should listen carefully to new activists, learn from
their approach and, where possible, jump over our own
shadow.
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Human rights and intergenerational climate justice

Climate change poses an unprecedented threat to human
rights and many of those who will suffer most from its
effects have contributed least to its causes. This injustice
is epitomized in the case of future generations, whose
ability to enjoy fundamental human rights is at risk from
our past and current actions. How should human rights
law respond to this intergenerational climate injustice?
Introduction
The wide-ranging and serious human rights implications
of climate change are by now well-understood. We know
that increasing temperatures, rising sea levels and
severe weather are already impacting on human rights
relating to basic needs like food, water and housing,
as well as the right to health and even the right to life
(HRC 2019; UNHRC 2016; OHCHR 2009). The impacts of
climate change on communities, particularly indigenous
communities, have serious implications for rights to selfdetermination, to utilize natural resources and maintain
connections to land, and to practice and pass on culture
and language. There are also human rights concerns
attached to our responses to climate change, pointing
to the need to safeguard human rights as we implement
adaptation strategies and transition to renewable energy
and a green economy (Lewis 2015; Pedersen 2011).
The differential impact of these effects on the Global
South is rightly understood as a serious injustice. Those
nations and communities that face some of the most
serious consequences are frequently among the lowest
contributors of greenhouse gas emissions and in many
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cases lack adequate financial and other resources to
respond adequately to the problem. It was in recognition
of this fact that the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) adopted the concept
of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) into
the climate change regime. The concept was explained
in the Rio Declaration, adopted at the same meeting of
nation states: “The developed countries acknowledge the
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit
of sustainable development in view of the pressures their
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command” (UNCED
1992: principle 7), and it has become a cornerstone of
international efforts to combat climate change (UNFCCC
1992: art 3; Kyoto Protocol 1997: art 10; Paris Agreement
2015: art 2.2).
Despite this legal commitment, the reality of climate
injustice persists and has inspired strong advocacy from
some states, especially Small Island Developing States
in the Pacific, to encourage wealthy nations to deliver
on their emissions-reductions commitments. Recently,
the Pacific Islands Development Forum (2019: para
1) adopted the Nadi Declaration which, in its opening
paragraph, expresses “deep concern about the lack of
comprehension, ambition, or commitment shown by
developed nations of the world regarding the impending
grave consequences that the current and ongoing
Climate Crisis poses for vulnerable Pacific Small Island
Developing States (PSIDS), which contribute negligible
amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to this humancaused global problem.”

79

Human rights and intergenerational climate justice

Until recently, the focus of climate justice campaigns has
been more on this dimension of intra-generational justice
– the need to seek an equitable distribution of burdens
among developed and developing nations and, to a lesser
extent, among communities within nations. Attention
has started to turn, however, towards the challenges of
intergenerational justice, as we gain a better appreciation
of the realities of the climate crisis.

rapid action to significantly reduce emissions, these
impacts may be severe, even catastrophic. Furthermore,
future generations may find themselves locked into
adaptation or mitigation strategies that we choose to
implement, for example geoengineering projects or other
technologies, but they are obviously unable to participate in the debate around those choices or to grant their
consent to any negative side effects.

Understanding intergenerational climate
justice

Given that future generations have not contributed to
greenhouse gas emissions and have no say in how we
choose to combat global warming, limiting their ability
to enjoy their human rights and forcing them to deal with
the consequences of our actions represents intergenerational injustice. To some degree, any action which might
have long-term environmental, economic or social consequences presents a risk of intergenerational injustice. The
magnitude, diversity and complexity of climate change
makes it the paramount challenge of our time, however.
It demands urgent action to address its intergenerational
impacts, while at the same time it exposes the limitations
of existing human rights frameworks in protecting future
generations’ rights.

In simple terms, intergenerational justice can be defined
as an equitable distribution of benefits and burdens
across generations. It is closely related to the concept of
intergenerational equity, famously articulated by Edith
Brown Weiss (1989; 2008), who argued that present
generations must leave the planet in no worse condition
than when they received it, to ensure that future generations have equitable options, quality and access when it
comes to natural and cultural resources.
The intergenerational injustice of climate change flows
from the fact that the human rights impacts of climate
change will continue into the future, affecting generations
as yet unborn, and forcing them to deal with the consequences of our current and past emissions. To minimize
the most serious future effects of climate change, states
need to keep global warming to 1.5°C or below, which is
the ambition articulated in the 2015 Paris Agreement (art
2.1(a); IPCC 2018b). On current trajectories, however, we
are expected to overshoot the internationally agreed limit
of keeping warming to ‘well-below’ 2°C (Paris Agreement
2015: art 2.1a), let alone 1.5°C.
Even if we ceased all greenhouse gas emissions now,
future generations would still experience some degree of
climate change due to committed warming – that is, the
inevitable warming of the planet caused by the lifespan
of the CO2 that has already been emitted and the thermal
inertia of the oceans (IPCC 2018b: sec A2; Mauritsen &
Pincus 2017). So future generations are already locked
into a degree of global warming and the human rights
impacts that come along with it, and unless states take
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Intergenerational justice in the climate
regime
The international community has acknowledged the
problem of intergenerational injustice in its legal
responses to climate change, but only in a limited and
arguably ineffectual fashion. The Paris Agreement (2015)
refers to intergenerational equity in one of its preambular
paragraphs:
“Acknowledging that climate change is a common
concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking
action to address climate change, respect, promote and
consider their respective obligations on human rights,
the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples,
local communities, migrants, children, persons with
disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and
the right to development, as well as gender equality,
empowerment of women and intergenerational equity”
(Preambular paragraph 11).
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The next paragraph refers to climate justice more directly,
but only to the extent that it notes “the importance for
some of the concept of ‘climate justice’” (Paris Agreement
2015: preambular paragraph 12). The Preamble of the
Agreement is not considered to be legally binding, and
given that intergenerational equity is only mentioned
as one among many principles which states ought to
consider, these references are hardly likely to demand
strong action from states to safeguard the rights of future
generations.
Interestingly, earlier drafts of the Paris text had included
more explicit references. A draft of article 2, which sets
out the purposes of the Agreement, had initially included
options for language explaining that states should
address climate change “for the benefit of present and
future generations” (Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) 2015a: sec C, art
2.2). At a later negotiation, this text was removed and
an alternative proposed that ‘intergenerational equity’
be included as one of the principles which states would
be required to consider in implementing their obligations
(ADP 2015b).
The reference to intergenerational equity in the operative
part of the Agreement was ultimately removed from the
final text, however. What remained (in addition to the
preambular reference noted above) was a reworded version of article 2.2, which reads: “This agreement will be
implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”
This arguably shifted the focus away from intergenerational equity and more towards intra-generational equity
and the need to strike a fair balance between members of
current generations.
A similar process of watering down occurred with the
coverage of human rights in the Paris Agreement. A
number of states, including the United States, Norway
and Australia, reportedly raised concerns that including
explicit references to human rights in the operative text
would dilute the purpose of the Agreement or create
potential for legal liability (Rajamani 2018: 244-245;
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Rowling 2015). Other reports indicated that developed
states took a hard line against human rights in retaliation
to developing states’ strong demands for a meaningful
loss and damage mechanism (Vidal & Vaughan 2015).
There had been strong advocacy during the negotiating
process for the Agreement to meaningfully recognize
the human rights consequences of climate change but,
despite more explicit references in some of the early
drafts, all that remained in the final text was the wording
of preambular paragraph 11 noted above: “Parties
should ... respect, promote and consider their respective
obligations on human rights.” This presents the question,
considered in the next section, of whether (and to what
extent) states already owe obligations towards future
generations under human rights law which might be
captured by the Paris approach.
Can the human rights framework promote
intergenerational justice?
Given the reality that future generations will be affected
by climate change in ways that will limit their human
rights, do human rights laws or principles offer any
potential for correcting this intergenerational injustice?
From a theoretical perspective, there is debate within the
fields of moral and political philosophy about whether it
is appropriate to speak of future generations possessing
rights. Some scholars have argued that human rights can
only be possessed by actual persons, and not by persons
who do not yet exist (e.g. Macklin 1981: 152). This reflects
what is sometimes called the ‘right-bearer contemporaneity requirement’ (Gosseries 2008: 456). Derek Parfit
(1984: 351ff.) famously argued that we cannot owe obligations towards future generations because our actions
today not only determine the conditions in which future
generations will live, but also the identities of future
persons: were we to act differently, those future generations would not come into existence. This ‘non-identity
problem’ suggests that current generations do not
possess duties in relation to future generations, and
future generations cannot therefore be said to possess
rights.
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However, these approaches fail to capture the intuitive
sense that we should care about the consequences
of our actions, particularly when we know that those
consequences will be negative, and that we have a moral
obligation to act in the interests of future generations.
A preferable approach is based on ‘interest’ theories of
human rights, which posit that human rights represent
fundamental interests which are important enough to
create obligations for others (e.g. Raz 1986; Feinberg
1971, 1981; Caney 2006). Following this approach,
we can easily appreciate that future generations have
interests, and so it is rational to say that they possess
(or at least will possess) human rights. Importantly, such
an approach confirms that we owe corresponding duties
with respect to future generations’ rights. It makes no
difference that we cannot know the identities of these
future people, because the rights and duties flow from
their interest-ownership and “that is all that is necessary
to certify the coherence of present talk about their rights”
(Feinberg 1971: 147).
So it’s theoretically possible to conceive of current duties
which correspond to future generations’ human rights,
but are those rights and duties presently enshrined in
human rights law and principles? Unfortunately, future
generations are not identified specifically as beneficiaries
of human rights under international law or under most
domestic applications of that law. Most conventional
interpretations of the major human rights treaties
suggest that states only owe obligations to their citizens
and to persons under their jurisdiction (e.g. ICCPR 1966:
art 2; ECHR 1950: art 1), which would seem to exclude
persons not yet born. There are some arguments in favour
of extending to states an obligation to cooperate internationally for the fulfilment of human rights, especially
economic, social and cultural rights (CESCR 2017), but
this too would normally be limited to members of current
generations.
Another issue is how states’ substantive obligations
should be defined in relation to future generations.
Under international human rights law, states typically
owe duties to respect, protect and fulfil human rights
(commonly known as the tripartite duties). The duty to
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respect requires that states refrain from taking actions
which impinge upon the enjoyment of human rights. This
duty could be interpreted through the lens of intergenerational equity to require that, at a minimum, states
do not act to undermine the ability of future generations
(at least their own future citizens) to enjoy their rights.
With respect to climate change, the duty to respect would
demand that action be taken to transition to zero net
emissions as quickly as possible, while at the same time
minimizing the negative human rights consequences of
mitigation and adaptation policies (Lewis 2018). The
duty to protect would impose similar obligations with
respect to regulating the actions of private actors, like
corporations. The duty to fulfil human rights is somewhat
more problematic when applied to future generations, as
it’s not entirely clear what future generations will require
in order to enjoy their human rights, or how far into
the future states are expected to provide for. Arguably,
however, it obliges states to establish and maintain
general conditions which lay the best foundation for
the enjoyment of human rights in the future, including
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and addressing the
causes of vulnerability.
A major challenge in better protecting the rights of future
generations in the context of climate change is the question of how to balance the rights of future and present
generations. Recognizing the rights of future generations
does nothing to supplant states’ obligations to present
generations, and the need to fulfil human rights in the
short term might justify some limitation of rights for
future people. Certainly, it might be difficult to prove that
a state is in violation of its human rights obligations
towards future generations where it acts in the name of
fulfilling more urgent needs.
However, we shouldn’t assume that the rights of present
and future generations necessarily conflict. Philip Alston,
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty
and Human Rights, has recently articulated the links
between poverty and climate change, noting that the
world’s poorest people are the most vulnerable to the
human rights impacts of climate change, and that on
current trajectories climate change threatens to force
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many millions more people into poverty (UNHRC 2019).
Further, as Edith Brown Weiss has explained, it’s not
reasonable to expect that people will care about future
generations’ interests if their own basic needs are not
being met (Brown Weiss 2008: 618). Addressing poverty
and development today and ensuring a just transition to
a green economy are therefore imperative in protecting
human rights in the future.
One of the other major drawbacks of the current human
rights framework is its claims-based approach to enforcement. Climate change does not fit the typical model for a
human rights violation, which typically requires proof that
a government’s action or inaction has caused a particular
human rights interference for a specific right-bearer
(OHCHR 2009; Bodansky 2014; Pedersen 2010; Knox
2009b). The cumulative, transnational and long-term
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions create challenges
for proving that a particular state’s conduct has caused
a given interference with human rights. This is a problem
where human rights effects are already materializing;
it is even more challenging when the consequences are
predicted to manifest at some time in the future.
The way forward
For these reasons, the existing human rights architecture
will struggle on its own to address the intergenerational
injustice of climate change. We need both a rethinking of
our obligations towards future generations and creative
ways of enforcing those obligations. As noted above, a
key area requiring attention is expanding the scope of
states’ duties beyond conventional notions of territory
and jurisdiction. One option is to broaden our understanding of what it means to be under the jurisdiction of
a state, so that where the exercise of a state’s jurisdiction
produces negative human rights effects, human rights
duties are activated. This approach has been advocated
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in a recent
Advisory Opinion in relation to extra-territorial obligations
(2017), and could potentially be applied to extend states’
obligations both geographically and temporally, so that
they owe obligations to future generations both within
and beyond their territories. A challenge to jurists in this
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respect would be defining the extent of future-focused
obligations and the point at which future generations’
interests are considered too remote to trigger current
responsibility. However, it may be possible to develop
standards of foreseeability or causal contribution that
would help define the obligations with more precision.
Another option is to expand rules of legal standing to
enable claims to be brought on behalf of future persons.
This could be done through the creation of a dedicated
‘guardian’ or other institution which can represent future
generations in legal actions and advocate for their
interests (González-Ricoy & Gosseries 2016). An ambitious proposal along these lines was presented at the Rio
+20 conference in 2012 calling for the creation of a High
Commissioner for Future Generations within the United
Nations framework (Ward 2012). While the proposal
ultimately did not proceed, work continues at national and
regional levels to create institutions which would work for
the benefit of future generations.
Human rights principles have potential to contribute
to such proposals, even if they are situated outside the
conventional human rights framework. For instance,
human rights provide a language for us to articulate the
nature of harms facing future generations, encompassing
a broad range of impacts from fundamental needs
through to economic, social and cultural rights. Thinking
of these impacts in terms of human rights also helps to
put them on a more even playing field with more immediate concerns, potentially facilitating a better balancing
of benefits and burdens across generations. In this
way human rights could work as a principled basis for
resolving conflicts between current and future interests.
The normative and moral force of human rights might also
help to combat the causes and effects of ‘short-termism’
– our tendency to prioritize more immediate outcomes over
longer-term interests (Mackenzie 2016) – by encouraging
greater consideration of future generations.
Adopting these changes may be challenging, particularly
within international human rights law, where modifying
existing treaties or creating new ones is dependent on the
political will of states. But even without these reforms, we

83

Human rights and intergenerational climate justice

are starting to see human rights language and principles being employed in litigation which addresses the
intergenerational impacts of climate change. For example,
in the United States a group of young people are pursuing
legal action against the federal government alleging that
its failure to tackle climate change represents a violation
of their constitutional rights (Juliana v United States
2016). Outside the legal system, young people around the
world are harnessing the power of human rights language
to demand stronger action from governments and highlight the seriousness of intergenerational climate injustice (e.g. ‘Fridays for Future’). Just recently, a group of
young people, including members of the Fridays for Future
movement, have launched a claim under the Convention on the Rights of the Child alleging that five states
have violated their human rights by failing to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with their Paris
obligations (Sacchi & Others v Argentina, Brazil, France,
Germany & Turkey 2019). The case will test the ability of
existing human rights infrastructure to deal with climate
change-related human rights issues and will be watched
closely by those interested in advancing intergenerational
climate justice.
In taking this creative and courageous action, younger
generations are demanding that we recognize that climate
change will have drastic effects within their lifetimes. We
cannot only think of climate change as a future problem,
however. Around the world we are already seeing grave
human rights impacts caused by climate change, as
severe storms, droughts, bushfires and floods destroy
homes, livelihoods and lives. We must work to address
intergenerational climate injustice in parallel with urgent
action on current threats, recognizing that the best way
to protect the rights of future generations is to take
strong action now. Continuing on the same path risks
locking future generations into a life of limited rights and
opportunities, when it is within our power to leave them a
world where the full range of human rights can be enjoyed
by everyone.
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The enjoyment of human rights will be both directly and indirectly affected by climate change. Common examples are sea
level rise, temperature increases, and extreme weather events affecting the rights to health, food, water and life amongst
others. These effects will not be felt equally: the more vulnerable segments of the global population will be hit hardest.
As the worlds of climate crisis activism and human rights protection become increasingly intertwined, their value for and
impact upon one another deserve closer inspection. The language, policies and (campaigning) strategies around climate
change and human rights are still in development, leading to new insights, (re)definitions, and new challenges for human
rights and environmental activists. The essays in this volume discuss the opportunities, threats and difficulties at the nexus
of human rights and climate change and examine the concept of climate justice as well as recent human rights approaches
to climate change issues in specific policy areas, such as migration, subnational authorities and strategic litigation.
With contributions from Ashfaq Khalfan & Chiara Liguori, Eric Posner, Jane McAdam & Sanjula Weerasinghe, Barbara Oomen,
Sara Seck, Annalisa Savaresi, Stephen Humphreys, Elizabeth Dirth, Anna Schoemakers and Bridget Lewis.

